Once the electoral
legal framework is finalized, planning and preparation for the implementation
of electoral activities need to be instigated. This will include developing
operational plans for the implementation of the different phases of the
electoral cycle, such as voter information; registration of voters, political
parties and candidates, and observers; political party campaigning; polling and
counting; and results management. Operational plans will point to activities to
be implemented, timelines, geographical scope, human resources and training
needed, budget and so on. Weakness or controversy in one electoral phase can
compromise the integrity of the subsequent phases or of the whole electoral
process.
Existing tensions
and conflicts may also spill over into electoral processes and affect electoral
actors, events, materials and facilities. It is therefore important that
electoral planning is timely, holistic and conflict-sensitive and that it
considers both the process and the structural factors of conflict. A baseline
risk analysis conducted during the planning phase will be an asset for
conflict-sensitive planning.
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Table 2.
Planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities
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A. Improved electoral management and justice
|
B. Improved electoral security
|
C. Improved infrastructure for peace
|
- Conduct an inter-agency exercise to foresee factors
and scenarios which may represent risks for elections in different phases of the
electoral cycle and across different geographical regions.
- Secure sufficient funds for electoral activities and
allocate specific funding lines for conflict and violence prevention efforts.
- Ensure that the boundary delimitation process is
conducted in timely fashion and that political stakeholders accept the
outcomes.
- Ensure that the operational timelines for
implementation of the election activities are realistic, feasible, and
translated into the election calendar.
- Establish electoral dispute resolution bodies and
mechanisms at an early stage in the process.
- Design sample electoral materials at an early stage
and test their usability and accuracy.
- Establish data collection and analysis capacities to
understand risk levels and make informed and conflict-sensitive decisions.
- Ensure that the introduction of information
technology-based electoral solutions is timely and manageable.
- Ensure political preconditions for the
implementation of technical activities.
|
- Conduct a timely exercise to assess security risks
relating to electoral processes within different electoral phases and across
different geographical regions.
- Operationalize
the electoral security strategy in respect to protection of electoral actors,
events, facilities and materials during the different electoral phases.
- Ensure that
joint security planning, that involves multiple security sector agencies and
an EMB, is a collaborative exercise that takes place at the national and
sub-national level.
- Develop a
curriculum for training of security sector agencies on the specifics of
security engagement during the electoral processes.
|
- Map organizations and
individuals with an agenda or capacity to promote peace and conflict
resolution during elections at a national and sub-national level.
- Join or initiate discussion
forums for participatory dialogues between EMBs, security sector agencies and
non-state actors in the planning phase of electoral processes.
- Formalize coordination
between state and non-state actors during elections and mobilize sufficient
financial and human resources for joint action.
- Consult with traditional and
religious leaders in order to understand their interest and potential to
assist in mediating electoral conflict.
- Create a platform to enable information exchange on
the electoral process and monitor the activities of electoral stakeholders
throughout
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A. Improved electoral management and justice
Electoral planning
is a process led by an electoral management body. Key considerations of
electoral planning are the timing of electoral events and the resources,
financial and human, needed for the implementation of specific activities.
Specific considerations include, among others, the costs associated with
different activities, the recruitment and training of election staff, the procurement
of electoral materials, logistical organization, communication, security and so
on. Timely, thorough and holistic planning processes will ensure broad
consultations within an EMB, as well as with external actors. In conflict-prone
societies, an EMB will benefit from conducting a risk assessment to identify
potential process weaknesses and security threats, both internal and external
to the electoral processes. An EMB should also establish an analytical capacity
to record incidents and observe changing risks throughout the different
electoral phases. In this case, the planning processes should, where feasible,
include specific details on how these threats can be addressed.
- Conduct an inter-agency exercise to foresee factors
and scenarios which may represent security risks for elections in different
phases of the electoral cycle and across different geographical regions
Conflict-sensitive planning
entails a thorough analysis of the security risks associated with electoral
processes. A baseline risk analysis should be implemented as an inter-agency
exercise that brings together election officials, security sector agencies,
civil society organizations, academia and others. Such an exercise can look
into the historical record of election-related violence and current trends at
national, provincial and local levels. The aim is to identify internal and
external factors that may increase risks and trigger election-related violence
throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle. A baseline risk analysis
should include gender and minority dimensions and also explore prevention and
mitigation strategies. Due to the changing dynamics of electoral processes, a
baseline analysis should be followed up by periodical exercises which will
explore emerging risks.
