One of the clearest conclusions to be gleaned from the comparative study of electoral systems is simply the range and utility of the options available. Too often, constitutional drafters simply choose the electoral system they know best in new democracies. This is the system of the former colonial power if there was one - rather than investigating the most appropriate alternatives. The major purpose of this Web site is to provide enough knowledge for electoral system designers to make informed decisions. This does not mean we would necessarily advocate wholesale changes to existing electoral systems; in fact, the comparative experience of electoral reform to date suggests that moderate reforms, building on those parts of an existing system which work well, are often a better option than jumping to a completely new and unfamiliar system.
There is much to be learned from the experience of others. For example, a country with a First Past The Post (FPTP) system that wished to move to something more proportional while retaining the geographic link to constituents should consider the experience of New Zealand, which adopted a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation system in 1993, see The Alternative Vote in Australia. A similar country that wanted to keep single-member districts but encourage inter-group accommodation and compromise should look at the experience of Alternative Vote (AV) in the Oceania region, see Papua New Guinea. Any deeply-divided country wishing to make the transition to democracy would be well advised to consider the case of South Africa's 1994 List-PR elections, see South Africa: Election Systems and Conflict Management, and the multi-ethnic power-sharing government elected as a result. A country that simply wants to reduce the cost and instability created by a Two-Round System (TRS) should examine the Sri Lankan, see Sri Lanka: Changes to Accommodate Diversity, or Irish preferential vote option, Ireland: The Archetypal Single Transferable Vote System. In all of these cases, the change from one electoral system to another has had a clear impact upon the politics of that country.
Some practical guidelines for electoral system designers follow.
Keep It Simple
Effective and sustainable electoral system designs are more likely to be those that can be easily understood by the voter and the politician. Too much complexity can lead to misunderstandings, unintended consequences, and voter mistrust of the results.
Don't be Afraid to Innovate
Many of the successful electoral systems used in the world today themselves represent innovative approaches to specific problems, and have been proven to work well. There is much to learn from the experience of others.
Pay Attention to Contextual and Temporal Factors
Electoral systems do not work in a vacuum. Their success depends on a happy marriage of political institutions and cultural traditions. The first point of departure for any would-be electoral system designer should be to ask:
- what is the political and social context that I am working within?
The second question might be:
- am I designing a permanent system or one that needs to get us through a transitional period?
Do Not Underestimate the Electorate
While simplicity is important, it is equally dangerous to underestimate the ability of voters to comprehend and successfully use a wide variety of different electoral systems. Complex preferential systems, for example, have been used successfully in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region (such as Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka, see Papua New Guinea, while the experience of many recent elections in new democracies has emphasised the important distinction between 'functional' literacy and 'political' literacy. Even in very poor countries, voters often have, and wish to express, sophisticated political preferences and choices.
Err on the Side of Inclusion
Wherever possible, whether in divided or relatively homogenous societies, the electoral system should produce a parliament that errs on the side of including all significant interests. Regardless of whether minorities are based on ideological, ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional or religious identities, the exclusion of significant shades of opinion from parliaments, particularly in the developing world, has often been catastrophically counter-productive.
Process is a Key Factor in Choice
The way in which a particular electoral system is chosen is also extremely important in ensuring its overall legitimacy. A process in which most or all groups are included, including the electorate at large, is likely to result in significantly broader acceptance of the end result than a decision perceived as being motivated by partisan self-interest alone. Although partisan considerations are unavoidable when discussing the choice of electoral systems, broad cross-party and public support for any institution is crucial to it being accepted and respected. The reform of the New Zealand electoral system from FPTP to MMP, for example, was preceded by a series of public plebiscites that served to legitimize the final outcome, see New Zealand: A Westminster Democracy Switches to PR. By contrast, the French Socialist Government's decision in 1986 to switch from their existing Two-Round System (TRS) to PR was widely perceived as being motivated by partisan reasons, and was quickly reversed as soon the government lost power in 1988.
Build Legitimacy and Acceptance among All Key Actors
All groupings that wish to play a part in the democratic process should feel that the electoral system to be used is 'fair' and gives them the same chance as anyone else to be electorally successful. The paramount aim should be that those who 'lose' the election cannot translate their disappointment into a rejection of the system itself, nor use the electoral system as an excuse to destabilize the path of democratic consolidation. In 1990 in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas lost control of the government but they accepted the defeat, in part because they accepted the fairness of the electoral system. Like South Africa, Sierra Leone and Mozambique were able to end their bloody civil wars through institutional arrangements that were broadly acceptable to all sides, see South Africa: Election Systems and Conflict Management.
Try to Maximize Voter Influence
Voters should feel that elections provide them with a measure of influence over governments and government policy. Choice can be maximized in a number of different ways. Voters may be able to choose between parties, between candidates of different parties, and between candidates of the same party. They might also be able to vote differently when it comes to presidential, upper house, lower house, regional, and local government elections. They should also feel confident that their vote has a genuine impact on government formation, and not just on the composition of the parliament alone.
