Preventing Election-related Violence

Topic IndexElectoral campaigning

During the election campaign phase, political parties mobilize significant human and financial resources to communicate messages to citizens to win their support. The list of potential risks during the campaign period is wide-ranging and may include psychological and physical violence directed against candidates, party activists and supporters, and violence directed against women and other marginalized or vulnerable groups. In particular, the electoral campaign may be marked by aggressive and inflammatory rhetoric. The use of the media and political rallying are two main ways of campaigning. In conflict-prone societies, both methods are often used to convey messages that exacerbate conflicts. During the electoral campaign period, an EMB should introduce mechanisms to constrain hate speech and violent actions by political parties and their supporters. This may include investigating and sanctioning perpetrators. Security sector agencies should maintain a safe environment for political party and independent candidates, activists and citizens to organize and participate in the campaign activities. Other non-state and state actors should promote peaceful and democratic electoral campaigning as well as monitoring, recording and reporting about incidents.

Table 5. Electoral campaigning

A. Improved electoral management and justice

B. Improved electoral security

C. Improved infrastructure for peace

Collaborate with other agencies to ensure comprehensive monitoring of media (including social media) campaigning at the national and sub-national level.
Establish mechanisms for the monitoring of political party campaign rallies in order to compile data on the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech.
Ensure that those responsible for violations of the campaigning rules and the instigation or perpetration of electoral violence are sanctioned.
Maintain close collaboration and information exchange with the security sector agencies throughout the campaign period at the national and sub-national level.

Maintain close cooperation and coordination with EMBs through a joint election operations centre.
Provide physical security to prominent electoral actors which may face security threats during the campaign period.
Provide physical security at electoral campaigning events.
Enhance security arrangements to protect marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women and minorities, during the campaigning phase.
Cooperate with electoral actors and the broader public to increase their security awareness and promote their constructive engagement in preventing and mitigating electoral violence.

Create forums to facilitate discussion and consensus relating to the implementation of the political party campaigning code of conduct and enforcement mechanisms.
Promote peace activism at the national and sub-national levels to deflate tensions and conflicts arising from inflammatory campaigning.
Establish structures and mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on provocative political party campaigning in the media and political party rallies.
Share reports on violations of campaigning rules, in particular the use of inflammatory language and hate speech, with the EMBs, prosecutor’s office, security sector agencies and media.

A. Improved electoral management and justice

Electoral management strategies to prevent election-related violence during the campaigning period will draw on legal provisions that define an EMB’s mandate in this respect. An EMB may have a specific mandate to investigate and sanction those who violate election campaign rules or perpetrate electoral violence during this period. Where an EMB does not have a specific mandate to investigate and sanction perpetrators, it should support the responsible agencies in implementing their mandate. In any case, an EMB will collaborate with other actors to put in place mechanisms that will ensure that incidents are observed and documented, and that perpetrators are held accountable.

Collaborate with other agencies to ensure comprehensive monitoring of media campaigning at the national and sub-national level

Political actors use media extensively during the campaigning period. They strive to occupy media space through paid advertisements, party press releases, and giving interviews to the media. In addition, political parties increasingly use the Internet and social media to reach citizens and promote their political agenda. From the media side, journalists can be proactive in reporting on campaign events and in facilitating political debates. In conflict-prone societies, especially where political divisions follow ethnic and religious lines, political campaigning may be negative. Hate speech and intimidation are often directed against political opponents and their supporters. The electoral legislation usually includes provisions that prohibit such behaviour and define sanctions against perpetrators. It is therefore important to ensure systematic monitoring of campaigning through the media, both traditional and social, and the sanctioning of those who resort to unlawful campaigning. Media monitoring may be a complex task that exceeds the capacity of an EMB or other existing institutions. Where this is the case, an EMB should coordinate with different agencies to ensure full coverage of the media campaigning including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private businesses that specialize in media monitoring. This will provide the EMB or the agencies with the mandate to sanction, with the evidence for holding perpetrators accountable.