A baseline electoral risk assessment is
conducted ahead of the 2013 general elections in Kenya. Following the
outbreak of election-related violence in 2007–2008, the Independent Electoral
and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of Kenya undertook a number of steps to
strengthen its capacity to prevent and mitigate electoral violence ahead of and
during the general elections in March 2013. The IEBC, supported by
International IDEA, organized a workshop that brought together the IEBC staff,
the Kenyan police and intelligence agencies, national human rights and
reconciliation commissions, and academics. A two-day discussion was focused on
mapping electoral risks in different counties ahead of the general elections.
The risks associated with the different phases of the electoral cycle were also
considered. In parallel, a national public opinion survey was conducted to
measure citizens’ perceptions in this regard. These exercises made it possible
to generate a baseline risk analysis which pointed to 14 risk factors which
needed to be monitored and analysed throughout the different electoral phases.[1]
The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Nacional
Electoral (INE), conducts electoral planning in consultation with the major
national agencies. Mexican elections are complex undertakings which, due to presence of
organized crime groups, often face enhanced security challenges. During the
planning phases, the INE maintains close consultation with the major national
agencies and institutes, including the army, navy, police, civil protection
organizations, energy and water agencies and others represented in the national
Group for Strategic Facilities Coordination. The Group coordinates operational
planning and prevention and mitigation of conflicts in different areas,
including electoral processes.[2]
Through the inter-agency data exchange, the INE is able to identify areas where
electoral processes face increased risks.[3]
The timely and transparent publication of the
election schedule by the Election Commission of Pakistan ahead of the 2013 elections
allows it to obtain timely feedback from electoral stakeholders. Historically,
elections in Pakistan have been marred by violence. After the President
announced the 2013 general election date, the Election Commission of Pakistan
(ECP) immediately started preparing an election schedule.[4] The
schedule was soon completed and published on the ECP website.[5]
This allowed political parties to scrutinize the schedule and to present
arguments with respect to the suggested changes in it. Following those appeals,
the ECP modified the schedule,[6]including
deadlines for nomination procedures, as well as the timelines for submitting
nomination appeals.[7]
- Secure and allocate sufficient
funds for electoral activities in the budget, including conflict and violence
prevention efforts
Electoral management bodies
(EMBs) need sufficient funds to safeguard the integrity of elections. This
entails investment in a well-trained electoral staff, the production of
high-quality electoral materials, the building up of internal information
technology (IT) and communication capacities, strong public relations and
outreach. In addition, an EMB should include specific budget lines for the
collection of unbiased information that will help assessing the quality of
electoral processes. In conflict-prone societies, it may be important to have
resources that can be directed towards the prevention and mitigation of
electoral violence. Of course, EMBs should be mindful to adopt strategies that
are sustainable and cost effective.
The financial resources allocated to the Election Commission of India by
the central and state governments include specific security and
violence-prevention budgets.
With over 700 million voters,[8]
India is the largest democracy in the world. The Election Commission of India
(ECI) is funded by the government of India. A so-called Consolidated Fund pays
for staff, technical operations, electronic voting machines and various office
expenses. Federal state governments cover expenses relating to staff at the
state headquarters and in the districts, the printing and transport of ballot
papers, preparing and printing the electoral register, procuring material for
the conduct of elections, training, the salaries of election officials and the
expenses of central election supervisors. Each state also pays for security
forces deployed for elections. During the 2009 parliamentary elections,
prevention efforts, which for example included video monitoring of ‘dangerous’
individuals, were funded out of the general election budget.[9]
‘The broad powers given to the ECI by the constitution have been liberally and
boldly interpreted to make the government pay for any necessary expenses. The
ECI’s accounts are subject to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General and
its report is tabled in the Parliament.’[10]
- Ensure that boundary delimitation process is conducted
in timely fashion and that political stakeholders accept the outcomes
The delimitation of
electoral boundaries may be very complicated, especially under some electoral
systems.[11] Electoral districts are
often aligned with a country’s administrative divisions, which may have some
practical advantages when citizens know them well. However, there are some
drawbacks. These boundaries may be artificial and of little significance to
citizens. Furthermore, this may divide natural communities, such as racial,
ethnic, religious, or spoken language communities.[12]
The decision to establish electoral districts must therefore be sensitive and
well informed to avoid division of the traditional communities of interest.
Fundamental principles for boundary delimitation include: (a) the
impartiality of the boundary authority; (b) equality of voting strength;
(c) the representativeness of cohesive communities defined by
administrative boundaries, geographic features, and interest; (d)
non-discrimination with respect to race, colour, gender, language, religion, or
related status; and (e) transparency and accessibility to the public.[13] The EMB should plan and
conduct boundary delimitation in a cooperative manner in order to prevent the
emergence of violence.[14] In this regard, electoral
dispute resolution mechanisms should be put in place to deal with complaints.
