Preventing Election-related Violence

Topic IndexVoting operations

Activities in the voting operations phase include logistical preparations for election day, the ballot casting process, vote counting and tallying of the result. This is the period when the logistical and security arrangements are put to the crucial test. High-level mobilization of the electoral administration, domestic and international observers, and security sector agencies, as well as the massive participation of citizens, makes the management and coordination of voting operations processes a very complex undertaking. Given that the period of time in which voting operations are implemented is relatively short, the time available for intervention and for correcting deficiencies in the process is very limited. If problems are widespread, they may seriously threaten the integrity of the election results. No elections are perfectly organized and trouble-free. However, the extent of the problem and reactions to it may differ. It is therefore important that possible risks are identified in advance and that measures are put in place to ensure that elections are peaceful and that the integrity of election results is preserved. In this respect, EMBs, SSAs and other state and non-state actors must work closely together throughout this sensitive period.

Table 6. Voting operations
A. Improved electoral management and justice	B. Improved electoral security	C. Improved infrastructure for peace
Ensure that all electoral materials are produced in sufficient quantities and delivered in timely fashion and safely to the storage facilities and polling and counting centres. Ensure that polling and counting staff are professional, well trained and acquainted with the latest electoral rules, regulations and procedures. Maintain close collaboration with security sector agencies in relation to the provision of physical security to voting materials, polling and counting staff, and facilities. Ensure that the designated poling and counting locations provide a safe environment for election officials, observers and voters. Ensure that special voting operations start on time and that the process is transparent. Ensure that that all electoral stakeholders are familiar with complaint procedures and that electoral dispute resolution bodies process complaints relating to voting and counting processes in good time and effectively. Establish open communication channels with all electoral stakeholders including political parties, observer organizations and citizens. Ensure that ballot casting, counting and result tallying are implemented according to the rules and regulations, accurately and transparently.	Provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations before, during and after election day. Monitor and analyse developments that may impact on the security situation around election day. Maintain close cooperation and coordination with the EMBs and other agencies through the JEOC. Ensure that security sector interventions are in line with the rules of engagement, and that the use of force is kept to a minimum.	Implement voter information and education activities relating to voting day operations. Compile, share and publicize information relating to electoral risks and violent incidents during the voting operations phase. Observe the voting and counting processes. Initiate or sustain peace initiatives and dispute resolution networks during the voting operations phase.

A. Improved electoral management and justice

During the voting operations phase, an EMB must undertake all necessary steps to maintain political stakeholders’ trust in the voting processes and their outcomes. In many ways, this may depend on the EMB’s ability to understand how problems or weaknesses related to previous phases may affect voting operations. It is also important to assess the potential for technical problems and electoral fraud to occur. In respect to logistical and technical challenges, an EMB must ensure the timely production and distribution of electoral materials, the presence of well-trained and professional electoral personnel, and transparent and accurate voting, counting and result tallying methods. During this period, an EMB needs to maintain close cooperation with political stakeholders, observers, security sector agencies and citizens. All electoral actors should have the means to communicate concerns to electoral officials at different levels, so that these can be addressed in a timely manner. Also, all electoral actors should have access to effective electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.

Ensure that all electoral materials are produced in sufficient quantities and delivered in timely fashion and safely to the storage facilities and polling and counting centres

The production, storage and distribution of election materials may raise controversies. In particular, if sensitive materials, such as ballot papers, voter registers and tabulation sheets, are unaccounted for, this may raise suspicion of electoral manipulation. The production, transport and storage of electoral materials therefore need to be timely, transparent and safeguarded. Sensitive electoral materials may have different security features and serial numbers. However, these features should not compromise the secrecy of the voting. Sensitive materials need to be safeguarded at all times, during both transport and storage, and accessible only to authorized personnel. This needs to be coordinated with the security sector agencies. Observer groups should be able to observe the handling of the sensitive election materials throughout the voting operations phase.

The Nigerian Independent National Election Commission cooperates with other state agencies to ensure the safe storage and transport of electoral materials ahead of the 2012 local elections in Edo State. Election-related violence is a recurring issue during election periods throughout Nigeria.^{^[1]} In 2012, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) cooperated with the Nigerian Central Bank (NCB) and security sector agencies in Edo State to ensure that all electoral materials, including anti-fraud customized ballot papers,^{^[2]} were stored and transported safely ahead of the governorship elections. After the production of electoral materials, they were stored at the NCB. Two days before polling day, electoral materials were moved by armoured vans and with security escorts to Edo State and stored in the branch NCB offices for safe custody. Electoral materials were unloaded by INEC officials and security personnel and observed by accredited party agents and the media. At the time, the INEC offices and officials in Edo State were also provided with increased security by the police, the army and the Civil Defense Corps.^{^[3]} The INEC logistical plans included measures to ensure that voting materials were delivered to the polling stations in a secure manner with the assistance of security personnel. However, due to the limited capacity of the security agencies, INEC’s insistence on delivering materials to polling locations only under the protection of security personnel led to some delay in voting procedures.^{^[4]} The governor in Edo State had to publicly condemn the late start of the election.^{^[5]} However, no major incidents of election-related violence were reported on polling day or during the announcement of the results.^{^[6]}

Ensure that polling and counting staff are professional, well trained and acquainted with the latest electoral rules, regulations and procedures

During voting operations, a number of temporary staff will be engaged to perform polling and counting duties. Although an EMB may be able to engage staff with prior experience, training for polling and counting personnel needs to be organized. Because the actual voting and counting exercises take place over a very short time, an EMB’s ability to replace polling and counting staff who show lack of understanding of the relevant procedures, or of the integrity or skills to conduct electoral assignments, will be very limited. Following the training of polling station and counting staff, therefore, an EMB should consider testing the trained staff to verify their understanding of the relevant electoral procedures, rules and regulations. This exercise should be conducted in good time to allow for retraining and replacement of the staff.