The establishment of an EMB Media Monitoring Unit in Guyana addresses violence related to irresponsible media reporting. In response to the election-related violence that occurred in Guyana’s 1992, 1997 and 2001 elections—instigated in part by the ‘conduct of irresponsible media which incited extremist elements to ethically motivated violence’—the Guyana Election Commission (GECOM) established an Independent Media Monitoring Unit (MMU). The unit was established following the signing of the self-regulatory Media Code of Conduct by the country’s main media houses. During the campaign phase, 17 people were recruited to the MMU to ‘analyze the political content of broadcast news and current affairs programs and of the main daily newspapers’. After initial support and training by the Commonwealth Secretariat, local professionals were in charge of the process. On a weekly basis, the MMU published ‘assessments of the balance and discouragement of violence achieved by each media house’. In contrast to previous elections, the 2006 general election in Guyana witnessed no violent incidents because of irresponsible media reporting.^{^[1]}

Establish mechanisms for the monitoring of political party campaign rallies in order to compile data on the use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech

Political party rallies involve mass gatherings of the party leadership and supporters. They therefore represent high-risk events. On the one hand, violence can be directed against the participants at rallies. On the other hand, participants can resort to violence against other groups as a result of a mob mentality and the excitement that is generated during the actual event. An EMB should, independently or in collaboration with other state and non-state actors, establish mechanisms for monitoring political party rallies. This may entail the deployment of campaign monitors to attend political party rallies and report on incidents. Systematic monitoring may discourage inflammatory rhetoric. Audio and video recording of electoral events may further discourage negative campaigning, given that these records may be used as an evidence against the perpetrators.

The Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina prepares to sanction politicians for hate speech. Following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord, which ended the violent conflict that had raged from 1992 to 1995, ethnicity has played a major role in political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an effort to win voters along ethnic lines, ethnic political parties have been inclined to use nationalistic rhetoric which is directed against other ethnic groups or minorities. Ahead of the 2008 local elections, the Central Election Commission (CEC) warned all political parties and candidates not to incite religious or ethnic hatred during the campaign period. Penalties for hate speech included USD 7,500 fines, the removal of candidates from the party list and the withdrawal of political certification by the CEC.^{^[2]} This prompted the improved monitoring of political party campaigning and reporting of hate-speech incidents to the CEC.

Ensure that those responsible for violations of the campaigning rules and the instigation or perpetration of electoral violence are sanctioned

Perpetrators of actions that may trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence, including hate speech and inflammatory rhetoric, should not feel that they have impunity from prosecution. If an EMB is mandated to sanction perpetrators, it needs to invest in efforts to deter unlawful campaigning and, if deterrence fails, to take resolute action to investigate and sanction perpetrators. When applying sanctions against political stakeholders, an EMB or other electoral justice institution must maintain the highest professional standards in order to avoid politicized decisions that can further increase tensions. In this respect, an EMB should work with other agencies, including the prosecutor’s office and relevant regulatory agencies.

The Election Commission of India finds a candidate guilty of violating the Code of Conduct during the 2009 general election campaign. This was also the case during the 2009 general elections, which saw incidents of both physical and psychological election-related violence.^{^[3]} In early 2009, the Election Commission of India (ECI) found one high-profile candidate guilty of violating the code of conduct during the campaign period. The candidate allegedly used inflammatory rhetoric, causing ‘feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes on the ground of religion’ during two separate election rallies.^{^[4]} The evidence was brought to the notice of the ECI by the District Election Officer.^{^[5]} The ECI ordered all video footage of the candidate’s campaign to be submitted as evidence. Based on this evidence, the ECI advised the political party concerned to withdraw its support for the candidate, stating that ‘any sponsorship of his candidature by the party would be perceived as endorsing his unpardonable acts of inciting violence and creating feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes of citizens in India’.^{^[6]} The ECI also initiated a criminal case against the candidate under Indian law by cooperating with the District Magistrate. The candidate was later arrested and taken into judicial custody awaiting trial.^{^[7]}

Maintain close collaboration and information exchange with the security sector agencies throughout the campaign period at the national and sub-national level

During the campaign period an EMB will collect wide-ranging information relating to political party campaigning, including tension-raising behaviour and incidents. This information will be useful to SSAs when planning and implementing security measures to protect electoral actors and events during the campaign period and after. It is important that election officials collaborate closely with the security personnel at the national and sub-national level to ensure that the information is shared in timely fashion. Election officials will benefit from security updates and specific information provided by the security sector agencies. This will help officials from both agencies to obtain a more holistic analysis and maximize the effectiveness of their actions.