The technical capacity of an EMB to implement boundary delimitation may require
the use of the Global Information Systems (GIS) software.[15]
Boundary delimitation improved through the use
of the GIS ahead of the general elections in South Africa in 1999. Preparations
ahead of South Africa’s 1999 general elections—the second post-apartheid
elections to take place—included adjustments to the electoral district
boundaries. The process started in 1997 with the Election Steering Committee
working in cooperation with the Department of Land Affairs and Statistics in
order to create a geo-spatial database for the entire country. After more than
a year, the geographical dataset was delivered to the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC). The Global Information System (GIS) software was used to
delimit approximately 14,500 electoral districts. In parallel, local electoral
officers from each municipality had been requested to convene party liaison
committees consisting of local representatives from all political parties to
examine the newly created maps depicting the voting districts. In total, the
IEC received only six disputes, all of which were resolved within two weeks of
the election. The IEC was honoured with the prestigious 2000 Computerworld
Smithsonian Award in the Government and Non-profit Organizations category for
‘innovative applications of information technology that benefit society’. In
making this award, special mention was made of the innovative use of GIS
systems by the IEC.[16]
- Ensure that the operational timelines for
implementation of election activities are realistic, feasible, and translated
into the election calendar
Even if the legal framework
defines the timing of elections, rules may allow the EMB to choose the exact
date of elections and consequently decide the timing of the different electoral
phases. In the timing and sequencing of elections, the EMB needs to allow
sufficient time for the implementation of all preparatory activities preceding
election day. Unrealistic timelines may cause delays and thus affect the
credibility of electoral processes and their outcomes. Planning of election
timelines should consider external risks, particularly in areas that are prone
to environmental hazards, as well as seasonal weather conditions. In some
countries, the planting season may affect the participation of women due to
their roles in food production. Poor weather conditions may affect the
transport of election materials and citizens’ access to the electoral
facilities. Time lost may be difficult or impossible to make up. Furthermore,
an EMB when planning needs to consider whether a possible second round of elections
is applicable. The second round of presidential elections may be particularly
sensitive because of the high electoral stakes and frustration that may
accumulate during the period leading up to the run-off. Once formulated,
operational timelines should be included in an election calendar that needs to
be periodically updated.
- Establish electoral dispute resolution bodies and
mechanisms at an early stage in the process
Well-functioning electoral
dispute resolution mechanisms have an inherent potential to prevent violence. The
planning process should pay particular attention to the timeliness of dispute
resolution and the capacity of the responsible bodies to deal with a
potentially large number of complaints. Since the electoral process cannot be
halted when a challenge is introduced, the establishment of adequate dispute
resolution mechanisms which are trusted and effective is essential for ensuring
the credibility of the electoral process.[17]
Eleven actions for an improved electoral dispute
resolution (EDR) system in Bhutan, 2008. After the 2008 parliamentary election, which
witnessed some violence,[18]
the EMB undertook efforts to understand and address weaknesses relating
to the election dispute resolution (EDR) mechanisms. The improvements included
(a) the establishment of a two-level EDR body; (b) the introduction
of clearer rules for complaint adjudication; (c) guidelines for the proper
presentation of complaints;
(d) the establishment of investigation committees; (e) improved
regulations governing the hearings; (f) better guidance for decision-making;
(g) the enabling of summary decisions; (h) better provisions for final and
binding decisions; (i) time limits for considering cases; (j) mandatory
referral; and (k) the making of provision for complaints during
non-election periods.[19]
- Design sample electoral materials at an early stage
and test their usability and accuracy
Electoral materials, including
voter registration forms, provisional and final electoral registers, ballot
papers and tabulation forms, need to be designed carefully to minimize the
potential for mistakes, disputes and conflicts. These materials should be
clear, concise and understandable for a broader population, including
linguistic minorities and people with disabilities, and have security features,
such as watermarks, security printing or other secure features as may be
appropriate for the context in which these will be applied. Allowing sufficient
time for the designing, testing and improvement of electoral materials may be
beneficial in avoiding tensions generated by technical problems. Furthermore,
there are many countries that do not have sufficient capacity to print or
source some of these materials and therefore resort to sourcing same abroad. In
these instances, communication with internal stakeholders is vital. The process
of sampling electoral materials and the security measures to be taken by
suppliers in the printing country become an important consideration for
electoral stakeholders. Decisions and activities need to be taken well in
advance, to compensate for the longer supply chain applicable in those
circumstances.