Balance Against Encouraging Coherent Political Parties
The desire to maximize voter influence should be balanced against the need to encourage coherent and viable political parties. Maximum voter choice on the ballot paper may produce such a fragmented parliament that nobody ends up with the desired result. There is widespread agreement among political scientists that broadly-based, coherent political parties are among the most important factors in the promotion of effective and sustainable democracy.
Long-Term Stability and Short-Term Advantage
When political actors negotiate over a new electoral system they often push proposals which they believe will advantage their party in the coming elections. However, this can often be an unwise strategy, particularly in developing nations, as one party's short-term success or dominance may lead to long-term political breakdown and social unrest. For example, in negotiations prior to the transitional 1994 election, South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) could have reasonably argued for the retention of the existing FPTP electoral system, which would probably have given them, as by far the largest party, a seat bonus over and above their share of the national vote. That they argued for a form of proportional representation, and thus won fewer seats than they could have under FPTP, was a testament to the fact that they saw long-term stability as more desirable than short-term electoral gratification.
Similarly, electoral systems need to be responsive enough to react effectively to changing political circumstances and the growth of new political movements. Even in established democracies, support for the major parties is rarely stable, while politics in new democracies is almost always highly dynamic. This means that a party that benefits from the electoral arrangements at one election may not necessarily benefit at the next.
Don't Think of the Electoral System as a Panacea for All Ills
While it is true that if one wants to change the nature of political competition the electoral system may be the most effective instrument to do so, electoral systems can never be the panacea for the political ills of a country. The overall effects of other variables, particularly a nation's political culture, usually have a much greater impact on democratic prospects than institutional factors such as electoral systems. Moreover, the positive effects of a well-crafted electoral system can be all too easily submerged by an inappropriate constitutional dispensation, the domestic dominance of forces of discord, or the weight of external threats to the sovereignty of the state.
But Conversely Don't Underestimate its Influence
While accepting that throughout the world the social constraints on democracy are considerable, such constraints still leave room for conscious political strategies which may further or hamper successful democratization. Electoral systems are not a panacea, but they are central to the structuring of stability in any polity. Deft electoral system engineering may not prevent or eradicate deep enmities, but appropriate institutions can nudge the political system in the direction of reduced conflict and greater governmental accountability. In other words, while most of the changes that can be achieved by tailoring electoral systems are necessarily at the margins, it is often these marginal impacts that make the difference between democracy being consolidated or democracy being undermined.
The Electorate's Willingness to Embrace Change
Electoral system change might seem like a good idea to political insiders who understand the flaws of the existing system, but unless proposals for reform are presented in an appropriate way, the public may well reject tinkering with the system, perceiving reform to be nothing more than a case of politicians altering the rules for their own benefit. Most damaging are situations when the change is seen to be a blatant manoeuvre for political gain (as was the case in France in 1986, in Chile in 1989, and in Jordan in 1993, see Jordan - Electoral System Design in the Arab World and Chile: Proportionality or Majoritarianism?). When the system alters so frequently the voters do not quite know where they are, as some have argued is the case in Bolivia, see Bolivia: Electoral Reform in Latin America.
Avoid Being a Slave to Past Systems
All too often electoral systems inappropriate to a new democracy's needs have been inherited or carried over from colonial times without any thought as to how they will work within the new political realities. Almost all the former British colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, for example, adopted FPTP systems. In many of these new democracies, particularly those facing ethnic divisions, this system proved utterly inappropriate to their needs. It has been similarly argued that many of the former French colonies in West Africa that retained the use of the francophone TRS system, such as Mali in 1992, see Mali: A Two-Round System in Africa suffered damaging polarization as a result. Similarly, many post-communist regimes continue to utilize mandatory turnout or majority requirements inherited from the Soviet era, see Ukraine - The Perils of Majoritarianism in a New Democracy.
Assess Impact of Any New System on Societal Conflict
Electoral systems can be seen not only as mechanisms for choosing parliaments and presidents, but also as a tool of conflict management within a society. Some systems, in some circumstances, will encourage parties to make inclusive appeals for support outside their own core support base. Unfortunately, it is more often the case in the world today that the presence of inappropriate electoral systems serve actually to exacerbate negative tendencies which already exist; for example, by encouraging parties to see elections as 'zero-sum' contests and thus to act in a hostile and exclusionary manner to anyone outside their home group. When designing any political institution, the bottom line is that even if it does not help to reduce tensions within society, it should, at the very least, not make matters worse.
Try to Imagine Unusual or Unlikely Contingencies
Too often, electoral systems are designed to avoid the mistakes of the past, especially the immediate past. Care should be taken not to overreact and create a system that goes too far in terms of correcting previous problems. Furthermore, electoral system designers would do well to pose themselves some unusual questions to avoid embarrassment in the long run:
- What if nobody wins under the system proposed?
- Is it possible that one party could win all the seats?
- What if you have to award more seats than you have places in the legislature?
- What do you do if candidates tie?
- Might the system mean that, in some districts, it is better for a party supporter not to vote for their preferred party or candidate?
For further information see Creation and Amendment Process and Process of Electoral Reform.