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission of Kenya shares information and risk alerts with the police during the 2013 general election campaign. Election-related violence was widespread throughout the 2007 general election in Kenya.^{^[8]}Although the main outbreak of election-related violence took place after the actual 2007 elections, incidents of violence were also recorded before election day, including during the campaign phase.^{^[9]} In the course of the preparations for the 2013 general elections, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) decided to enhance its capacity to understand and analyse electoral risks, and to take action to prevent and mitigate election-related violence throughout the electoral cycle. The IEBC partnered with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in using the Electoral Risk Management Tool. The use of the tool allowed the IEBC to collect electoral risk data and generate electoral risk alerts. These were used by IEBC officials to make informed and conflict-sensitive electoral decisions. Also, risk data and alerts were shared with external agencies, including the police^{^[10]} and other electoral stakeholders, such as the Uwiano Platform for Peace.^{^[11]}

B. Improved electoral security

During the electoral campaign phase, security sector agencies will be responsible for providing and maintaining a safe environment for electoral officials, political party candidates, party activists, journalists, event monitors and citizens. This may include providing protection to individuals, events, and vulnerable groups and their settlements. In particular, SSAs should focus on the security of electoral campaigning events that will gather large numbers of participants, such as political party rallies. In this respect, SSAs will benefit from close cooperation with an EMB and other state and non-state actors.

Maintain close cooperation and coordination with an EMB through a joint election operations centre

Following the process of registration of political parties and candidates, SSAs need to work closely with an EMB to obtain information on registered political subjects and candidates. Furthermore, EMBs will be able to provide information and updates relating to the electoral campaign processes. This information, in particular incidents of hate speech and inflammatory language, will be relevant in the deployment of security personnel during the electoral campaigning. The establishment of a Joint Electoral Operations Centre (JEOC) that provides a platform for close-to-real-time information exchange between different security sector agencies and an EMB may improve situation awareness and improve coordination of actions.

Joint security coordinating centres are established ahead of the 2010 elections in the Philippines’ Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Political and election-related violence in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is prevalent and deeply rooted.^{^[12]} In late 2009, politicians and political party supporters, including large numbers of women, travelling to Commission on Elections (Comelec) offices were intercepted and abducted or killed by armed gangs.^{^[13]} As a result, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), in close cooperation with Comelec, enhanced security arrangements in the run-up to the 2010 elections. Comelec deputized law enforcement agencies to perform security duties relating to the conduct of the elections.^{^[14]} Regional police offices strengthened ‘their respective Joint Security Coordinating Centers (JSCC) with the AFP field commander to immediately address any untoward incidents during the campaign period’. Throughout Mindanao, the PNP and the AFP ‘mobilized 9,711 personnel, many of which were deployed to man the 828 mobile checkpoints established to enforce a total region-wide ban on firearms. Moreover, the PNP was also tasked with preventing private security companies from acting as armies for political stakeholders ahead of the elections, as well monitoring the actions of local volunteer security personnel. Round-the-clock close coordination with the officials of Comelec was also implemented.^{^[15]} According to the PNP and AFP, the elections were generally peaceful and orderly, and ‘minor incidents were quickly addressed by the Joint Security Coordinating Centers (JSCC) positioned at various strategic places in the three regions’.^{^[16]}

Provide physical security to prominent electoral actors which may face security threats during the campaign period

Depending on the country context and the security risks associated with running for an elective seat, security sector agencies may need to provide physical protection to political leaders or high-profile political candidates, their offices or households. In societies where women are marginalized, their activism during the campaigning period may expose them to psychological or physical violence. Furthermore, similar security arrangements may need to be put in place for journalists, public opinion leaders and other individuals whose engagement or activism during the electoral campaign increases the likelihood of their being exposed to violence.

Security sector agencies protect presidential candidates during the 2012 presidential elections in Taiwan. Following assassination attempts on high-level politicians during the election periods of 2004 and 2010, security arrangements were stepped up ahead of the 2012 presidential elections. The National Security Bureau (NSB) provided security teams to all presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The NSB special protective task force provided candidates with a protective arrangement following the registration processes. The special task force provided security plans as well as security protocols which, for example, would require the campaign teams to provide lists of their staff and guests at events to the NSB during the campaigning. In total 135 members of the NSB security task force were included in three teams assigned to provide security for each of the three presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Each team was also supported by specially trained police officers and bullet-proof vehicles throughout the campaign period.^{^[17]}

Provide physical security at electoral campaigning events

Political campaign events and activities include political party rallies, town-hall meetings, media appearances, posting of campaign materials and so on. These events will bring political leaders, candidates, activists, supporters, citizens and journalists to public locations that may not have appropriate security arrangements in place. To provide security, SSAs need to have prior information on planned events. The responsibility for providing timely information about campaign events usually lies with the respective political subjects. In some contexts, the police may have a mandate to authorize or decline requests for the organization of campaign-related events due to security concerns. This may be an effective strategy to avoid conflicts arising from situations where political rallies are scheduled at the same time or at the same location by different political subjects. Political party rallies are mass gatherings and participants may be vulnerable to attacks or acts of terrorism. Securing these events may therefore require the deployment of substantive intelligence and security personnel. If participants are travelling from different locations to attend rallies, SSAs should secure the main routes of travel.