- Establish data collection and analysis capacities to
understand risk levels and make informed and conflict-sensitive decisions
Numerous factors can cause
outbreaks of election-related violence. These may be process-specific
(electoral) or context-specific (structural) factors. Risk assessment is a
useful methodology in assessing relevant risk factors in a given national and
electoral context. However, the risks associated with specific factors may
change over time. Factors that are not initially categorized as risks may
resurface during the later stages of electoral processes. It is therefore
important to establish a standing capability within the EMB to analyse risk
dynamics throughout the electoral cycle. This can be done through continuous
data collection and analysis, with the aim of producing information that allows
conflict-sensitive electoral decision-making. Furthermore, such analysis can be
used to mobilize external agencies that may have mandates and capacities to
address identified risks, such as security sector agencies and other state and
non-state actors. At the same time, electoral management bodies will benefit
from improved information and analysis generated and shared by external
agencies and actors.
The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral
(IFE)[20],
develops a robust risk data analysis system ahead of elections. One year ahead
of the 2009 legislative elections, Mexico was experiencing an increased number
of attacks on civil society by organized criminal groups, causing uncertainty
and fear. Due to increased security risks, the IFE put in place a general
strategy to prevent attacks on citizens and political actors. Two mechanisms
were put in place, namely a ‘political-electoral information system’ and a
‘scenario analysis programme’, to allow the IFE to assess risks relating to
drug trafficking, murders, robbery, kidnapping, poverty and electoral
complexity throughout the country. The ‘state risk index’ included data from a
task force composed of local state governments and security sector,
communication and infrastructure agencies. The system was designed to minimize
the risks related to the electoral process and to protect the electorate going
to the polls in 2009. The overall strategy contributed to informed
decision-making in terms of preventative action.[21]
In Burkina
Faso, the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES)provided a training program on conflict prevention and mitigation
strategies for communal-level election commissioners. The training program was
based on IFES’ EVER methodology and customized to the Burkina Faso context, as
well as to the operations of the Independent National Electoral Commission
(CENI) and its communal administrative divisions. Following training, IFES
provided support to the Independent Communal Electoral Commissions (CECI) and
Independent District Electoral Commissions (CEIA) to establish an elections
conflict monitoring cell, which identified sources of potential conflict,
collected data through focal points, analyzed data gathered, implemented
conflict prevention activities, and issued. The monitoring cell used
information collected through focal points to draft reports on the nature and
frequency of conflict incidents, tension levels, and threats. The reports were
then delivered to the CENI to enhance its decision-making process ahead of the
2016 municipal elections, and its implementation of conflict prevention
measures. The reports and data from the monitoring cell were also delivered to
the National Committee for the Security of Elections.
- Ensure that the introduction of information
technology-based solutions is timely and manageable
EMBs are
increasingly relying on the application of sophisticated IT-based solutions in
the implementation and management of delicate and complex electoral processes.
Popular IT systems include biometric voter registration, electronic voting and
electronic vote transmission. The use of IT may ensure that electoral processes
are more expeditious and less prone to human mistakes, and thus contribute to
increased trust in, and the credibility of, election results. On the negative
side, late procurement and testing and breakdowns of these systems may cause
serious problems to election administrators, resulting in loss of public
confidence and damaged credibility of election results. To minimize the risks
relating to the introduction of new technologies, an EMB should ensure that the
testing and procurement of equipment happen during an initial stage of the
electoral processes. It should be possible to compensate for delayed delivery
and testing, or failure of these systems, through the deployment of alternative
resources and procedures. Experience shows that introduction of ITs may work
best if the development and implementation are incremental and are owned and
trusted by all relevant national stakeholders. It is also important to highlight the complex
relationship that exists between the choice and sophistication of the technology
used in an election and the level of confidence in the electoral process. In
some cases, the introduction of electoral technology might not be the best
solution. Thus, the need to ensure that new technologies are considered on a
case-by case basis in accordance with national needs and financial capacities,
following a comprehensive and consultative feasibility study.
