Preventing Election-related Violence

Topic IndexRejection of the election results

The rejection of electoral results is an extreme act that may stem from a real or perceived lack of integrity and credibility in the electoral process and its outcome. In very broad terms, rejection of the result by a particular party may result in self-exclusion from participation in a democratic institution or process. Very often such a decision may lead to protests with violent outcomes.

Empirical cases:

Haiti presidential and legislative elections 2010/2011. Violence erupted after the results of the first round of voting were declared in December 2010. Jude Célestin, the candidate of the party of outgoing President René Préval, came second, thus qualifying for the next run-off. The supporters of presidential candidate Michel Martelly, who came third and thus did not qualify for the run-off, were outraged by the fact that he was only one percentage point behind Célestin.[1] Protests escalated and resulted in a large-scale campaign of destruction as well as the deaths of 13 people.[2] The Provisional Electoral Council re-examined the ballot papers and announced that Martelly had come second and thus qualified for the run-off.[3]

Interrelated factors: environmental hazards (external);[4] gender-based discrimination and violence (external).[5]

Côte d’Ivoire presidential election 2010. After the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, rejected the election results violence erupted, resulting in the deaths of 3,000 people and the creation of over 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).[6] The competing presidential candidate, Alassane Ouattara, gained 54.1 per cent of votes.[7] Gbagbo refused to step down, however, which resulted in violent demonstrations, abductions of perceived political opponents from the opposition Rally of the Republicans (RDR), beatings and torture.[8]

Interrelated factors: presence of non-state armed actors (external); human rights violations (external);[9] poor socio-economic conditions (external);[10] problematic ballot counting and result tallying (internal); problematic election day operations (internal).[11]

Cambodia, General Election, 2013. After a proclamation of victory for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the main opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) refused to accept the results and boycotted parliament, citing widespread electoral irregularities.[12] Concerns over alleged electoral rigging were also expressed by the EU, the UN and Human Rights Watch. The CNRP organized protests which both grew in scale over the following months and provoked a violent reaction from the government. An agreement was finally signed between the two parties on 22 July 2014.[13]

Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); alleged human right violations[14] (external); Violent actions by political parties (internal); problematic voter registration (internal); problematic registration of political parties and candidates (internal); management of the final round of electoral appeals (internal).
Venezuela, presidential elections, 2013. Electoral violence erupted in Venezuela after the publication of presedential election results. Following a tense campaign the results gave Nicolás Maduro, Hugo Chavez’s heir, victory over his opponent, Henrique Capriles, by a margin of 1-6 per cent. While the opposition refused to accept these results amid accusations of fraud, the government accused the opposition of plotting a coup. Massive demonstrations and political turmoil followed the government’s refusal to initiate a recount.[15] While the government blamed Capriles’ supporters for the ensuing violence, Human Rights Watch expressed concerns over alleged wide-scale governmental human rights abuses.[16]

Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); Human right violations (external); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); Problematic Election Day operations (Internal); Poor management of the final round of electoral appeals (internal).

[1] UNHCR News Service, ‘As Haitian Elections Near, UN Voices Concern at Electoral Violence’, 16 March 2011, available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/03/369242-haitian-elections-near-un-voices-concern-electoral-violence, accessed 12 April 2018.

[2] UN General Assembly and Security Council, ‘Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN document A/65/820, S/2011/250, issue 93 (23 April 2011); UNHCR News Service, ‘As Haitian Elections Near, UN Voices Concern’; and ‘Election Violence Flares in Haiti’, New York Times, 8 December 2010, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/americas/09haiti.html>, accessed 23 September 2011.

[3] UNHCR News Service, ‘As Haitian Elections Near, UN Voices Concern at Electoral Violence’.

[4] International Crisis Group, ‘Haiti: The Stakes of the Post-Quake Elections’, Latin American/Caribbean Report no. 35 (27 October 2010), Executive Summary p. 2, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/haiti/35%20Haiti%20-%20The%20Stakes%20of%20the%20Post-Quake%20Elections.pdf>, accessed 29 September 2011.

[5] Human Rights Watch, ‘A Vote to Help Women Around the World’, 2 December 2010, available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/02/vote-help-women-around-world>, accessed 6 August 2013.

[6] BBC, ‘Ivory Coast Deadline for ICC Testimony’, 17 June 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13815109>, accessed 23 September 2011; and Aljazeera.net, ‘“Hundreds killed” in Cote d’Ivoire Violence”, available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/04/201141232021597365.html>, accessed 23 September 2011.

[7] Reuters, ‘Ivory Coast Poll Winner Named, Army Seals Borders’, 2 December 2010, available at <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE6B13FN20101202>, accessed 23 September 2011.

[8] Aljazeera.net, ‘“Hundreds Killed” in Cote d’Ivoire Violence’.

[9] International Crisis Group, ‘A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Côte d’Ivoire’, Africa Report no. 176 (1 August 2011), pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/critical-period-ensuring-stability-cote-d-ivoire>, accessed 14 August 2018.

[10] International Crisis Group, ‘Cote d´Ivoire: Securing the Electoral Process’, Africa Report no. 158 (5 May 2010), available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/158-cote-d-ivoire-securing-the-electoral-process.aspx>, accessed 2 November 2011.

[11] International Crisis Group, ‘Cote d´Ivoire: Finally Escaping the Crisis?’, Africa Briefing no. 77 (25 November 2010), available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/B077-cote-divoire-finally-escaping-the-crisis.aspx>, accessed 2 November 2011.

[12] Al Jazeera, “Cambodia opposition claims massive poll fraud”, 29 July 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2013/07/201372931511970482.html

[13] The Phnom Penh Post, "Political deadlock broken", 22 July 2014, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/political-deadlock-broken

[14] United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Djibouti 2013 Human Rights Report : https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220318.pdf

[15] The Guardian, Protests in Venezuela as opposition disputes Nicolás Maduro's victory, April 16^th, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/16/protests-venezuela-capriles-nicolas-maduro

[16]HRW, “Letter to the UN about post-electoral violence in Venezuela”, July 11^th, 2013: https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/11/letter-un-about-post-electoral-violence-venezuela

الأدوات الشخصية

ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT

ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

ELECTORAL OPERATIONS

Preventing Election-related Violence