Police provide physical security during high-risk political party rallies in India. Election-related violence is a common issue in India,^{^[18]} especially in areas where separatist movements wish to exploit the ‘visibility of the electoral campaigns to conduct paramilitary and criminal strikes against the government and its symbols’.^{^[19]}Ahead of India’s 2009 general election the police intensified their security arrangements during campaigning in the ‘Maoist belt’ and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Enhanced security arrangements were necessary as Maoists had increased their attacks in various states ahead of the polling process. The police therefore conducted random searches around the campaigning sites and increased their presence throughout the rallies themselves.^{^[20]} Other security measures included helicopter transport to take candidates to and from the election rally sites and police roadblocks in the vicinity of election rally sites throughout the campaign period. Moreover, increased security was provided by the Border Security Force along the border with Pakistan.^{^[21]} Enhanced security measures were put into place since the ‘model code of conduct for the guidance of political parties and candidates’, which was endorsed by all political parties in 2007, stipulates that all political parties or candidates must inform the local police of the venue and time for all political party rallies and routes to be used during a procession ‘well in time in order for the police to make necessary arrangements for controlling traffic and maintaining the peace’.^{^[22]}

Enhance security arrangements to protect marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women and minorities, during the campaigning phase

In an effort to galvanize their electoral base during the electoral campaign period, political actors may resort to threats and intimidation and use inflammatory rhetoric directed against other ethnic, religious or social groups. Hate speech and other inflammatory rhetoric may lead to physical violence. Intimidation and coercion are also recognized as a category of election-related violence that deserves sanctioning. When violence occurs, marginalized groups such as women suffer greatly. Minorities and other vulnerable groups can be targeted as well. If the electoral campaign period is marred by inflammatory rhetoric, SSAs should put in place standing capacities for the protection of marginalized and vulnerable communities. This may be particularly important in situations where political party rallies or other mass gatherings may turn hostile to minority communities based near the location of a rally.

Women candidates are given security protection during the Kenyan general elections in 2013. Approximately 20 female political party candidates were assaulted during the run-up to the 2007 general election in Kenya.^{^[23]} Furthermore, women in general were exposed to high levels of violence during the post-election period, lasting until 2008, which resulted in over 1,300 deaths and approximately 3,000 cases of rape.^{^[24]}Ahead of the 2013 general elections, security for female candidates was increased by the setting up of a specially trained security unit. The unit, consisting of officers from the National Youth Service, the Kenya Forest Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service, were first gazetted by the Inspector General of the Police and then deployed across the country to deal with election-related matters, including providing female candidates with security during the campaigns and guarding women candidates on election day.

Cooperate with electoral actors and the broader public to increase their security awareness and promote their constructive engagement in preventing and mitigating electoral violence

The efficiency of the security sector agencies (SSAs) in maintaining safety during the election campaign phase may depend on their ability to forge constructive relationships with electoral actors and the broader public. SSAs should initiate discussions that will increase the security awareness of political stakeholders and the public, in particular vulnerable groups. The benefits can be twofold. On the one hand, such discussions will allow SSAs to communicate how individuals and groups can work with the police to increase public security. On the other hand, SSAs will get a better understanding of security concerns among different electoral actors and social groups. Electoral actors and the broader public will benefit from an enhanced understanding of the security risks and of how their actions and behaviour may exaggerate security threats or contribute to peaceful outcomes of tense situations.

The police cooperate with electoral actors to broaden general security awareness ahead of the 2012 general elections in Ghana. In 2012, Ghana experienced some election-related violence in certain parts of the country during the voter registration phase, including assaults, shootings and arson.^{^[25]} As a result, the Ghana Police Service (GPS) cooperated with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and several other stakeholders to organize a public ‘peacemakers rally’. The event, held at the National Theatre in Accra, was attended by several hundred people. The GPS together with the Ghana Journalists Association made a public declaration of their commitment to peace ahead of the 2012 elections. The GPS address also aimed to broaden the public’s security awareness ahead of the campaign period. On this occasion, a senior police official assured Ghanaians that the police and other security agencies were ready to provide security to ensure peaceful elections. The public was informed about security arrangements put in place to protect political party rallies, electoral materials, facilities and voters, as well as to preserve the integrity of the elections. It also underlined that preserving peace is a shared responsibility and politicians were admonished to promote peace during the electoral campaign, avoid the use of hate speech or insults and to be aware that their utterances could spark tension or violence.^{^[26]}Police announced plans to establish the National Election Security Taskforce and train 16,000 personnel from all the security agencies to provide security during the elections. Ghanaians were encouraged to contribute to peaceful political processes and to avoid comments, statements and insults that would incite others. They were also advised to abstain from violence even in the face of provocation, and to use legal channels instead of taking the law into their hands. Finally, voters were advised not to give their voter IDs to others, not to destroy ballot papers or supply ballot papers to any person or engage in other malpractices.^{^[27]}