E-voting is introduced gradually by the
Brazilian Superior Elections Tribunal. ‘Introduction of e-voting in Brazil was
motivated by economic and fraud-prevention factors. A multi-year approach for
the gradual introduction of e-voting was adopted and included the following
steps: (1) Voter and civic information including usability and feasibility
studies starting in 1986; (2) Capacity building within the EMB, and
digitalization of the result aggregation; (3) Development of hard- and
software, involving local technical expertise; (4) Testing of equipment in the
Brazilian environment; (5) EMB’s final decision on the type of machine fitting
the Brazilian context best; (6) Quality control and testing in various
environments; (7) Authorization of e-voting in 1996 local and municipal
elections; (8) Post-election review and subsequent quality overhaul; (9) Full
e-voting roll-out in the 2002 general elections. A hacking competition was
organized in 2009 to create additional confidence in the technology. Over the
years citizens and stakeholders gained enough trust in the system for the paper
trail that was initially included to be deemed redundant and scrapped after
technical problems associated with the printers. While systems without paper
trails are often disputed, the Brazilian case exemplifies what can be achieved
with successful trust, capacity and consensus building over many years and several
electoral cycles.’[22]
In the lead up to the 2009
parliamentary elections, the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities
participated in the Lebanese
Election Violence Risk Assessment (LEVRA) project aimed to track the risk of
election-related conflict in each electoral district in Lebanon. This contributed to the development of effective security planning
(with other security agencies and stakeholders) to mitigate risks of
election-related conflict during the campaign, polling and results phase of
parliamentary elections. LEVRA used a methodology that analyzed data to
indicate risk of political, confessional or electoral violence and assessed
whether the data indicated a risk of violence in that district. In partnership
with a local Geographic Information Systems (GIS) company, a tracking and mapping software was developed
to record and data, incorporating GIS technology to map the risk assessments
for each electoral district. Subsequently, incident maps were developed, and
the information was used to design a security plan for the parliamentary
elections. LEVRA also established a secure website that contained the
risk assessment information, available for use by the Ministry and other
stakeholders.
- Ensure political preconditions for the implementation
of technical activities
Elections are often organized
in national contexts where the political landscape is very complex. Political
divisions within the legislative and executive institutions can increase the
complexity of electoral processes and demand increased integrity and
operational capacities of the organizations with electoral mandates. While it
may be important to ensure that a political consensus is reached among the
relevant political actors that give an EMB legitimacy, an EMB should have a
good awareness of the politically delicate phases and activities in order to
ensure that political consensus is maintained before and during the
implementation of specific technical segments of elections. This may require
political sensitivity and consensus-building skills among election
administrators.
The Mexican EMB, the Instituto Nacional
Electoral (INE), exercises political sensitivity when implementing technical
processes. To implement its mandate in the complex political context of Mexico, the
INE distinguishes between two aspects of electoral management. The first is the
technical dimension. It entails management of resources and operational
activities to ensure that election processes are implemented in a timely,
credible and peaceful manner. The second dimension is political. The INE
acknowledges that election administrators require a good sense of the political
situation in order to better understand the possible political connotations of
electoral activities. This allows it to make politically sensitive electoral
decisions and take action ensuring that electoral processes do not raise
political controversy. In fact, Mexican experiences confirm that there is an
interplay between the technical and political dimensions of electoral
processes. ‘Politics and technique change jointly: technique is the
administrative body, and politics is what gives sense and feeds the spirit of
the administration’.[23]
B. Improved electoral security
Planning of security
precautions and responses needs to be undertaken on the basis of risk
assessments of the general election environment and specific issues related to
the geographic or political landscape. Security sector agencies are generally
accustomed to strategic and operational security planning. In an election year,
these plans must take into account the dynamics of electoral conflicts, such as
increased political tensions and conflicts, and requirements to provide
security for a large number of electoral actors, activities and facilities and
a great deal of information. To support and reinforce the integrity of
electoral processes, the SSAs’ electoral security planning must be timely and
well informed about specific electoral needs. Specific consideration should
include electoral risks, needs for the provision of physical protection (to
actors, events, facilities and materials), financial and human resources,
coordination with other actors and so on.
- Conduct a timely exercise to assess security risks
relating to electoral processes within different electoral phases and across different
geographical regions
Security sector agencies
should mobilize organizational expertise to carry out a comprehensive electoral
risk assessment early on in the electoral processes. This assessment must look
into the historical and current electoral conflict dynamics in different
geographical regions. To the greatest extent possible, consultations should
involve all relevant stakeholders including EMBs, relevant ministries (for
example, interior, defence, police, justice, health and transport), local governments,
political parties and civil society organizations.[24]
Understanding of the political actors’ incentives to resort to the use of
violence during electoral processes can inform the planning of appropriate
security responses.[25]
The Colombian Ministry of Defence maps risks
relating to electoral security during local elections in 2011. In 2008, the
government of Colombia estimated that illegal armed groups could, through
intimidation and other violent means, potentially disrupt the 2011 local
elections in as much as one-third of the country. As a response, the Ministry
of Defense mapped out high-risk areas with a focus on electoral security. In
total, 53 police regional centres were involved in mapping out risk areas by
using the existing statistical data and targeted surveys. The exercise
identified 58 municipalities where candidates might experience increased
security risks. High-risk areas were provided with security protocols and
protection schemes in order to guarantee a functional electoral process.
