Codes of conduct are general guidelines setting out standards of behaviour, normally agreed on a voluntary basis. The fact that codes of conduct are not normally incorporated in law means that they can proclaim standards that are difficult to embody in a statute. For instance, codes of conduct for political parties have included obligations on them to act with 'self-restraint.' It would be hard to incorporate a definition of self-restraint into the law in such a way that breaches could be defined, proved, and made subject to penalties. See also Establishing a Code of Conduct and Codes of Conduct.
Despite their general, didactic nature, codes have nevertheless been incorporated occasionally into electoral law, sometimes in a special schedule. In a number of African countries, they are embodied in electoral legislation.
The definition of 'codes of conduct for political parties' adopted by the International IDEA is:
a set of rules of behaviour for political parties and their supporters relating to their participation in an election process, to which parties ideally will voluntarily agree; and which may, subsequent to that agreement, be incorporated in law.'pce01#1'
Examples of Codes of Conduct for Parties
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Candidates, and Election Workers. Provisional Election Commission, 1996
Cambodia: United Nations Electoral Law for Cambodia, 1992 Annex - Code of Conduct, August 1992
Ghana: Code of Conduct for Political Parties in Ghana for Public Elections, 1992
India: Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of Political Parties and Candidates. Election Commission of India, 1991
International IDEA: Draft Code of Conduct for Political Parties Contesting Democratic Elections, 1997
Namibia: Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Activities by Political Parties in Respect of Elections, Government Gazette, 1992
South Africa: Electoral Act, 1993 - Schedule 2 - Electoral Code of Conduct, 1993
Grounds for Criticism of Codes of Conduct
It is easy to be cynical about codes of conduct. First, they are open to criticism on the ground that they sometimes do no more than embody platitudes. For example:
- Bangladesh, 1996: 'An election shall not be influenced by money, arms, muscle power or local influence.'
- Malawi, 1994: 'Parties must use acceptable language.'
- Malawi, 1994: 'Political parties and independent candidates shall not induce people to do things against their will.'
On the other hand, they are equally open to criticism on the ground that they sometimes include provisions that are so precise that there is no reason why they should not be part of a conventional electoral law. For example:
- India, 1991: 'Excepting the voters, no one without a valid pass from the Election Commission shall enter the polling booths.'
- Guinea, 1992, Seychelles, 1992: 'Defence Force personnel shall not go to vote in their uniforms.'
- Malawi, 1994: 'Parties and their supporters shall not hold campaign meetings within the premises of military units and police stations at any time ...'
Second, codes will tend to be least respected where they are most needed. In countries where elections are being held amid deep mistrust and in the immediate aftermath of bloody conflict, is it not utopian to expect the rival parties and candidates to be seriously influenced and restrained by exhortations about 'good behaviour'? What impact are voluntary codes likely to have in the former killing fields of Cambodia? Can they really eliminate, or even reduce, tensions between ethnically-based parties in war-torn Bosnia?
Third, if codes of conduct are given the force of law, this may lead to problems for opposition parties. In general, the language of codes is so broad that it will be easy for an oppressive regime to accuse its opponents of breaches, while leaving its own supporters free from prosecution.
Fourth, the value of codes of conduct is lessened if they are introduced - as frequently happens - as a result of pressure from international bodies. There is a temptation for the different parties to sign up to codes in the expectation that they will then be free to ignore them.
Justifications of Codes of Conduct
First, codes of conduct need not, and do not always express vacuous generalities. They may set out standards that are by no means obvious. For example:
- Bangladesh, 1991, Ghana, 1992, Guinea, 1995, Seychelles, 1992: 'No party will take any initiative for the release of any armed person arrested by police during the election campaign or in (or in the vicinity of) a polling station during voting.'
- Sierra Leone, 1996, South Africa, 1993: 'Parties shall ensure the full and equal participation of women in the electoral or political process.'
- Cambodia, 1992;s Namibia, 1989: 'Parties will meet on a fortnightly basis to discuss all matters of concern relating to the election campaign. A standing committee of party leaders at headquarters will meet on a fortnightly basis ...' (In Namibia, meetings are weekly once the election date has been announced.)
Second, declarations of what may seem to be pious hopes may nevertheless have a considerable educational value. They send out a clear moral message, and leave parties open to public opprobrium if they blatantly disregard standards that they have undertaken to respect.
Third, the process of discussion of rules and standards between opposing party officials and leaders may be valuable in lessening fears and creating moral bridges, especially at a time when a country is emerging uneasily from civil war or from non-democratic rule. The very process of creating a code of conduct is arguably a significant instrument of conflict resolution. According to International IDEA's Draft Code of Conduct for Political Parties Contesting Democratic Elections, such codes:
...have been a feature in a number of elections in which the democratic process was facing significant challenges, and have been implemented with the intention of minimizing conflict, eradicating intimidation, and encouraging a climate of open, free and fair competition during the election period.
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