C. Improved infrastructure for peace

Non-state and state actors involved in peace activism can play an important role during the campaigning phase. Provocative campaigning may exacerbate tensions between different social groups and raise anxieties particularly among vulnerable groups. Organizations that constitute a countrywide infrastructure for peace may engage in activism which will constrain provocative campaigning and deflate interparty or inter-communal tensions during the campaign period.

Create forums to facilitate discussion and consensus relating to the implementation of the political party campaigning code of conduct and enforcement mechanisms

The code of conduct for political party campaigning can be a key tool to promote peace during the campaigning phase. These provisions may already be included in the electoral law or a specific code of conduct that regulates the behaviour of political parties and during elections. However, where such provisions do not exist, or are not respected and enforced, these commitments need to be established and enforced. Reputable non-state and state actors may have a convening power to bring political parties together to discuss and agree the principles of peaceful electoral campaigning and the effective enforcement mechanisms.

A civil society organization promotes the adoption of and adherence to the campaigning code of conduct during the 2012 national elections in Ghana. Although the Political Party Code of Conduct (CoC) was first adopted in 2000, lack of an enforcement mechanism resulted in non-compliance and political parties’ misconduct throughout the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections. Ahead of the 2012 national elections, the Institute of Political Party Affairs (IEA) facilitated a series of interparty dialogue meetings to revise and strengthen the CoC enforcement mechanisms. The revision of the CoC was in part based on experience, such as the use of hate speech and unsavoury language during the voter registration period, and on the realization that preventative action needed to be taken to prevent or mitigate ‘irresponsible political conduct or activity’.^{^[28]} The new CoC, adopted by all political parties, set out the guidelines for responsible campaigning, and covered a broad range of issues including abuse of incumbency, defacing of posters, biased media reporting and campaign violence. The IEA, with the approval of the political parties, established a National Enforcement Body (NEB) to monitor political parties’ adherence to the CoC ahead of the general elections. The NEB was composed of members representing the Electoral Commission, the National Commission for Civic Education, the Ghana Journalists Association, the security services and political parties, and chaired by the Ghana National Peace Council. The NEB is also tasked with educating the electorate and political party supporters on the provisions of the code.^{^[29]} The establishment of one national and ten regional enforcement bodies was intended to increase the capacity to monitor campaigns, rallies and other political party activities throughout the country, investigate alleged incidents and impose sanctions on those in breach of the CoC. The NEB was also able to publish its investigation findings in newspapers and on the air waves, thereby naming and shaming party offenders.^{^[30]} In the case of serious offences, security sector agencies and other state bodies were alerted for appropriate action to be taken.^{^[31]}

Promote peace activism at the national and sub-national levels to deflate tensions and conflicts arising from inflammatory campaigning

Civil society organizations, including women’s and youth groups, religious networks and interest groups, may play an important role in promoting peace during the campaigning period. They can engage in activism and involve political representatives, state officials and traditional leaders in addressing anxieties that emerge from provocative party campaigning. Peace campaigning strategies should clearly define the target audience (e.g. young people) and the communication mechanisms (e.g. the media, roadshows), messages and symbols used.^{^[32]} Strategies implemented at the community level, such as the use of community-based radio stations, will have the potential to reach all citizens, including vulnerable groups, and to bridge language barriers.^{^[33]} Peace campaigning should promote tolerant political debates and seek public commitments by politicians in support of peaceful elections.^{^[34]}

The business community launches a peace campaign in Kenya ahead of the 2013 general elections. Due to the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008, the Kenyan economy suffered losses estimated at USD 3.7 billion. For that reason, the Kenyan business community, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (Kepsa), launched a peace campaign ahead of the 2013 general elections. The initiative, supported by numerous civil society and faith-based organizations, aims to prevent violence during general elections in 2013. The peace initiative dubbed ‘My Kenya’ was launched with the beginning of the formal political party campaign period. My Kenya includes the use of media advertisement, road shows and concerts to remind Kenyans to reject violence before and after election day. Kenya’s corporate organizations provide most of the funding needed to implement campaign activities, which amounts to over USD 4.6 million.^{^[35]}