Political actors travelling to areas where protection schemes were put in place
were encouraged to inform the police before travelling. This allowed the
authorities to ‘dispatch adequate protection measures’.[26]
- Operationalize the electoral security strategy in
respect to protection of electoral actors, events, facilities and materials
during the different electoral phases
Operationalization of
electoral security plans will help in translating broader electoral security
concepts into practical action points. It will point to specific categories
that need security protection, such as actors (election officials, political
leaders), electoral events (political party rallies, for example), electoral
facilities (such as voter registration centres and EMB offices and warehousing
facilities where electoral materials are kept), and electoral materials (such
as sensitive electoral materials). Furthermore, it will link specific security
protection needs with specific phases of the electoral cycle and assign
inter-agency responsibilities.
Operationalization of an electoral security
strategy during the 2009 elections in India. The Election Commission of India (ECI) was in
charge of putting in place an electoral security strategy for the protection of
electoral actors, facilities and materials ahead of the 2009 parliamentary
elections. The challenges included the provision of security arrangements for
828,000 polling stations. To compensate for a shortage of security personnel,
since demand for them would be so great, the ECI requested that chief electoral
officers in each state make a preliminary assessment of where to deploy extra
security and where to take specific action to deter individuals who might
perpetrate fraud or violence. “Vulnerability mapping” helped the chief
electoral officers identify which polling places in their state would be most
vulnerable. The chief electoral officers then had the power to call upon the
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), a paramilitary police service operated by
India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, to supplement state police during elections.,
The CRPF operated under the command of the Director General of the police, who
took orders from the Chief Electoral Officer during the electoral period. This
led to a decline in the number of election-related incidents and the ECI
declared that the 2009 election was one of the most peaceful in the country’s
history.[27]
- Ensure that joint security planning, that involves
multiple security sector agencies and an EMB, is a collaborative exercise that
takes place at the national and sub-national level
Electoral security is most
effective when adapted to the local security context.[28]
Implementation of the electoral security strategy may require the
establishment of joint coordination bodies such as task forces or joint
election operation centres.[29]
Such security forums will maintain and enhance coordination between agencies
throughout the electoral cycle. Security planning may also take into account a
wider range of actors including political parties, other ministries and civil
society groups.[30]
Coordination between the Interim Independent
Electoral Commission and the Kenyan police strengthens security planning ahead
of the 2010 referendum. Post-electoral violence in 2007–2008 claimed the lives of over 1,500 Kenyans
and caused the internal displacement of more than 300,000 people.[31]
In the context of preparations for the 2010 constitutional referendum, the
Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) and the Kenyan police
collaborated on the development of a comprehensive electoral security plan.
This methodology included identification of the security personnel required to
provide electoral security. Needs assessments were conducted nationwide by the
respective officer commanding police divisions (OCPDs). This information was
consolidated at the national level and collated through a comprehensive report
that was shared with the Commission. The IIEC worked closely with the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and the police on security operations ahead of the elections
and consulted with the Office of the President, the Department of Registration
of Persons and Immigration and, the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and
Constitutional Affairs in order to ‘effectively operationalize election
activities’. To strengthen the capacity of the Kenyan police force to provide
electoral security, uniformed personnel from the Kenyan Wildlife Services and
the Prison Department were seconded, trained and then appointed as police
officers immediately before and after election day.[32]
- Develop a curriculum for training of security sector
agencies on the specifics of security engagement during the electoral processes
Security sector agencies need
training to understand the specific challenges relating to their engagement
during electoral processes. Such training should include human rights and
gender awareness.[33]
When developing the training, the SSAs should collaborate with the EMB. The
training needs to take into account the levels of literacy and linguistic
diversity of security sector officers and the length of the training. If the
training is cascaded, the capacity of trainers to convey the training, while
maintaining its standard, must be ensured.
UN agencies develop a training curriculum for
the Sudanese police ahead of the 2010 general elections. The 2010 general
election was regarded as an important milestone of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement which ended the armed conflict in Sudan.[34] With
assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Elections
Assistance Basket Fund, the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and the United
Nations Mission in Darfur developed a training curriculum on electoral security
in order to train over 34,000 Sudanese police officers at different levels
ahead of the 2010 general election. The curriculum provided a summary of the
electoral law, the polling process, the role of the police, likely offences,
and mock polling scenarios. The UNPOL also produced 27,000 pocket-sized copies
of a as a quick reference guide outlining basic procedures and recommended
police conduct during polling days. This training curriculum covered the
development of a polling day deployment strategy to mitigate election
‘flashpoints’.[35]
C. Improved infrastructure for peace
In addition to EMBs and SSAs,
which have clear mandates and responsibilities to ensure that elections are
peaceful, a number of other state and non-state actors may have a specific
interest in contributing to peaceful elections. These may include civil society
organizations and other groups and individuals which represent the building
blocks of a national infrastructure for peace. During the election planning
phase, these actors should be proactive in identifying and reaching out to
other organizations and individuals with a similar agenda and recognized
potential to mediate and resolve disputes, such as traditional leaders. This
may require the establishment of a joint collaborative forum which can ensure
that efforts are coordinated and results are maximized. Specific actions may
include the mapping of all existing organizations and actors that may
contribute to peaceful elections, the promotion of collaborative platforms and
forums, resource mobilization, operational planning, and the establishment of
collaboration with EMBs and SSAs.