Large-scale training of poll workers ahead of the 2004 general elections in Indonesia. Indonesia holds the biggest single-day elections in the world. Ahead of the 1999 parliamentary elections, the first democratic elections in 45 years, 2.8 million poll workers were employed by the National Election Commission (KPU) to work at 300,000 polling stations spread across 17,000 islands. Although election day was mostly peaceful, it was described as ‘seriously flawed administratively’ because the poll worker training programme was ‘inconsistent at best, and/or non-existent throughout the country’.^{^[7]} The fear of election-related violence between political parties emerged after violent conflicts involving political parties’ security personnel in 2003. Ahead of the April 2004 legislative election,^{^[8]} 4 million polling staff members were employed to serve 150 million voters expected to vote at 585,000 polling stations. With the technical support of the UNDP, IFES and the Australian Election Commission, the KPU trained poll workers. Due to timing and budgetary constraints, as well as the large number of poll workers mobilized, training was divided into two components, namely (a) a cascade training-of-trainer system, reaching 15 per cent of the poll workers, and (b) publicly aired training videos and radio programmes, quick reference sheets, manuals and booklets designed to train 85 per cent of poll workers. Both the legislative and the presidential elections of 2004 were relatively free of major incidents and irregularities, although some procedural problems with the handling of ballot papers by polling station staff suggested that more training, especially for those managing polling stations, was needed for the future.^{^[9]}
Maintain close collaboration with security sector agencies in relation to the provision of physical security to voting materials, polling and counting staff, and facilities

To ensure that security sector agencies can engage in the protection of electoral staff and facilities at the right time and adequately, and prevent violence against actors participating in the voting processes, an EMB should liaise with, and provide relevant data to, SSAs at the earliest opportunity. For this purpose, electoral officials should work closely with security officers at the national and sub-national levels. It may be particularly useful for the chairpersons of polling stations and counting committees to meet with responsible security officers prior to election day in order to inspect the polling/counting locations together and discuss security arrangements. If concerns exist, these should be communicated to the relevant instances in both organizations, so that security arrangements can be strengthened in time.

Formalized collaboration between EMBs, SSAs and the judiciary with respect to security arrangements on election day in India. In India historical social divides have often spilled over into the electoral processes through the use of intimidation and violence. To address these challenges, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has developed a Vulnerability Mapping Tool which formalizes collaboration between EMB officials, SSAs and the judiciary in taking action to analyse, deter and mitigate election-related violence. The Election Commission’s Compendium of Instructions (Instruction SI. No 1) provides the framework for mapping out hot-spot areas ahead of an election as well as the inter-agency coordination efforts needed to prevent intimidation of vulnerable voters.^{^[10]} Ahead of election day, presiding officers are also provided with detailed instructions on security arrangements at polling stations in the form of a handbook provided by the ECI. These instructions include information on the responsibility of the Central Police Force, the Local State Police (LSP) and the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF) in terms of protecting the polling station perimeter and regulating orderly entry into the polling station. The handbook also makes clear that polling should not start unless the CPF are present. It also points out that the CPF are responsible for (a) escorting the presiding officers and the electronic voting machines (EMVs) to the reception centre after the voting is completed and (b) guarding the ‘strong room’ where the EVMs are stored until the day of the count.^{^[11]}
Ensure that the designated polling and counting locations provide a safe environment for election officials, observers and voters

When elections are organized in post-conflict or conflict-prone environments, the actual physical location of polling or counting centres may determine the likelihood of election-related violence occurring. It is therefore important to ensure that polling and counting locations provide a safe environment for electoral officials, observers and voters. Some practical considerations are: (a) whether the location is acceptable to all voters; (b) whether it can be associated with historical atrocities and related grievances; (c) whether access roads can be safeguarded; (d) whether it will serve antagonistic groups; (e) whether it is associated with incidents during previous elections; and (f) whether it has sufficient space, lighting and other capacities to facilitate voting and counting and so on. Conflict-sensitive decisions with regard to determining polling and counting locations will consider the potential triggers of conflict in a given geographical and social context.

Security considerations in determining polling station locations in Mauritius. Among criteria for identifying suitable polling stations defined by the Electoral Commissioner’s Office in Mauritius are security conditions. Accordingly, the police are requested to deploy sufficient manpower in order to maintain ‘law and order of each voting station’. Security within the counting locations also includes the safeguarding of sealed ballot boxes ahead of election day as well as for the counting process.^{^[12]}

Ensure that special voting operations start on time and that the process is transparent

Special voting is organized for voters who are unable to cast their ballots at regular polling stations. These categories may include refugees, IDPs, and diaspora voters, as well as voters who are housebound, hospitalized, jailed, or performing military, security, or election services on election day, or are temporarily absent from the country for diplomatic or other reasons. Out-of-country voting (OCV) may be particularly important in countries which have experienced displacements of population as a result of armed conflict. Inclusion of these categories of people in the democratic processes will ensure that they are not deprived of their voting rights. However, it is very difficult to ensure that OCV processes are transparent. In many cases, out-of-country voters will vote at special polling stations abroad, such as consular offices, and by post. In such cases, political parties may find that observation of these processes is too difficult. It may therefore be of great importance to organize OCV in cooperation with international organizations that can support the impartiality of the processes.

