An important responsibility of political parties is to act as watchdogs during the election process, to protect the party's interests by closely monitoring the correctness of the procedures used during registration, [polling], and the count. The crucial role of party representatives is to witness the entire procedure and to check for fraud. This requires the presence of the parties during the registration process, during the voting process, when the ballot boxes are sealed, when they are opened, when votes are counted, and when ballot boxes are transported.
A task normally expected of parties during registration, see Political Parties and Interest Groups and Gathering Changes to Preliminary List, is to ensure their supporters are included and to object to the registration of those they feel are not entitled to be on the register. The public authorities leave it to the rival parties to conduct the policing of the register (voter's list) on the assumption that their local organisations will have local knowledge and that it will be in their self-interest to object to the inclusion of electors placed on the register by their political opponents. [In order to allow this 'policing by party' the system in many countries (Britain, Bosnia, Namibia for example) is to provide a draft or provisional register; followed by a period of complaints and objections, only after which the final register comes into force.]
Monitoring the transport of ballots and sensitive election equipment is done either by party monitors (Mozambique 1994), or, in many cases, police or other security personnel, or by the use of tamper evident bags or seals (used in most new elections). In established democracies, such as Sweden, sometimes a high trust level can result in no monitoring of the transport whatsoever.
One of the most difficult and yet essential parts of the process to monitor is the vote count. Mechanisation, or a complex count, may lead to suspicion on the part of the party monitors. A clear understanding of procedures is essential to present proper challenges to inaccuracies or unfairness at the count, see Challenging Results.
The presence of agents of candidates and parties is a strong anti-fraud device. However, this depends on the ability of each party to recruit and train the necessary number of local representatives. In Ghana for example, in the 1996 elections, or in Cambodia in the 1993 elections, it was difficult for parties to recruit poll watchers in areas where they were politically weak. In countries with strong tribal traditions or where for other reasons (in Cambodia's case, polarisation in the aftermath of the war) a single party predominates in an electoral district, opposition parties may not be able to fulfil the poll watching task properly.
The opposite problem can also occur. In a 1998 by-election in Mauritius, for instance, with over 40 candidates each entitled to two agents, the counting places reportedly became overcrowded with dozens of such agents.
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) Handbook on monitoring elections cites the following regarding partisan election monitoring: 'Even in countries with long-standing democratic traditions, political party representatives are assigned to virtually all voting sites on election day. In addition to discouraging electoral manipulation, the presence of party pollwatchers demonstrates a party's organisational strength to prospective voters, which may accrue psychological benefits for a party engaged in a closely contested election. Party pollwatchers also provide political parties with an important and timely source of information regarding voter turnout after the polls close. Party pollwatchers, however, represent partisan electoral contestants. In the event of a dispute or irregularity, these pollwatchers have a natural tendency to protect the interests of their party, candidate or issue. In a polarised political environment, the information collected by political parties may be challenged as biased and untrustworthy.' 7.