- Map
organizations and individuals with an agenda or capacity to promote peace and
conflict resolution during elections at a national and sub-national level
Effective mechanisms for
conflict prevention and mitigation may take different forms in different
societies. In consolidated democracies, judicial institutions usually enjoy the
citizens’ trust and are able to mediate or resolve conflicts effectively. In
some societies, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and authorities, such
as religious or tribal leaders, complement the judiciary and constitute an
essential conflict prevention and mitigation mechanism. In conflict-prone
societies, additional efforts are often required to develop and enhance
conflict-prevention and peace-building capacities through the establishment of
peace and liaison councils and forums that involve civil society organizations,
political parties, government agencies, reputable citizens, and organizations
and individuals that work to promote gender equality and women’s participation.
Understanding the full peace-building and conflict-prevention potential may
require mapping of the existing infrastructure for peace.
- Join or
initiate discussion forums for participatory dialogues between EMBs, security
sector agencies and non-state actors in the planning phase of electoral
processes
Participatory and democratic
dialogue through multi-stakeholder forums and consultations between state and
non-state actors should be established during the planning phase. If electoral
management bodies and security sector agencies do not take the initiative to
organize dialogue forums, or do not include non-state organizations, these may
take proactive steps to convene such forums themselves. Existing forums,
established to coordinate broader peace-building and conflict-prevention
efforts outside the electoral context, may serve as platforms for discussion
and coordination around actions the prevention and mitigation of
election-related violence during the election period.
Non-state actors conduct nationwide consultations
to support peaceful elections in Somaliland in 2012. Although
recognized as credible, the 2010 elections in Somaliland witnessed some
election-related violence in the form of intimidation and murder.[36]
Ahead of the November 2012 local government election, the Somaliland Non State
Actors Forum (SNSAF) conducted a nationwide consultation process which created
a platform for dialogue, bringing together all electoral stakeholders such as
National Election Commission (NEC), the Committee for the Registration and
Approval of Political Associations (RAC), political parties and associations,
government officials, parliamentarians and civil society organizations which
included traditional and religious leaders, women’s organizations and legal
experts. The objective of the pre-election dialogue was to identify the main
issues that might have a negative impact on the elections, and to generate
appropriate strategies to ensure that elections were free, fair and peaceful.
Some of the concerns identified during the dialogue included shortcomings in
the electoral legal framework relating to ballot paper design, polling station
arrangements, the demarcation of electoral districts and boundaries, inadequate
voter education, the NEC’s general lack of capacity and finances, inappropriate
election timing (no election date was decided at the time of the consultations)
and security concerns.[37]
- Formalize
coordination between state and non-state actors during elections, and mobilize
sufficient financial and human resources for joint action
Strengthening a society’s
resilience to conflict and violence during elections may require enhanced
coordination between, and joint action by, the major state and non-state actors
that have a mandate to work for peaceful elections and an interest in doing so.
These organizations should work together to develop operational plans for
engagement throughout the different phases of the electoral cycle at the
national and sub-national level. In conflict-prone societies, such plans should
foresee the establishment of standing bodies for data collection and analysis,
the creation of early warning alerts, and coordination of prevention and
mitigation activities. Preventive and mitigation actions requires funds,
however. In the long run, such mechanisms are inexpensive and cost-effective.[38]
State and non-state actors establish a
collaborative early warning and conflict prevention platform ahead of the 2010
referendum in Kenya. During the outbreak of election-related violence in Kenya in 2008, far
fewer incidents were recorded in the Kenyan districts where a District Peace
Committee (DPC) existed than in districts without such a committee. The results
were so convincing that, after the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of
2008 was passed, the government decided to establish DPCs in all of Kenya’s
districts. Prior to the 2010 constitutional referendum, the National Steering
Committee on Conflict Management (NSC), the National Cohesion and Integration
Commission (NCIC), PeaceNet Kenya (an umbrella body for peace-building CSOs in
Kenya), and UNDP Kenya established the Uwiano Platform for Peace. This Platform
also involves other key government agencies such as the Provincial
Administration, Kenya Police, Administration Police, the National Security
Intelligence Service (NSIS) and the Interim Independent Electoral Commission
(IIEC) in ‘a unique multi-stakeholder conflict prevention, de-escalation and
response strategy that emphasized preventive action, diplomacy and community
dialogue’.[39]
The contribution of Uwianoto the peaceful referendum has been well documented.