Out-of-country voting during the run-up to the 2009 national and provincial elections in South Africa. Elections in South Africa are organized in a highly contested environment with some social tensions and conflicts. Conflict sensitivity is therefore an important aspect of electoral management. In 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled that South Africans living abroad would be entitled to cast their ballot during the 2009 national and provincial elections.^{^[13]} In total, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa approved 18,855 of the 20,350 notifications for out-of-country voting (OCV). One week before election day, 9,857 voters cast their vote in 123 South African missions across the globe. The head of each mission was appointed special voting officer and the staff of the mission were tasked with administering voting procedures. Also, 2,457 votes were cast at foreign missions by government officials and their families. The ballot papers were then sent to the IEC national office in Pretoria before election day. The registration details of voters who had cast special votes (using a double envelope system) were checked against the electoral register to ensure that only eligible voters’ ballot papers were considered. This reconciliation process was undertaken in the presence of political party agents and election observers. Thereafter, the ballot paper was placed in the relevant ballot box to be counted, again in the presence of party agents and election observers.^{^[14]}

Ensure that all electoral stakeholders are familiar with complaint procedures and that electoral dispute resolution bodies process complaints relating to voting and counting processes in good time and effectively

The voting operations period may see many electoral complaints filed by political actors. When the legal deadlines for the announcement of the preliminary and final election results are short, timely processing of electoral complaints may be difficult. Electoral justice mechanisms must therefore have sufficient capacity to process large numbers of complaints in a short period, while at the same time maintaining high professional standards and integrity. To ensure that election complaints (sometimes referred to as election petitions) are filed with the relevant electoral dispute resolution authority, EMBs should work with political actors to make them familiar with the complaint procedures.

Electoral dispute and complaint management during the 2009 national and provincial elections in South Africa. The pre-election phase ahead of the 2009 elections in South Africa saw clashes between political parties in some provinces.^{^[15]}The country has established an Electoral Court, which has the status of a Supreme Court. Its powers include, among others, the review of any decision of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) relating to an electoral matter as well as matters relating to the interpretation of any law or any other matter for which appeal is provided in law. In total, 867 formal complaints were lodged with the IEC, 200 of which came directly from political parties. None of these complaints were eventually referred to the Electoral Court. Using an Issue Tracker Application, the IEC was able to refer complaints to the relevant department for prompt resolution. The outcome was then communicated to the complainant.^{^[16]} Nine formal complaints relating to voting and counting procedures were submitted to the IEC by three political parties before the election results were announced. After reviewing the individual complaints, the IEC notified the political parties that it did not find any major irregularities concerning the voting operations. No appeal process was initiated by the political parties to the Electoral Court.^{^[17]} Also, through the Conflict Management Program, which deployed 107 trained mediators throughout the county, complaints were dealt with on election day relating to long queues or delays or insufficient ballot papers.^{^[18]}

Establish open communication channels with all electoral stakeholders including political parties, observer organizations and citizens

An EMB will face an increased workload during the voting period. This will include extensive decision-making, coordination of field activities, and resolving urgent logistical, technical or legislative challenges. However, it is important that the EMB remains available for cooperation and exchange with political stakeholders, observer groups and citizens during the voting operations phase. In this respect, an EMB should encourage frequent meetings of political party liaison committees, organize briefings for observers and journalists, and open voter hotlines to improve exchange with citizens. In particular, hotlines will enable it to provide voters with personal information while also learning about perceptions of, and satisfaction with, its own work.

The Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa establishes and maintains communication with political party liaison committees during the 2009 elections. Ahead of the 2009 national and provincial elections, incidents of election-related violence occurred during political party gatherings in KwaZulu-Natal province.^{^[19]} The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) met formally with the National Party Liaison Committees (PLCs), which are a permanent consultative structure, 30 times between April 2008 and April 2009. During this time, the PLCs raised ‘matters of concern’ or made ‘recommendations on electoral processes’ to the IEC. The meetings also served as a forum in which the IEC could ‘inform and consult’ the PLCs on specific activities. In particular, the PLCs (in the national, provincial and local spheres of government) were consulted when the IEC was considering (a) changes to existing legislation; (b) the electoral timetable; (c) boundaries of electoral districts and the locations of polling stations; and (d) the recruitment of presiding officers, among other things. Through the PLCs, political parties were available for consultation with the IEC during the voting operations phase, as they were situated in the Results Operation Centre.^{^[20]}Furthermore, the PLCs served as a valuable conflict-resolution mechanism between parties to resolve interparty disputes without going to court.^{^[21]}

The Election Commission of India opens call centres for citizens’ complaints during the 2011 legislative assembly elections. Incidents of election-related violence are common and widespread in India, especially on election day.^{^[22]} As a result, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has established a complaints mechanism for citizens. Ahead of election day, the state chief electoral officers are required to set up mechanisms to register complaints by voters. These may include websites and toll-free call centres supervised by election officials. Once the complaint is registered, action will be taken within a defined time frame. The complainants will be informed via SMS, through the website or by the call centre operators about action taken.^{^[23]}Ahead of the 2011 legislative assembly election in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, the State Chief Electoral Officer opened a call centre in each district. Citizens were encouraged to report electoral malpractice such as the distribution of money, liquor or arms to voters.^{^[24]}

Ensure that ballot casting, counting and result tallying are implemented according to the rules and regulations, accurately and transparently

Many aspects of polling, counting and result tallying can go wrong. Some very common problems include delayed distribution of materials; missing, insufficient or unaccounted-for materials; voters arriving who are not found in the electoral registers; prolonged voting time; disputes and conflicts involving voters and political party and civil society observers, as well as polling station committee staff; procedural confusion; counting mismatches; threats of violence and violent incidents inside or outside the polling stations; the destruction of sensitive voting materials; and so on. If there are problems with the voting and counting processes, an EMB will only have a narrow window of time to address problems, correct deficiencies or resolve disputes on the spot. Its success may depend on an EMB’s contingency planning, agility, mediation skills and credibility. Detailed records of events from the polling stations, including complaints from observers, will help in resolving voting and counting appeals more effectively.

