In several elections, for reasons outlined in Vote Counting at Polling Stations, votes are initially counted at voting stations; in some cases they are subsequently recounted at counting centres. There are cases, however, where no counting is done at voting stations, but ballots are transported directly to centralised counting centres after the close of the polls.
Rationale for Counting Centres
Some combination of the following scenarios warrants consideration of a counting centre approach:
- when voting stations are not properly equipped for counting;
- when there are very few party or candidate representatives or National/international electoral observers available to observe the count in a large number of voting stations;
- when a complex ballot makes the count too time-consuming and complicated for the poll workers to manage after the close of the station, warranting the specially trained personnel and facilities that a counting centre can offer. A complicated ballot could be one on which several questions are posed on the same ballot; or when voters have to prioritise their choices;
- when the secrecy of the vote preference of an individual may be compromised by the announcement of results in voting stations with very few voters;
- when the secrecy of a community's vote preference needs to be safeguarded due to the threat of violence, repercussions, or intimidation in politically volatile situations;
- when security conditions are such that it is deemed easier to secure the protection of a smaller number of counting centres rather than of a large number of voting stations;
- when a mechanical or computerised counting system requires centralisation.
In a counting centre approach, where ballots from two or more polls are mixed together, with results published by counting centre instead of by polling station, it is more difficult to link communities with affiliation. This may help to protect the secrecy of the voting pattern, especially in some small communities (normally the ballots are counted by voting station but the centre approach will give the possibility to merge).
Even in countries where the count is predominantly done at voting stations, one or more counting centres can ease administration for certain types of ballots. This includes absentee ballots, mail-in ballots from armed forces, diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or directly from the voters (by mail). Such ballots can be forwarded to the appropriate counting centre and added to the ballots from applicable polls, making counting easier to organise and easier to protect the secrecy of such absentee ballots.
There may be many counting centres or there may be only one national counting centre. The limit to the level of centralisation will be the level at which votes are translated into a number of legislators or seats. In a First Past the Post (FPTP) system of the Commonwealth type, the counting centre may be at the electoral district level (at a town hall, for example) but not at the national level. In a proportional representation system based on regional lists, a counting centre may not be more centralised than the region that the list is based on (see Electoral System and Ballot Type Implications for the Count).
Transportation to the Counting Centre
At the closing of the polls, poll workers seal the ballot boxes and prepare them to be transported to a counting centre along with related documents such as the ballot account form. Each ballot box is then sorted and tallied. The content of the ballot box can be counted separately or mixed with two or more boxes together, after reconciliation, to protect the identity of a poll and/or voters. The statement of the vote for each counting centre is sent to a regional or national counting centre and the representatives of political parties, National/international electoral observers are allowed to copy the results.
Releasing interim results is generally much slower when ballots are counted at counting centres. There are several reasons for this:
- the counting process can normally only start once all ballot boxes arrive at the centre;
- more personnel are involved in the process (required for the reception; storage and dispatch of ballot boxes);
- counting may be delayed if several days are required to receive and count all ballots;
- more elaborate procedures need to be followed (due to volumes of materials and personnel);
- more control mechanisms must be introduced (controlling access to location by observers, candidates, party representatives), etc.
The logistical complexities of moving ballot boxes and related materials to the counting centre can be an obstacle if transportation is difficult or not readily available. Systems are required to receive and store the ballot boxes efficiently while the need to transport the ballot boxes may make it difficult to maintain transparency and retain confidence in the voting system, the counting system, and the election body concerned. Resulting delays in the announcement of the results can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud during the delivery of boxes or the consolidation of the results of the count.
To ensure the success of the counting process, there are administrative considerations and training requirements related to vote counting at counting centres which need to be addressed early in the electoral process and once decided, they must be respected. Each of these procedural components has particularities and subtleties associated with their respective processes.
Procedures
At the closing of the voting station authorised persons and poll workers stay in the voting station and prepare the ballot box for transportation from the voting station to the counting centre. The slot of the ballot box is closed and sealed and the first reconciliation of ballots is done before completing the ballot account form. The seals on the ballot box are then verified along with all forms in sealed envelopes attached to the ballot box. The waybill or transport form is completed according to the type of transportation used.
Important security measures need to be taken to ensure that the ballot boxes will arrive safely at the counting centre. Once at the counting centre, unloading of ballot boxes should be carefully planned and supervised and movement of all ballot boxes should be tightly controlled. All forms related to transportation and movement of the ballot boxes will be completed and verified so that any ballot boxes that are missing can be traced.
