Electoral Incentives for Inter-Ethnic Accommodation
The South Pacific country of Papua New Guinea (PNG) has utilised two different electoral systems - the Alternative Vote (AV) from 1964-1975 when it was an Australian territory, and First Past the Post (FPTP) from 1975 onwards, when it attained independence, see Alternative Vote and First Past the Post (FPTP). Its experience is interesting for a number of reasons. First, Papua New Guinea is one of the few developing countries with an unbroken record of continuous competitive elections and numerous peaceful changes of government. Second, the change from one election system to another resulted in a series of unexpected consequences which illustrate the different effects apparently similar electoral systems can have.
Papua New Guinea inherited the AV system from Australia, and used it for three elections in 1964, 1968, and 1972. But, unlike Australia, PNG is a highly ethnically-fragmented state, and its experience of the three elections held under AV rules lends support to the claims that AV can promote inter-ethnic accommodation and moderation in deeply divided societies. This was because of the preferential nature of AV, under which voters express not just their first choice of candidate, but also their second and later choices. Because of the clan-based nature of PNG society, under AV most voters invariably gave their first preference to their own clan or 'home' candidate. But, in many seats, this was not enough for any single candidate to gain a majority of votes; they needed the second preferences of other groups as well. In order to do this, candidates had to sell themselves as a good 'second-best' choice to other clan groups - which meant, in general, someone who would be attentive to the interests of all groups, not just their own. It also meant that those candidates who formed alliances and co-operated with each other would often be more successful than candidates who attempted to win the seat from their own voter base alone. This gave many candidates an incentive to act in an accommodative manner to other clans. The mechanics of the system also ensured that the winning candidate would have the support of an absolute majority of voters. In a substantial number of cases, the winning candidate was not the one who had the biggest 'bloc' of supporters, but rather the one who could successfully build support across several groups.
Thinking that First Past the Post would be simpler system which would have similar effects to AV, Papua New Guinea changed to a FPTP electoral system at independence in 1975. However, the different incentives provided by the new FPTP system led to quite different results than were expected. Because candidates no longer needed an absolute majority of votes cast in order to be successful, but just more than any other group, the candidate from the largest clan would often win the seat outright. There was no incentive to co-operate with anyone else. Electoral violence increased, because it was in some candidates' interests to stop opponents' supporters from voting, rather than to campaign for their second preferences as they had under AV. Also, because there are so many clans all trying to win the seat, candidates learned that they could be successful with very limited support. At the 1992 elections, almost half the PNG parliament was elected with less than 20% of the vote - one successful candidate gained only 6.3%. It is now common for candidates to be encouraged to stand in order to 'split' a dominant clan's voter base. This has led to a number of observers and politicians to call for the reintroduction of AV.
The Papua New Guinea case illustrates just how dependent much of the accepted wisdom regarding electoral systems is on the structure of the society concerned. Despite having a FPTP electoral system, PNG has a very fluid party system, based on individuals rather than ideologies, and all governments so far have been weak coalitions, which have changed on the floor of parliament as well as at elections. The single-member system of representation has resulted in high levels of turnover of politicians from one election to the next and in a strong sense of accountability on the part of most local members to their electorate. However, under the AV system this sense of accountability tended to be spread across a number of groups, whereas under FPTP a member's clan base is sometimes his or her sole focus.