B. Improved electoral security

During the voting operations phase, security sector agencies must take all necessary steps to ensure that elections are conducted in a peaceful environment in which all electoral actors feel safe, and where electoral materials and facilities are well protected. In practical terms, SSAs will need to ensure that sensitive electoral materials are safeguarded while in storage facilities, during transport, and during the actual voting and counting. Furthermore, SSAs will need to ensure that all electoral actors feel protected. Safety should not be limited to the immediate surroundings of polling centres but should include access roads and other public spaces. Due to the large number of polling and counting locations on election day, this may stretch the human and material capacities of security sector agencies. SSAs will therefore benefit from collaboration with an EMB and other state and non-state actors in terms of understanding where to focus their efforts and resources. While performing election security duties, police officers must maintain the highest professional standards and keep the use of force to a minimum.

Provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations before, during and after election day

In the period before, during and after elections, security sector agencies have the mandate and responsibility to provide security to electoral actors, materials and locations. Personal protection arrangements for political party candidates, electoral officials and journalists who face increased security threats should be extended throughout the voting operations phase. Other arrangements may include the provision of security to electoral officials and observers in high-risk areas. Security arrangements for voters should ensure that they feel safe to cast their ballots. Access roads to polling locations need to be safe. In the event of incidents and technical problems on election day, SSAs need to be able to maintain control of the situation and protect electoral officials, offices and vulnerable groups which may be targeted by perpetrators of electoral violence. From the moment the sensitive electoral materials are produced, SSAs need to ensure that these materials are safely stored and protected during the voting and counting.

Protecting electoral actors and locations before and during the 2011 local elections in Colombia. In the run-up to the 2011 local elections, more than three dozen candidates were assassinated. This included 15 mayoral candidates and 26 people running for seats in town and city councils.^{^[25]} Approximately one month ahead of election day, the police activated security protocols for 72 municipalities identified as high-risk. Candidates residing in these municipalities received exceptional protection by security sector agencies before and during election day.^{^[26]}On election day itself, the military and the police mobilized 300,000 servicemen across the country as part of a government-led security initiative called Operation Democracy which aimed to ‘protect the right to elect and be elected’.^{^[27]} This included the deployment of 165,000 officers at over 85,000 polling stations. Reserves were deployed across the country. ‘As part of these efforts, the Strategic Police Information Center (CIEP) was created to coordinate the police deployment, provide public information, and to ensure the safety of voters. The National Police Information System of Plan Democracy (SIPDE) has also been created to gather information and to provide protection for official websites which contain sensitive information.’^{^[28]} In the city of Bogota, the police also invoked a 30-hour gun ban around election day. The high level of security was deemed appropriate in order to protect candidates and civilian voters from organized criminal groups and non-state armed actors such as FARC (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) who threatened to destabilize the electoral process.^{^[29]}
A mobile security arrangement is put in place to safeguard the 14-days-long polling process during the 2012 general election in Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinean elections are often marred by incidents. These include intimidation of voters and electoral officials by candidates and their supporters through the use of firearms, the hijacking of ballot papers and boxes, the stuffing of ballot boxes, and the destruction of private and public property. For these reasons, over 8,000 police, army and correctional officers and Australian defence personnel were enlisted to provide security for 4,700 polling stations, out of which 1,700 were only accessible by air. Due to complexities related to security and logistical challenges, elections in Papua New Guinea are conducted over a 14-day period. The process is coordinated by an inter-agency coordination body, chaired by the Chief Secretary to the government. The security arrangements put in place ensure that sufficient security capacities are deployed in the region where elections take place. Thus, half of 8,000 security personnel were deployed in the highlands provinces a few days before the election. When the polling was completed, they were transferred to the next province where polling was scheduled.^{^[30]}
Monitor and analyse developments that may impact on the security situation around election day

A deterioration of the security situation during the voting operations phase, in particular with the approach of election day, represents a major challenge to security sector agencies. Security actors need to monitor events and adjust their contingency planning to reflect changing realities. In particular, they need to develop a good understanding of the areas where election-day problems, such as technical hiccups or perceptions of rigging, may trigger violent reactions. In addition to establishing a security presence to counter violence, they should share such information with an EMB to ensure that risks are managed through improved electoral management and justice.

Ghanaian security sector agencies watch for early warning signs ahead of 2008 elections Numerous incidents of election-related violence took place in northern Ghana ahead of the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections.^{^[31]} Violent incidents included attacks on journalists during the voter registration period as well as shootings during political party gatherings.^{^[32]} In response to these incidents, members of the security sector agencies, which included the police, the military, customs and immigration, established a ‘coordinated security strategy under the unified command of the Inspector General of Ghana’s police force’. Security personnel cooperated with ‘other electoral stakeholders to watch for early warning signs of violence and take steps to address potential flash points’.^{^[33]} In total the Ghana Police Service identified 1,399 hot spots that could see unrest during the election. Areas varied from specific villages to entire districts.^{^[34]} A National Elections Security Task Force (NESTF) was also established to provide operational capacity for swift action with respect to election-related threats and acts of violence.^{^[35]} This was further operationalized through the deployment of regional security task forces responsible for election security^{^[36]} and a dedicated polling station communications network.^{^[37]}

Maintain close cooperation and coordination of responses with the EMBs and other agencies through the JEOC

During the voting operations phase, security sector agencies need to establish and maintain an operational centre where information from different security agencies, the electoral management body and other relevant organizations can be gathered and analysed and prevention or mitigation actions initiated. Whenever possible, strategies to address increased risks and incidents should include multi-layered approaches to conflict resolution, for example, peace building, negotiations, conflict mediation and so on. Joint Electoral Operations Centres provide a good working platform to operationalize and coordinate conflict prevention and mitigation during elections.