Establish mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on provocative political party campaigning in the media and political party rallies

To reach out to citizens, parties, mobilize candidates, members and supporters in an effort to occupy spaces through which political messages can be sent to voters. Electoral campaigning is mainly done (a) through the traditional media, including newspapers, radio and television; (b) through new media, including social networks and blogs; and (c) in person, through political party rallies. In conflict-prone societies, campaigning strategies may appeal to fears and emotions, or resort to intimidation. The media can also contribute to provocative campaigning by favouring particular political options and working against their competitors and supporters, which may include intimidation. Even if the use of inflammatory rhetoric is defined as an election offence in the electoral and media codes of conduct, gathering information and evidence relating to provocative campaigning and intimidation may be a challenge. In some cases, political parties will be watchful and report incidents involving their political opponents or media. However, in conflict-prone societies, it may be effective if a reputable non-state or state actor, without a stake in the electoral outcome, monitors and reports such incidents. These actors may include media regulatory agencies and civil society groups that specialize in media reporting or have the capacity to observe local media and political party rallies at national and sub-national level.

Civil society groups engage in media monitoring ahead of the 2010 elections in Sudan. The 2010 general elections were a milestone in implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the 22-year-long conflict there. During the period leading up to the 2010 general elections, the Sudan Media and Elections Consortium (SMEC), made up of six national and international organizations with experience in media support,^{^[36]} monitored and reported on equal access to the media and the use of hate speech during the electoral campaign. The SMEC conducted both quantitative and qualitative media monitoring, providing detailed information on the allocation of air time given to political parties, media impartiality and incidents of hate speech by the various newspapers, radio and TV channels or political parties interviewed by the media. The SMEC’s final report, which covers media reporting from the campaign up until the post-electoral phase, also included recommendations on specific provisions for the media and other agencies to improve equality of access and to reduce incidents of hate speech in the future.^{^[37]}

The Indonesian Election Oversight Body (Bawaslu), the General Elections Commission (KPU) and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology hold a roundtable on and coordinate a response to the spread of fake news and hate speech in preparation for June 2018 regional elections. Building on growing awareness of the link between misinformation and violence in Indonesia, such as deadly protests surrounding the candidacy of then-Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, a roundtable was held in January 2018 bringing together 28 actors from Bawaslu, KPU, Ministry of Home Affairs, Executive Office of the President and national civil society groups. [38] These representatives were interested in learning about ways to minimize the effects of hate speech and communal incitement. The conversations built on strategies outlined in the white paper “Countering Hate Speech in Elections: Strategies for Electoral Management Bodies”[39] from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and covered topics such as strengthening policy and regulatory frameworks, modelling good behaviour from all electoral actors, speaking out clearly against discrimination and hatred; and monitoring and collecting data on hate speech and resultant violence. This resulted in the January 31, 2018 signing of a memorandum of action between the Bawaslu, KPU and Ministry of Communications and Information Technology to curb fake news and hate speech including coordinating efforts to monitor hoax news and inter-communal incitement in official social media accounts registered by political parties and candidates.[40]

Share reports on violations of campaigning rules, in particular use of inflammatory language and hate speech, with the EMBs, prosecutor’s office, security sector agencies and media

Collecting evidence on the use of inflammatory rhetoric during an electoral campaign is a complex task. However, it may be of little relevance if those who resort to such rhetoric are not sanctioned. Imposing sanctions on political parties and prosecuting political party candidates during election campaigns may be extremely difficult. If responsible agencies abuse their mandates, or if the prosecution is perceived as action directed against one party or candidate for the benefit of another political actor, it can escalate tensions and lead to deeper conflicts. When reports of unlawful campaigning are collected, they should be forwarded to the relevant body that has the mandate and integrity to investigate and prosecute electoral offences. These may include an EMB, general or special prosecutors, and security sector agencies. In cases where institutions, which are mandated to prosecute electoral offences, show a lack of commitment to sanctioning perpetrators, this information can be presented to the public and other stakeholders through the media, putting pressure on the perpetrators and responsible agencies.

