Preventing Election-related Violence

Topic IndexThe presence of non-state armed actors

Non-state armed actors refers to individuals or groups who use violence to achieve their objectives but are not acting as part of the state’s regular forces or institutions.^{^[1]} They include rebels or guerrilla fighters, militias or paramilitaries, armed clan chiefs, warlords, terrorists, mercenaries and private security companies as well as marauders.^{^[2]} Problems related to non-state armed actors are especially acute when these have a direct presence in the country, although their location in neighbouring countries can also raise tensions.^{^[3]} Such groups do not necessarily respect borders and can use neighbouring territory to seek shelter or mobilize material. If these groups have a political agenda, they can spread instability.

The presence or influence of non-state armed actors will increase risks of violence during elections.^{^[4]} Irregular armed groups may destabilize the country by engaging in electoral manipulation.^{^[5]} In particular, they can resort to intimidation of candidates and voters.^{^[6]} The risk of violence is particularly high when Secruity Sector Agencies (SSAs) do not have the capacity to respond to evolving security challenges, or when parts of the security sector are in collusion with militias or paramilitary groups. Such cases are exacerbated when the state does not have complete control over its territory, or when porous borders allow the illegal transit of armed groups.^{^[7]}

Empirical cases:

Colombian presidential and legislative elections 2010. Colombia has been immersed in a violent internal conflict for more than 50 years, with a broad array of non-state armed actors that range from, for example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) involved.[8] Both these groups have caused major distortions in the political process, often radically modifying historical electoral trends.^{^[9]}
Interrelated factors: the presence of organized crime (external);^{^[10]} grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external); human rights violations (external);^{^[11]} contested electoral law (internal); inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal); problematic election-day operations (internal).^{^[12]}
Afghanistan presidential and provincial council elections 2009. The recent history of Afghanistan is marked by political instability, with the Taliban still carrying out attacks against both the government and civilians.^{^[13]} Electoral processes are one of their main targets. During the 2009 election, the Taliban were responsible for numerous threats and terrorist acts in the pre-election period, mainly targeting candidates and their staff. In addition, at least 10 electoral officials, candidates and campaign workers were abducted, and 31 people killed on election day.^{^[14]}
Interrelated factors: the presence of non-state armed actors (external);^{^[15]} human rights violations (external); grievances relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (external);^{^[16]} contested electoral law (internal); poor performance of the electoral management body (internal); an inadequate system for the resolution of electoral disputes (internal); inadequate electoral security arrangements (internal); problematic voter registration (internal); problematic ballot counting and tallying (internal).^{^[17]}
Afghanistan, presidential election, 2014. The 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan was marked by widespread fraud, voter intimidation and violence perpetrated by political parties, war lords, local tribal and religious leaders and the Taliban. For ideological reasons, the Taliban were expected to attempt to orchestrate enough violence to derail the election. Other factors, however, impacted on their efforts. Both foreign patrons and local strongmen lobbied for their attacks to be targeted to favour particular candidates. This in turn resulted in significant internal fragmentation amongst the Taliban, and uneven violence during the first round of voting. More generalized violence was observed during the second round resulting in voter intimidation, whole villages prevented from voting, voter turnout irregularities, and the killing of many of the security forces personnel who were protecting the elections, EMB staff members and voters included.[18]

Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); Human right violations (external); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); the presence of organized crime (external).

[1] Schneckener, ‘Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance’, Private Actors and Security Governance (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2006).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Chuter, David, ‘From Threats to Tasks: Making and Implementing National Security Policy’, Journal of Security Sector Management (Cranfield University, Shrivenham), 5/2 (2007), p. 6, available at <http://www.ssronline.org/jofssm/issues/jofssm_0502_chuter.pdf?CFID=3616679&CFTOKEN=33301837>, accessed 5 July 2011.