A coordinated security response provided by National Joint Operational Centres before, during and after the 2011 local elections in South Africa. The 2011 local government elections in South Africa were fiercely contested. Before election day, ‘protests threatened to disrupt elections in at least three of South Africa’s poorest provinces—North West, Limpopo and Northern Cape’.^{^[38]} The National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS), led by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and represented by multiple government departments including the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), started preparing security arrangements six months ahead of the 2011 local elections. Approximately two months before election day NATJOINTS activated nine National Joint Operational Centres (NATJOCs) situated in nine South African provinces. NATJOCs were responsible for all coordination related to security actions and reactions in their respective provinces. Election security coordinated by NATJOCs on election day included safeguarding of the inner perimeters of the 20,864 polling stations. In certain areas, the outer perimeter was secured as well. NATJOCs also coordinated SAPS and IEC escorts of election materials to and from the polling stations as well as general crime prevention duties.^{^[39]}

Ensure that security sector interventions are in line with the rules of engagement, and that the use of force is kept to a minimum

In the event of election-related violence occurring during the voting period, security sector agencies must intervene to protect electoral actors, facilities and materials, and vulnerable groups. In some cases, violent incidents may be sponsored by political actors who seek political gains. In other instances, tensions and incidents may be the result of people’s anxieties relating to deficient electoral processes, manipulation by political stakeholders, or even responding to unfounded rumours. In any case, it is important that police act in line with the rules of engagement and refrain from the excessive use of force.

A police oversight mechanism established during the 2012 gubernatorial elections in Nigeria. Election-related violence is a recurring issue in Nigeria. The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) has on occasion been regarded as biased and non-responsive towards imminent threats.^{^[40]} During the 2012 Edo State gubernatorial elections, the Police Service Commission (PSC)^{^[41]}—which is a civilian oversight body—was tasked with monitoring the conduct of police officers during the elections. The monitoring mission was part of the PSC’s overall responsibility of holding the NPF accountable for its actions. Before the election, the PSC issued a document entitled Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Election Duty^{^[42]} to the NPF. The guidelines highlight 11 key principles such as alertness; approachability; professionalism; maintenance of impartiality; fairness; use of force; awareness of electoral law; and so on. In total, 11 officers divided into three teams monitored the election in Edo State. The PSC also opened three telephone hotlines for citizens to lodge complaints. The police also cooperated with the CLEEN Foundation, a Nigerian-based NGO which deployed observers throughout Edo State to observe the conduct of security operatives on election duty.^{^[43]} Overall, the PSC monitoring mission concluded that the NPF had conducted themselves very well and congratulated the police for their professional conduct. The PSC also praised the NPF for their rapid-response capability which had allowed for increased security in certain areas at short notice.^{^[44]}

C. Improved infrastructure for peace

During the voting operations phase, non-state and state actors that share an interest in and a mandate to support the conduct of peaceful elections should focus their efforts on voter information, election observation and the exchange of risk data with other actors, including EMBs and SSAs. Due to the scope and dynamics of voting operations, these actors will need to build internal capacity to engage and coordinate efforts so as to maximize results.

Implement voter information and education activities relating to voting day operations

Civil society organizations are well positioned to implement programmes tailored to reach out to the general population, but also to remote or isolated communities and marginalized and vulnerable groups, including women. In addition to the general set of skills required to implement training programmes, CSO activists should be acquainted with the electoral rules and regulations, and have specific information on the timing and locations of electoral events and electoral dispute resolution procedures. Voter education should focus on the rights and obligations of all citizens to participate in electoral processes. Specific education efforts should aim to generate interest among and create a safe environment for vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as women, to participate in electoral processes.

A media campaign is designed to promote the participation of young people ahead of the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections in Tunisia. Due to the negative experiences with elections under the pre-revolution regime, there was suspicion and fear among the people of Tunisia during the run-up to the 2011 National Constituent Assembly election. To address these concerns, Radio Mosaique FM, one of Tunisia’s foremost radio stations, together with the UNDP, launched a voters’ educational game designed to promote youth participation. The game, called DemocraTweet, was initiated a few weeks ahead of election day. It covered broad election-related topics, from the institutional legal framework to election procedures. Radio Mosaique FM, which attracts a large number of website and Facebook visitors, decided to make particular use of social media. Young people were targeted in particular because they make up a large proportion of the Tunisian population, and because of their pivotal role during the 2010–11 ‘Jasmine Revolution’.^{^[45]}
Compile, share and publicize information relating to electoral risks and violent incidents during the voting operations phase

With the approach of election day, incidents of election-related intimidation and physical violence directed against electoral actors, journalists and citizens may increase. If such violence is directed against citizens in remote areas or against marginalized groups, such as women, incidents may never be reported to the authorities and even if they are reported, security sector agencies may, for political reasons, fail to prosecute perpetrators. Non-state actors may be well positioned to engage, through their networks, in systematic collection of data on incidents, perpetrators and victims. Such data should be shared with the security sector agencies for investigation and prosecution. Where SSAs fail to respond, these data can be publicized in the media to pressure responsible actors to take action.

Civil society organization monitors and reports on election-related violence during the 2010 presidential election in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan elections in 1999 and 2005 saw cases of election-related violence. Ahead of the presidential election in 2010, violent attacks against candidates, campaigners and political activists were reported. In this context, the Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV)^{^[46]} deployed several hundred electoral observers across the country. One of their main tasks was to record incidents of electoral violence. The organization started monitoring activities long before the elections, kept them up during voting operations, and continued thereafter. On election day alone, the CMEV deployed 3,790 monitors throughout the county, who worked in mobile teams or stationed at polling stations.^{^[47]}On election day, it recorded 178 incidents, of which 94 were categorized as major and included intimidation and the use of firearms. The CMEV used a range of means to analyse and present information, including Google maps for mapping incidents of violence.^{^[48]} This information was presented to the public and used to pressure the responsible agencies to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of election-related violence.