A statutory agency is mandated to monitor and investigate hate speech in Kenya. Following the outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was formed with the mandate to promote peaceful coexistence among all Kenyans. During the campaign period ahead of the 2013 general elections, the NCIC monitored political rallies, public forums and traditional media in relation to the use of hate speech and incitements. The 2008 National Cohesion and Integration Act gives the NCIC the power to ‘investigate complaints of ethnic or racial discrimination or any issue affecting ethnic and racial relations and make recommendations to relevant authorities, including the Director of Public Prosecution, on remedial measures. The NCIC has partnered with national telephone providers in order to prevent and mitigate text messages that include hate speech. It has also worked with the Cyber-Crime Unit at the Police Criminal Investigation Department to obtain telephone records of people suspected of sending hate messages from telephone providers. Furthermore, the NCIC monitored use of hate speech on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as commentaries on news websites. This has been achieved through the employment of 40 staff members tasked with the monitoring of social networking sites. The monitoring also included Kenyans in the diaspora.^{^[41]}

[1] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming (New York: Democratic Governance Group/Bureau for Development Policy, 2009), p. 43.

[2] BBC Monitoring, ‘Bosnian Election Body Announces Clampdown on Election Campaign Hate Speech’, 3 September 2008, available at <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-188020881/bosnian-election-body-announces.html>, accessed 9 January 2013.

[3] ‘29 Die in Indian Elections Violence’, CBS News, 11 February 2009, available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-3454.html>, accessed 12 April 2013.

[4] ‘EC Find Varun Gandhi Guilty, Asks BJP to Drop’, ZeeNews.com, 22 March 2009, available at <http://zeenews.india.com/generalelection/2009-03-22/517132news.html>, accessed 12 April 2013.

[5] ‘ECI Condemns Varun Gandhi for Hate Speeches’, Times of India, 28 March 2009, available at <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-03-28/lucknow/28010953_1_varun-gandhi-highly-derogatory-speeches-hatred-between-different-classes>, accessed 12 April 2013.

[6] ‘Election Commission Indicts Varun Gandhi for Hate Speeches’, India Today, 22 March 2009, available at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Election+Commission+indicts+Varun+Gandhi+for+hate+speeches/1/33463.html>, accessed 12 April 2013.

[7] ‘Varun Gandi Acquitted in Second Hate Speech Case’, Times of India, 12 April 2013, available at <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-03-05/india/37469147_1_barkhera-police-station-inflammatory-speeches-varun-gandhi>, accessed 12 April 2013.

[8] Roberts, Mara J., Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya (Charlottesville, Va.: New Dominion Philanthropy Metrics, 2009), available at <http://www.ndpmetrics.com/papers/Kenya_Conflict_2007.pdf>; and Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), The General Elections in Kenya 2007, Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, No. 38 (Nairobi, 2008).

[9] ‘Police Vow to Protect Female Candidates in Kenya Poll’, AFP, 23 November 2007, available at <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i9wepXDuO3MoojCf22jaiBs-SOtA>, accessed 10 April 2013.

[10] International IDEA, ‘Working for Democracy’, 23 April 2013, available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mqXv4x0G1r8>, accessed 23 April 2013.

[11] International IDEA, ‘The Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission Test IDEA’s Electoral Risk Management Tool for Kenya’s Election’ 7 March 2013, available at <http://www.idea.int/elections/iebc-tests-the-international-idea-electoral-risk-management-tool-for-kenyas-election.cfm>, accessed 18 April 2013.

[12] ‘Philippines Gun Ban Kicks Off Amid Campaign Violence’, Time World, 13 January 2010, available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953251,00.html#ixzz2H0BKReiv>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[13] ‘Dozens Killed in Election-related Fighting Between Rival Families’, Asia News, 23 November 2009, available at <http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=16939>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[14] Commission on Elections (Comelec), Resolution No. 9035, 21 September 2010, available at <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Elections/2010BarangaySK/Resolutions/Res9035>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[15] Manila Bulletin Publishing Cooperation, ‘9,711 Personnel Deployed for Barangay, SK Election Campaign Period’, 12 October 2010, available at <http://www.mb.com.ph/node/281767/9711-per>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[16] Manila Bulletin Publishing Cooperation, ‘Barangay Elections in Mindanao Regions Peaceful’, 25 October 2010, available at <http://www.mb.com.ph/node/284065/barangay-election>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[17] ‘NSB to Brief Candidates on Security Issues’, Taipei Times, 14 November 2011, available at <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/11/14/2003518276>, accessed 12 December 2012.