The ballot box is checked and then sent to a planned location in the counting centre for ballot boxes ready-to-be-counted (see Count Checklist for an example of a counting center set-up). From there individual ballot boxes are delivered to the appropriate counting table. The ballot box is opened and once the contents of the ballot box are emptied, the validity of each ballot is verified and sorted into different piles before being tallied: valid ballots (by candidate/political party/option), and rejected ballots. To facilitate the decision making process, clear rules of interpretation or guidelines regarding the basis for rejecting a ballot should be provided to the counting official, and known in advance. (See Quick reference - counting centres - Bangladesh for an example of a quick reference guide used in Bangladesh; Closing instructions for the deputy Returning Officer - Canada used in Canada; and training manuals from South Africa Manual - South Africa and Bosnia Manual - counting at counting centres - Bosnia).
Representatives of political parties/candidates/options should be able to examine the rejected ballots and, if they do not agree with the decision of the counting official, be allowed to make formal objections which can form the basis for contesting the results of the count.
Using a count sheet, all valid ballots, spoiled ballots, and rejected ballots are counted - none should be destroyed at this stage of the process. A verification of the count and a last reconciliation should be done before completing the statement of the vote for each ballot box. The ballot box can then be re-sealed and appropriate counting documentation can be completed and either be enclosed or attached to the ballot box in a separate sealed envelope.
The ballot box is then transferred to a pre-planned location in the counting centre where counted ballot boxes are securely stored. Once there, the person in charge will verify, count, and label each ballot box creating the cumulative audit trail for the counting centre. All the ballot boxes are safely kept at the counting centre until further notice from the Electoral Management Body.
The results recorded on the statement of the vote for each ballot box will be communicated to the person responsible for combining results for the counting centre. While preparing the cumulative statement of the vote for the entire counting centre, progress reports will also be prepared and sent to the central office of the Electoral Management Body as results for electoral districts are available. Results will be transmitted directly to the national Electoral Management Body so they can be released as they come in.
Representatives of political parties/candidates/options as well as National/international electoral observers, if present, should be allowed to make copies of the progress reports, the statement of the vote for each ballot box, and the cumulative statement of the votes.
The national office of the Electoral Management Body adds the results transmitted as well as results of special ballots, advance polls, mobile voting station, etc. All results should be tallied per political party/candidate/option and publicised as soon as possible. If results are challenged, additional procedures may apply.
To be able to implement such procedures regarding vote counting at counting centres, it is essential that appropriate training be conducted. Training requirements, as well as all other administrative considerations (see Administrative Considerations) will need to be forecast in the budget for the election or referendum.
During training and managing a counting centre it is important to emphasise non-partisanship in the conduct of the work. Numerous jurisdictions require that all counting workers sign an oath (see Oath of a Poll Clerk - St Vincent and the Grenadines) to make this point clear, documented, and understood by all personnel involved. Counting workers should not make any remarks or mention any personal political affiliation or affinity, nor wear any badge or clothing with political slogans or logos. Since the counting official at each table will have to handle disputes over any rejected ballots, he will be the first person to deal with representatives of political parties/candidates/options. This person (if applicable according to the legislation) will also have to make the final decision in validating or rejecting any ballot. Neutrality and non-partisanship are imperative in this decision-making process. In many jurisdictions, counting officials can be legally prosecuted if their work is proven to be partisan during the counting process.
To ensure that the level playing field concept is adhered to, it is recommended that all political parties designate a representative to be present in each counting centre and assign these representatives to scrutinise the counting process. However, it remains the choice of each party as to whether they send a representative to every counting table or not. Many jurisdictions consider the presence of political party representatives to be essential to ensure integrity, guarantee consistency, and provide witnesses to the transparency of the process. Indeed, when the time comes to make an important decision during the counting process, such as modifications to previously completed forms, then all party representatives involved should sign the forms to demonstrate that they are informed and agree with the decision. Careful application of such procedures provides tangible evidence that the rules are consistent and the process transparent.
Record the 'History' of Each Ballot Box
At the counting centre, just as at the voting station, the election management body should be able to retrace the history of each ballot box from the moment it leaves the local office of the Electoral Management Body until it returns with the counted ballots (especially important when the ballot papers of two ballot boxes or more are mixed together). An adequate audit trail will allow the Electoral Management Body to maintain full control and ensure that possibilities of fraud via ballot box tampering are extremely limited and can be detected if attempted. Numbering each ballot box is a simple method of implementing such a control system. The same number should appear, as well, on each form used at the voting station and at the counting centre. The importance of recording the history of each ballot box is evident in cases of judicial recount.
In general, the major process components of vote counting at counting centres are the following:
- preparation of the ballot boxes before transportation from the voting station to the counting centre;
- transportation of the ballot boxes to the counting centre;
- provision of party, candidate, or observer accompaniment of the ballot boxes;
- reception and regulation of the ballot boxes at the counting centre,
- opening the ballot box,
- reconciling ballots in each box with number of voters;
- sorting and counting the ballots so the results can be transmitted to the next level of the Electoral Management Body that compiles them and further transmits until the results are publicised.