Civil society organizations monitored and reported on election-related violence during the 20012 provincial elections for the governorship in Aceh, Indonesia.

“To monitor and mitigate election-related violence, IFES has partnered with two local organizations to implement an Election Violence Education & Resolution (EVER) project. These organizations, Forum LSM Aceh and Aceh Institute, seek to mitigate election-related violence by monitoring and documenting incidents in 60 districts and 12 regencies for a six-week period (four weeks prior to Election Day and two weeks after). EVER partners issue reports and press briefings based on field monitoring results to stakeholders, including KIP Aceh, and they held an additional press conference last week, which reported about 77 verified incidents of election violence since monitoring efforts began in March.”[49]

Observe the voting and counting processes

Election observation efforts, involving political parties, civil society groups and international actors, are always focused on voting and counting operations. Through observation, interested actors can witness the integrity of electoral processes and record incidents that, in their view, represent irregularities. The capacity of electoral observation missions to discourage manipulation of voting and counting is well established. Well-documented cases which identify the perpetrators of electoral violence and fraud will make it possible to prosecute and sanction offenders. The presence of independent observers will also discourage political party observers from intimidating voters.

Domestic electoral observers report critical election day incidents during the 2012 general elections in Ghana. Several incidents of election-related violence were recorded in Ghana during the 2008 election and during the run-up to the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.^{^[50]} The Coalition for Domestic Electoral Observation (CODEO), the largest independent and non-partisan domestic observation coalition in Ghana, observed the 2012 general election. CODEO trained and deployed approximately 4,500 non-partisan observers, 3,000 of whom observed the voting, counting and collation process, while 1,500 observed the parallel vote tabulation (PVT). Information collected by the observers during polling day was collected and analysed by the CODEO secretariat ahead of public dissemination. CODEO published two reports during election day, a midday report and a close-of-the-polls report. The observers, constituency supervisors, and regional coordinators were also tasked with reporting critical incidents directly to a dedicated CODEO hotline. These incidents, which included violence, harassment and intimidation, voting procedure violations, suspension of voting, and the presence of unauthorized persons in polling stations, were then verified by a Critical Incident Team. In total, 79 critical incident reports were received during voting operations, of which 13 cases related to harassment and intimidation.^{^[51]}
An NGO observes the conduct of security operatives during the 2012 gubernatorial elections in Nigeria. Election-related violence is a recurring issue in Nigeria. The Nigerian Police Force has on occasion been regarded as biased and non-responsive towards imminent threats.^{^[52]} During the 2012 Edo State gubernatorial elections, the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (or CLEEN Foundation) recruited, trained and deployed observers in all local government areas to observe the conduct of security officials on election duty. CLEEN also published a shortened version of the police’s Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Electoral Duty in state and national newspapers. The notice also included numbers of CLEEN-established call centres, where citizens could issue complaints and report incidents with respect to the conduct of security officials during election day. Shortly after the election, the centre issued a public statement which included specific observations and recommendations on election security for future elections.^{^[53]}

Initiate or sustain peace initiatives and dispute resolution networks during the voting operations phase

Non-state and state actors that promote peace and engage in mediation and conflict resolution around elections will usually build their capacities and commence peace initiatives during the earlier phases of the electoral cycle. These efforts need to be intensified, or otherwise established, and tailored to address risks and tensions surrounding the polling and counting processes. Specific peace campaigning activities can include the promotion of dialogue forums with the aim of bringing together political leaders and getting them to pledge non-violent resolution of electoral disputes. Furthermore, peace councils can be activated to mediate the resolution of electoral disputes relating to tensions and incidents before and after election day. In cooperation with EMBs and security sector agencies, CSO representatives and other state and non-state actors can be trained to engage in peaceful conflict resolution and dispute mediation around election day, thus complementing EMB and SSA efforts.

National and sub-national peace initiatives support organization of the peaceful 2010 constitutional referendum in Kenya. The Uwiano Platform for Peace was launched several months ahead of the 2010 constitutional referendum. The referendum was the first voting exercise since the 2007 general election, when post-election violence caused the deaths of more than 1,500 people and the displacement of more than 300,000.^{^[54]} The strategic aim of Uwiano was to promote peace building, conflict management, and national cohesion and integration processes by developing a platform in which state and non-state organizations could work together at the national and sub-national levels. This was done through the identification of hot spots and the taking of timely action before, during, and after election day. On the grassroots level, District Peace Committees (DPCs), peace monitors and CSOs were tasked with communicating with the Joint Secretariat in Nairobi on issues of peace and conflict on a regular basis. This included SMS messages and early warning reports throughout the election period. Furthermore, DPCs were tasked with building partnerships with businesses and professionals at the local level as well as identifying rapid response teams and mediators to engage in confidence-building measures. In order to deploy for ‘local level negotiation and mediation processes, dialogue, communal cohesion activities, activities that counter propaganda and hate speech’ the DPCs were expected to request funds from the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) administrated by the Joint Secretariat. In general, between 600 and 1200 USD was disbursed per request within 48 hours. ‘ERF received over fifty applications for community visit projects, public meetings, community dialogues, mediation and reconciliation.’^{^[55]}

[1] International Crisis Group, ‘Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis’, Africa Report No. 123, 28 March 2007, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-elections-avoiding- political-crisis>, accessed 8 May 2018

[2] ‘Edo to Get Special Ballot Papers for Governorship Election’, The Guardian, 8 June 2012, available at <http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=88596:edo-to-get-special-ballot-papers-for-governorship-election&catid=1:national&Itemid=559>, accessed 10 January 2013.