[18] CBS News, ‘29 Die In India Election Violence’, 11 February 2009, available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-3454.html>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[19] Fisher, Jeff, ‘Electoral Conflict and Violence’, IFES White Paper 2002/1, 5 February 2002, available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019255.pdf>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[20] Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), ‘High Security for Rahul’s Election Rallies in Bengal’, 13 April 2009a, <http://twocircles.net/2009apr13/ high_security_rahul_gandhis_jammu_visit.html>, accessed 29 August 2018

[21] Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), ‘High Security for Rahul Gandhi’s Jammu Visit’, 23 April 2009b, <http:// twocircles.net/2009apr23/high_security_rahuls_election_rallies_bengal.html>, accessed 4 January 2013

[22] Election Commission of India, ‘Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of Political Parties and Candidates’, 5 October 2010, available at <http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/Model_Code_Conduct.pdf>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[23] Agence France-Presse, ‘Police Vow to Protect Female Candidates in Kenya Poll’, 26 November 2007, <http://panafricannews.blogspot.se/2007/11/kenyan-police-vow-to- protect-women_26.html>, accessed 8 May 2018

[24] Roberts, Mara J., Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya (Charlottesville, Va.: New Dominion Philanthropy Metrics, 2009), available at <http://www.ndpmetrics.com/papers/Kenya_Conflict_2007.pdf>, accessed 11 April 2013.

[25] Modern Ghana, ‘Press Statement on Election Related Violence In Ghana’, 17 April 2012, available at <http://www.modernghana.com/news/389711/1/press-statement-on-election-related-violence-in-gh.html>, accessed 7 January 2013.

[26] Ghana News Agency (GNA), ‘Ghana Police Service Ready for Peaceful Elections: PRO’, 26 May 2012, available at <http://ghananewsagency.org/social/ghana-police-service-ready-for-peaceful-elections-pro-44044>, accessed 7 January 2013.

[27] Modern Ghana, ‘Peace Rally in Accra’, 27 May 2012, available at <http://www.modernghana.com/news/397931/1/peace-rally-in-accra.html>, accessed 4 January 2013.

[28] GhanaWeb, ‘Need to Hold Political Parties Accountable to Code of Conduct’, 23 September 2012, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php? ID=251184>, accessed 8 May 2018

[29] Institute of Political Party Affairs, ‘Establishment of National and Regional Enforcement Bodies for the Political Parties Code of Conduct 2012’, 23 March 2012, available at <http://www.ieagh.org/index.php/iea-media/media-releases/276-establishment-of-national-and-regional-enforcement-bodies-for-the-political-parties-code-of-conduct-2012>, accessed 2 January 2013.

[30] All Africa, ‘Ghana: 5 Regions to Enforce Parties Code of Conduct’, 2 April 2012, available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201204031266.html>, accessed 3 January 2013.

[31] GhanaWeb, ‘Need to Hold Political Parties Accountable to Code of Conduct’, 23 September 2012, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php? ID=251184>, accessed 8 May 2018

[32] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming (New York: Democratic Governance Group/Bureau for Development Policy, 2009), p. 23.

[33] Haider, H., ‘Community-based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts’, Issue Paper, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham, 2009, p. 5.

[34] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Elections and Conflict Prevention, p. 32.

[35] ‘Industry Chiefs Launch Peace Campaign ahead of Elections’, Daily Nation, 30 January 2012, available at <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Top-business-chiefs-rally-for-peaceful-vote-/-/1056/1316588/-/item/1/-/c6e6ryz/-/index.html>, accessed 2 January 2013.

[36] These were the Sudan Development Initiative (SUDIA), International Media Support (IMS), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Osservatorio di Pavia, the Arab Working Group for Media Monitoring and the Fojo Media Institute.

[37] Sudan Media and Elections Consortium, ‘Media and Elections in Sudan: Monitoring the Coverage of the Sudan 2010 Elections: Report’, December 2010, <https:// www.mediasupport.org/publication/monitoring-the-coverage-of-sudan-2010-elections/ >, accessed 8 May 2018

[38] https://www.ifes.org/news/countering-communal-incitement-and-hate-speech-indonesia

[39] https://www.ifes.org/publications/countering-hate-speech-elections-strategies-electoral-management-bodies

[40] https://jakartaglobe.id/news/bawaslu-kpu-ministry-join-forces-fight-fake-news-ahead-regional-polls/

[41] ‘NCIC Monitoring SMS, Web Chatter for Hate Speech, Daily Nation, 5 May 2011, available at <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1156904/-/7rhsok/-/index.html>, accessed 2 January 2013.

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