Preventing Election-related Violence

Topic IndexPoor management of election results

EMBs are responsible for the compilation of election results from the field, reconciliation of results at the electoral district and central levels, announcement of the preliminary election results and announcement of the final election results.

The imperative is to minimize the time lapse between election day and announcement of the final election results. Any unnecessary or unexplained delay will feed suspicions concerning the integrity of results processing. Whether real or perceived, biased processing of election results will increase the likelihood of outbreaks of violence.

Empirical cases:

Mozambique presidential and parliamentary elections 1999. International observers charged that the national Electoral Commission did not follow international standards relating to electoral transparency, or release official results in a timely manner.[1] When it did announce the results, they were viewed as fraudulent by the opposition Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). Approximately 100 people died during the violent protests that followed.[2]

Interrelated factors: inadequate funding, financing and budgeting (internal); unequal media access and favouritism (internal); poor voter information campaign (internal).[3]

Kenya parliamentary and presidential elections 2007. Much of the violence that occurred was due to irregularities after election day.[4] After analysing the results from 18 selected constituencies, an independent review commission found that there were indications that the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) had conducted a poor tallying process.[5] Allegations of malpractice and fraud following the result’s announcement contributed to triggering election-related violence that led to the deaths of more than 1,100 people killed by armed individuals or mobs. The security forces were also criticised for either failing to prevent these killings or, in some instances, for being directly responsible for them.[6]

Interrelated factors: gender-based discrimination and violence (external); presence of non-state armed actors (external); poor socio-economic conditions (external).[7]
Djibouti, parliamentary elections, 2013. February 2013 parliamentary election were the first where the opposition had participated since 2003. The election took place in a tense context marked by significant curtailment of opposition and media freedoms. Amid accusations of widespread fraud, the opposition refused to accept the declared results. A formal complaint was rejected on a legal technicality, and polling station results were not published. Large-scale protests followed, resulting in widespread detentions.[8] Opposition parliamentarians boycotted parliament for months, until an agreement was reached with the government in December 2014[9]. 2016 elections were subject to similar challenges and controversies.[10]

Interrelated factors: Conflict relating to changing power dynamics (external); Human right violations[11] (external); Unequal media access and favoritism (internal); Provocative and violent actions by political parties (internal); Rejection of the election results (internal).

[1] Carter Center, ‘Observing the 1999 Mozambique Elections Final Report’, August 2000, p. 33, available at <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABS326.pdf>, accessed 9 September 2011.

[2] Teshome, Wondwosen, ‘Electoral Violence in Africa: Experience from Ethiopia’, International Journal of Human and Social Science, 4/6 (2009), p. 464, available at http://www.waset.org/journals/ijhss/v4/v4-6-60.pdf, accessed 29 September 2011

[3] Carter Center, ‘Observing the 1999 Elections in Mozambique’, August 2000, pp. 4, 5, available at <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/280.pdf>, accessed 8 November 2011.

[4] [Kriegler Commission], Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections Held in Kenya on 27 December 2007, pp. 35, 125, available at <http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/FinalReport_consolidated.pdf>, accessed 23 September 2011.

[5] [Kriegler Commission], Report of the Independent Review Commission, p. 129.

[6] Alston, ‘Report of the UN Special Rapporteur’, pp. 37–8, accessed 26 August 2011.

[7] International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya in Crisis’, pp. 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19.

[8] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014 - Djibouti, 4 August 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53e0a20cb.html [accessed 25 April 2017]

[9] Reuters, Djibouti government reaches deal to bring opposition into parliament, Dec 31^st 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-djibouti-politics-idUSKBN0K90HW20141231

[10] OpenDemocracy, Opening up democracy in Djibouti: great powers and little battalions, April 8^th 2016: https://www.opendemocracy.net/joshua-neicho/opening-up-democracy-in-djibouti-great-powers-and-little-battalions; fidh, Djibouti: at least 6 killed as regime takes 80% of parliamentary seats in election, 18 march 2013 https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/djibouti/Djibouti-at-least-6-killed-as-13040

[11] United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Djibouti 2013 Human Rights Report : https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220318.pdf

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Preventing Election-related Violence