[3] Punch, ‘Edo Poll: CBN Delivers Election Materials under Heavy Security’, 13 July 2012, <http://www.punchng.com/news/edo-poll-cbn-delivers-election-materials-under-heavy- security/>, accessed 10 January 2013

[4] ‘Massive Voters Turnout at Edo Guber Elections’, Vanguard, 14 July 2012, available at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/massive-voters-turnout-at-edo-guber-elections/>, accessed 10 January 2013.

[5] ‘What Is the Value of INEC’s Voter’s Card?’, Sunday Trust, 30 September 2012, available at <http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11479:what-is-the-value-of-inecs-voters-card&catid=63:point-blank&Itemid=115>, accessed 10 January 2013.

[6] Voice of America, ‘Nigerians Celebrate Governor’s Victory in Peaceful Election’, 15 July 2012, available at <http://www.voanews.com/content/nigerians_celebrate_governers_victory_in_peaceful_election/1405009.html>, accessed 11 January 2013.

[7] Kaplan, A., Republic of Indonesia Evaluation of Poll Worker Training, January 2000, (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2000, <http://www.ifes.org/publications/republic-indonesia-evaluation-poll-worker-training- january-2000>, accessed 8 May 2018

[8] Three elections were held in 2004: national, provincial and regency/city legislative elections on 5 April 2004, first-round presidential elections on 5 July 2004, and second-round presidential elections on 20 September 2004.

[9] Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), ‘Indonesia General Assembly Elections Presidential Election 2004’, December 2004, <http://newmediaauthority.com/anfrel/ wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2004_indonesia.pdf>, accessed 15 February 2013

[10] Election Commission of India, Compendium of Instructions, Model Code of Conduct, Vol. 3 (New Delhi, 2009), pp. 1–6, available at <http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/compendium/vol3.pdf>.

[11] Election Commission of India, Handbook for Presiding Officers, 2009, Section 7, ‘Security Arrangements at Polling Stations’, available at <http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/HandBooks/Handbook_for_Presiding_Officers.pdf>, accessed 5 February 2013.

[12] Kasenally, Rouikaya, ‘Chapter 8: Mauritius’, in Denis Kadima and Susan Booysen (eds), Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa 1989–2009: 20 Years of Multiparty Democracy (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), 2009), pp. 293–4.

[13] B&S Europe, ‘FWC-LOT 7 – Culture, Governance and Home Affairs-n 2009/202498: EU Election Mission to South Africa Final Report’, 26 May 2009, p. 22, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/microsoftword-finalreport_electionmissiontosouthafrica_28sep.pdf>, accessed 6 February 2013.

[14] Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), ‘National and Provincial Elections’, 22 April 2009, p. 93, available at <http://www.elections.org.za/content/Dynamic.aspx?id=1344&name=Elections&LeftMenuId=100&BreadCrumbId=220>, accessed 6 February 2013.

[15] Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) Election Observation Mission, ‘South Africa National and Provincial Elections
22 April 2009’, 2010, pp. 24–5, available at <http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/sou2009eom.pdf>, accessed 6 February 2013.

[16] Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), ‘National and Provincial Elections’, p. 99.

[17] B&S Europe, ‘Culture, Governance and Home Affairs-n 2009/202498’, p. 25.

[18] Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) Election Observation Mission, ‘South Africa National and Provincial Elections’, pp. xvi–xvii.

[19] Ibid., pp. 24–5.

[20] Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), ‘National and Provincial Elections’, p. 9.

[21] Ibid., p. 25.

[22] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia’, 2011, available at <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/UNDP_elections_violence_AP.pdf, accessed 12 April 2013.

[23] Election Commission of India, Press Note No. ECI/PN/70/2012 3 October 2012, available at <http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/current/pn3102012.pdf>, accessed 12 April 2013.

[24] The News Himachal, ‘Election Expenditure Monitoring, Control Rooms and Call Centres Set Up’, 18 October 2013, <https://www.thenewshimachal.com/2012/10/election- expenditure-monitoring-control-rooms-and-call-centres-set-up/>, accessed 8 May 2018

[25] Fox News Latino, ‘Candidates Killings Climb Ahead of Colombian Elections’, 25 October 2011, <https://zayzay.com/news/candidate-killings-climb-ahead-of-colombian- elections/>, accessed 29 August 2018

[26] Colombia Reports, ‘Colombia Announces Plan to Protect Election Candidates’, 30 August 2011a, <https://colombiareports.com/interior-ministry-takes-charge-of-candidate- protection/>, accessed 29 August 2018

[27] Colombia Reports, ‘Colombia Mobilizes 360,000 for Election Security’.

[28] Colombia Reports, ‘ 26 October 2011, available at <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/19957-security-tightened-ahead-of-sundays-election.html>, accessed 30 January 2013.

[29] International Crisis Group, ‘Cutting the Links Between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia’s 2011 Elections’, 25 July 2011, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37-%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics-%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf>, accessed 30 January 2013.

[30] Contribution from International IDEA by Henry Ivarature, Senior Programme Officer of International IDEA (former Senior Government Officer in the PNG Department of the Prime Minister), 15 April 2013.

[31] IRIN, ‘Ghana: Pre-election Violence Escalates’, 9 September 2008, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/80250/GHANA-Pre-election-violence-escalates>, accessed 30 January 2013.