[4] Ferreira, Delia et al., Dirty Money in Politics: How El Padrino’s Contributions Affect Security in Latin America (conference) (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2011), available at <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Videos/2011/How-El-Padrinos-Contributions-Affect-Security-in-Latin-America.aspx>, accessed 5 July 2011; and International Crisis Group, ‘Guatemala’s Elections: Clean Polls, Dirty Politics’, Policy Briefing, Latin America Briefing no. 24 (Bogota/Brussels: ICG, 2011), available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/guatemala-s-elections-clean-polls-dirty-politics>, accessed 2 May 2018

[5] Schneckener, ‘Fragile Statehood’, p. 32.

[6] Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’, p. 8.

[7] Schneckener, U., ‘Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance’, in A. Bryden and M. Caparini (eds), Private Actors and Security Governance, Yearbook

[8] Sweig, J. E., ‘What Kind of War for Colombia?’, Foreign Affairs, 81/5 (2002), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2002-09-01/what-kind-war-colombia>, accessed 2 May 2018; and Theidon, Kimberly, ‘Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1 (2007), pp. 72, 73, available at <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~anthro/theidon/theidon_pdf/theidon_IJTJ.pdf>, accessed 6 July 2011.

[9] Organization of American States (OAS), Political Affairs Secretary, Informe Final de la Misión de Veeduría Electoral de la OEA sobre las Elecciones Legislativas Celebradas en la República de Colombia el 14 de Marzo de 2010, 2010, OEA/Ser.GCP/doc.4508/10, p. 8; Organization of American States (OAS), Political Affairs Secretary, Informe Final de la Misión de Veeduría Electoral de la OEA sobre la Elección Presidencial y Segunda Vuelta Presidencial Celebradas en la República de Colombia el 30 de Mayo y el 20 de Junio de 2010, OEA/Ser.GCP/doc.4515/10, 2010, pp. 19, 54; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), ONU Derechos Humanos Observe Reducción Significativa de Violencia Durante las Elecciones, UNHCHR, Colombia Office, Bogota, 2010, available at <http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/comunicados/2010/cp1007.pdf>, accessed 6 July 2011; and López Hernández, Claudia et al., Y Refundaron la Patria …, De Cómo Mafiosos y Políticos Reconfiguraron el Estado Colombiano, Debate, Santafé de Bogotá, 2010.

[10] Felbab-Brown, Vanda, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2010), pp. 1–12.

[11] Organization of American States (OAS), Political Affairs Secretary, Informe Final de la Misión de Veeduría Electoral de la OEA sobre las Elecciones Legislativas Celebradas en la República de Colombia el 14 de Marzo de 2010, p. 8; Organization of American States (OAS), Political Affairs Secretary, Informe Final de la Misión de Veeduría Electoral de la OEA sobre la Elección Presidencial y Segunda Vuelta Presidencial Celebradas en la República de Colombia el 30 de Mayo y el 20 de Junio de 2010, pp. 19, 54; and United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), ONU Derechos Humanos Observe Reducción Significativa de Violencia.

[12] Misión de Observación Electoral, ‘Mapas y Factres de Riesgo Electoral 2010’, March 2010.

[13] International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan Conflict History’, January 2010, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/afghanistan.aspx>, accessed 6 July 2011.

[14] Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’, pp. 18, 19; International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance’, Asia Briefing no. 96 (2009), pp. 7, 8, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/b96_afghanistan___elections_and_the_crisis_of_governance.pdf>, accessed 6 July 2011; and Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan: Human Rights Concerns in Run-Up to Elections’, 17 August 2009, available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/17/afghanistan-human-rights-concerns-run-elections>, accessed 6 July 2011.

[15] Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up.

[16] Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’; and International Crisis Group, ‘Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance’.

[17] European Union Electoral Observation Mission, ‘Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Final Report Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 20 August 2009’, p. 9, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2010_election_observation_afghanistan_final_report_0809_en.pdf>, accessed 23 January 2012.

[18] USIP, Violence, the Taliban, and Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections, January 7, 2015, https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/01/violence-taliban-and-afghanistans-2014-elections

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Preventing Election-related Violence