The key success factors included the strong national profile of the principal
partners and their linkage to credible grass-roots networks, including the
Provincial Administration, security agencies and district peace committees.
Positive media input supportive donors and development partners and the UNDP’s
invaluable role in mobilizing resources. The establishment and
operationalization of the Emergency Response Fund (ERF), also referred to as
the Rapid Response Fund, was one of the most notable achievements of Uwiano.
- Consult
with traditional and religious leaders in order to understand their interest
and potential to assist in mediating electoral conflict
Acknowledgement of the role of
traditional and religious leaders in the peace infrastructure is an important
measure for preventing electoral violence, particularly in remote areas. It is
important to be aware that the authority of elected leaders has been often in
competition with traditional leaders´ power.[40]
Engagement should be based on a constructive approach and respect for
traditions.[41]
However, some traditions are not always inclusive and participatory, especially
with regard to women’s participation. Traditional and religious leaders should
not be perceived as biased if they are to have the legitimacy to resolve
disputes.[42]
It is important to be aware of gender roles and
context-specific practices and beliefs when working with religious leadership
in any particular context.
Chiefs affirm support to democratic processes
ahead of Sierra Leone’s 2007 elections. Following a decade-long conflict, Sierra Leone
organized its first peacetime general elections in 2002. These elections did
witness some incidents of election-related violence. In this respect, the potential
of the paramount chiefs to contribute to the prevention and mitigation of
election-relation violence ahead of and during the 2007 elections was explored.
Ahead of the campaigning phase, the Fatima Institute and the UNDP organized
several leadership consultation workshops around the country in an effort to
clarify the role of the paramount chiefs in the electoral process, resulting in
the Makeni Protocol whereby chiefs affirmed their commitment to promote the
democratic and electoral process.[43]
In general, the 2007 election was regarded as free and fair; however, incidents
of intimidation were still recorded during the campaign period and on election
day.[44]
- Create a platform to enable information exchange on the electoral process
and monitor the activities of electoral stakeholders throughout
Election Watch initiatives are a means
to increase the transparency of the electoral process. Through observation of
the voting operations, information of the public about the activities in the
different stages of the electoral cycle (such as voter registration, nomination
of parties and candidates, or campaigning).[45]
Moreover, election watch projects monitor the work of other electoral
stakeholders, such as political parties, or review the reporting in the media.
The Namibian Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) launches
an Election Watch ahead of general elections in November 2014 and regional and
local elections in 2015.[46] The project uses different channels
to publish election-related material: it operates a website that features
background documents and explanations on elections, news from the Electoral
Commission, political analysis, party lists, manifestos and speeches.[47]
Further, it produces a regular Election Watch Bulletin[48]
with information on electoral activities in an online and print version and
also makes use of social media. This way, information is made accessible for
civil society activists, journalists, students and the public in general. The
objective of the project is to act as a platform for the exchange of the views
of the citizens and civil society activists on the electoral process and a
vehicle for voter education[49].
Another asset is that it can make a contribution to the peacefulness of the
electoral process: Through such a comprehensive monitoring effort, potential
problems that might threaten the effective organization of the vote and trigger
conflicts can be detected. After all, the initiative also strives to promote
Namibian, African and international electoral and democratic standards.
[9] Scharff, Michael, ‘Policing Election Day: Vulnerability
Mapping in India, 2006–2009’ ([Princeton, NJ]: Trustees of Princeton
University, Innovations for Successful Societies, 2011), p. 7, available
at <https://
successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID173.pdf>,
accessed 3 May 2018
[10] International IDEA, Electoral Management Design: The
International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), p. 195.
[20] Following a Constitutional reform,
the mandate of the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) was broadened and the name
changed to Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE)
[45] Cf. The Electoral Integrity
Project: Election Watch NGOs. – Available at: https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/existing-datasets/election-watch-ngos
[46] NamibianSun: IPPR launches
Election Watch Namibia, 10 June 2014. – Available at:
https://www.namibiansun.com/news/ippr-launches-election-watch-namibia/
[47] Election Watch. Promoting
democracy in Namibia. – Available at: http://www.electionwatch.org.na/
[48] Institute for Public Policy
Research (IPPR): Election Watch, Issue No. 6 2015. – Available at:
http://www.ippr.org.na/sites/default/files/Election%20Watch%20Bulletin%206%20List%20of%20Candidates.pdf
[49] Election Watch: About us. –
Available at: http://www.electionwatch.org.na/?q=about