[32] IRIN, ‘Ghana: Pre-election Violence and Irregularities Worry Watchdogs’, 7 August 2008, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/79703/GHANA-Pre-election-violence-and-irregularities-worry-watchdogs>, accessed 30 January 2013.

[33] National Democratic Institute (NDI), ‘Colloquium on African Election: Best Practices and Cross-Sectorial Collaboration’, 11 November 2009, p. 9, available at <http://www.ndi.org/files/African_Elections_Best_Practices_ENG.pdf>, accessed 30 January 2013.

[34] IRIN Africa, ‘Ghana: Police Gear Up to Prevent Election Violence’, 21 November 2008, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/81613/GHANA-Police-gear-up-to-prevent-election-violence>, accessed 30 January 2013.

[35] Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), ‘Democratic Transition and Electoral Security in Ghana’, CPMRD Newsletter, December 2008, available at <http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Newsletters/Newsletters/Dec_2008.aspx>, accessed 30 January 2013.

[36] European Union Election Observation Mission, ‘Ghana: Final Report, Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2008’, February 2009, p. 19, available at <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/eu_eom_final_report_ghana.pdf>, accessed
30 January 2013.

[37] ‘Police Identify More than 1,000 Flashpoints’, 21 November 2012, available at <http://www.africanelections.org/ghana/news_detail.php?nws=6954&t=Police%20identify%20over%201,000%20flashpoints>, accessed 5 February 2013.

[38] BBC News, ‘South Africa Votes in Crucial Elections’, 18 May 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13427900>, accessed 17 January 2013.

[39] South African Government Information, ‘The National Joint Operational Centre of the Security Forces Activated 24/7 for Local Government Elections’, 16 May 2011, available at <http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=18423&tid=33516>, accessed 17 January 2013.

[40] ‘Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis’, Africa Report No. 123, 28 March 2007, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-elections-avoiding- political-crisis>, accessed 8 May 2018

[41] The Police Service Commission, Nigeria, ‘Mandate’, [n.d.]<http://psc.gov.ng/about/>, accessed 8 May 2018

[42] Cleen Foundation, ‘Securing Elections in Nigeria’, 2011, pp. 43–5, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Securing%20Election%20in%20Nigeria.pdf>, accessed 14 February 2013.

[43] Cleen Foundation, ‘Preliminary Statement by CLEEN Foundation on the Conduct of Security Officials during the Edo State Gubernational Elections held on Saturday, 14 July 2012’, 17 July 2012, available at <http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.se/2012/07/preliminary-statement-by-cleen.html>, accessed 14 February 2013.

[44] ‘Edo Polls: Police Service Commission Releases Interim Report’, News Diary, 18 July 2012, available at <http://newsdiaryonline.com/edo-pollspolice-service-commission-releases-interim-report/>, accessed 14 February 2013.

[45] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Supporting Democratic Elections in the New Tunisia’, available at <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/successstories/supporting-democratic-elections-tunisia.html>, accessed 15 April 2013.

[46] The CMEV was formed in 1997 by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), the Free Media Movement (FMM) and the Coalition Against Political Violence as an independent and non-partisan organization to monitor the incidence of election-related violence. Currently, the CMEV is made up of the CPA, the FMM and the INFORM Human Rights Documentation Centre.

[47] Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV), ‘Presidential Elections: 2010 Statement on Elections Day’, 27 January 2010, available at <http://cmev.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/statement-on-election-day_27_01_2010_english_final.pdf>.

[48] International IDEA, ‘Monitoring Election Related Violence in Sri Lanka’, 22 May 2015, <https:// www.idea.int/news-media/news/monitoring-election-related-violence-sri-lanka>, accessed 8 May 2018

[49] IFES, UPDATED - Elections in Aceh: Another Step Forward, retrieved from https://www.ifes.org/news/updated-elections-aceh-another-step-forward

[50] Modern Ghana, ‘Elections 2012: The Ghana Police and Politicians’, 22 October 2012, available at <http://www.modernghana.com/news/425456/1/elections-2012-the-ghana-police-and-politicians.html>, accessed 15 February 2013.

[51] Coalition for Domestic Electoral Observation (CODEO), ‘Polling Day Observation: Situational (Close of Polls) Report’, 7 December 2012, available at <http://www.gndem.org/sites/default/files/CODEO_CLOSE_OF_POLLS_STATEMENT_07_Dec_12.pdf>, accessed 31 January 2013.

[52] ‘Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis’, Africa Report No. 123, 28 March 2007, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-elections-avoiding- political-crisis>, accessed 8 May 2018.

[53] CLEEN Foundation, ‘Preliminary Statement by CLEEN Foundation on the Conduct of Security Officials during the Edo State Gubernational Elections Held on Saturday, 14 July 2012’, 17 July 2012, available at <http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.se/2012/07/preliminary-statement-by-cleen.html>, accessed 14 February 2013.

[54] Roberts, Mara J., Conflict Analysis of the 2007 Post-election Violence in Kenya (Charlottesville, Va.: New Dominion Philanthropy Metrics, 2009), available at <http://www.ndpmetrics.com/papers/Kenya_Conflict_2007.pdf>, accessed 13 February 2013.

[55] Uwiano Joint Secretariet, ‘UWIANO Platform for Peace Experiences and Lessons Learnt’, 2012, available at <http://www.google.se/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nscpeace.go.ke%2Fnsc%2Findex.php%2Fresource-library%2Fdownloads%2Fpublications%2F100-uwiano-lessons-and-experiences-learnt-report%2Fdownload&ei=Rnx2UN-BDe3Q4QSBgIGgBQ&usg=AFQjCNHbq3i3aN00NWHjS9WZhDQzocW6Sw&sig2=n3053LHnQY2p8FP5q6-9Hw>, accessed 31 January 2013.

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Preventing Election-related Violence