Before the ballot boxes are opened, a check could be made that there are only authorised persons present in the counting centre. In some instances the list of authorised persons might include members of the armed forces.
Once the ballot boxes are at the counting centre and ready to be counted, the counting official will verify the seals on the ballot box and open it. The contents are emptied on a table in the presence of counting workers, representatives of political parties, candidates, national/international electoral observers, etc. Sealed envelopes attached to the ballot boxes are opened and verification of the reconciliation done at the voting station is made.
The ballots on the table are counted to establish quantity. The number of ballots in the ballot box should match the number of voters who voted. This figure should be compared to the one written on the ballot account form completed at the voting station.
A last reconciliation is done once all ballots are sorted and tallied by candidate/party/option to verify that all totals are correct before making the official entries and completing the statement of the vote for the ballot box. Everybody (national/international electoral observers and security personnel may be excluded) involved in the counting process should sign the forms to confirm that the accounting of ballots was satisfactory, or to state that they are aware of the source of the discrepancy (if any) and that they agree with the decision taken by the counting official. Once the forms are completed and the ballots bundled, the ballot box will be closed and re-sealed with all the ballots inside, see Sealing of Ballot.
In case of discrepancies, the counting process should be repeated until the missing ballots are found, even if only one ballot is missing. If, after verification, the missing ballots are still unfound, then the Electoral Management Body should be informed of the problem and verification of their ballot accounts should be done (especially verification of the number of ballots sent to the voting station). Keeping higher authorities informed of any problem is part of the transparency required in an election. If no solution is found, appropriate amendments should be made on the ballot account forms (and on any form on which this information is required) and on the statement of the vote signed by the counting official and representatives of political parties/candidates/options. This new figure should then become the official one for the ballot box.
In some jurisdictions, counting of ballots that cannot be reconciled or that are not within a certain tolerance (i.e. difference is not more than 2, 3 or 5 ballots) legislation, regulations, or directives may prohibit proceeding with the count. If significant discrepancies are discovered, local rules could apply to the level of action taken. In some cases, if significant fraud is suspected, it may be necessary to delay opening and counting the contents of a ballot box until the Electoral Management Body investigates the problem and decides what to do with the ballot box. Poll officials and others involved should be aware of these provisions through their training.
Merging Results to Protect Secrecy
In some situations, Electoral Management Bodies will combine, merge, or amalgamate results of several ballot boxes. This is generally done if the voting procedure makes it possible to identify every person whose vote has gone into a particular ballot box; or if the number of votes in the ballot box is so small that there is a significant risk that all the votes will be for one candidate or party.
In such cases, the secrecy of the vote could be compromised. Results should be combined (mixed or amalgamated) with another ballot box. This can also be done in cases where it appears that the secrecy of individual votes can be secured. There is real risk arising from the fact that a particular voting station, having voted predominantly in a particular way, could result in retribution being visited on the persons who voted at that polling station.
Mixing the ballots from two or more boxes from different areas, and then attributing all the votes to one ballot box with proper notation in the results form can mitigate these problems. The counting centre approach is appropriate for making this type of modification effective in counting procedures. For internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers per box can be made to keep the audit trail clear.
Combining (merging) results can also be done for incarcerated voters, absentee, or other category of voters using special ballots. Since the ballots are usually counted at the head office of the Electoral Management Body or in a specific counting centre, results can easily be combined (merged) with other results to protect the secrecy of the vote. Once again, for internal use only, a special mention of ballot numbers by category can be made to keep the audit trail clear.
