Integrity problems can arise in several areas of the count. They can be at the polling table level
where the individual ballots are counted or in the collation of the polling station totals. They can
be the result of a genuine mistake or they can be a deliberate action to manipulate the outcome.
Votes counted by hand may be subject to math errors or other human errors. Machine
counts may be more accurate, but at the same time, a machine cannot determine the intention of
the voter if the voter's mark is not in the spot read by the machine.
Some of the integrity issues involved in ensuring a valid and accurate count:
Time and location of the count
The timing of a count can affect its integrity. The longer the ballots remain uncounted, the more
time there is for tampering. The general consensus is that counting should be done as soon as possible after the close of the
poll. At the same time, minimum conditions must be met, such as having adequate light,
security and the presence of monitors.
Where intimidation is a problem, counting at the individual table level may be problematic. There
could be security problems or the problem of identifying the voting trends of a small group of
voters. Where this is an issue, counting can be moved to a regional location where tables can be
mixed before counting. This provision is included in the election laws of several countries, including
South Africa's, which gives election managers flexibility, by allowing a count to be moved 'in the
interest of ensuring a free and fair elections.'
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Ensuring the voter's intention is counted
Voters can mark their ballots but miss the check off box or space. This can lead to the issue of
how to count the vote. A too strict application of where voters can place their mark can result in
the invalidation of otherwise valid votes.
In a country with low literacy rates, this can raise integrity concerns. For instance, Mozambique used this strict interpretation in its first
election in 1994. Even if it
was clear who the voter voted for, for example, by checking the face of the candidate instead
of the box, the vote was counted as a spoiled ballot. Missing the check off space is also an issue for machine read ballots,
as the machine will only read the check off box spaces.
New Zealand addresses this issue by using a clear intention test: 'Even though the voter may
not have marked his or her vote exactly in accordance with the instructions, the overriding test for
deciding whether a vote should be counted is whether the voter's intention is clear.'
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Ensuring voters votes are not identifiable
The secrecy of the vote is maintained when ballots are not marked with anything that could identify the
voter. If ballots are validated by a stamp or signatures, using a standard mark can help ensure that these marks cannot be used to connect a ballot with a voter. Voter education can also focus on ensuring that voters know not to put their name or other identifying mark on their ballot.
Maintaining the secrecy of the vote can arise when votes are counted at too low a level. If a table
only has a handful of voters and the votes are counted at that table, it will be clear how the
persons voted. This can also be true to identify collective votes, such as how a village voted.
This can be an issue in countries undergoing a transition or which have problems with intimidation,
as discussed above in Timing and Location of Polling Sites.
For instance, in the 1998 elections in Cambodia, counting was to be done at the table level, but domestic
election observers and opposition candidates pushed for a revision of the electoral law to permit the mixing of ballots from different villages. This mixing was ultimately allowed and prevented the
identification of how villages voted. It did create, however, problems for monitors, who found it
difficult to adequately cover the consolidation sites where many tables were counted simultaneously.
Ensuring an accurate count
A count must be accurate so it reflects the votes cast. As with ensuring free and fair
voting (see Integrity Measures to Protect Against Fraud), problems in the counting can be minimized by:
- Good management of the count, including adequate training for all counters and
monitors. A chaotic count, even if it is accurate, feeds perceptions of manipulation and
inaccurate results. Good management can ensure a smoother count, by providing written
counting procedures for counters to follow, forms with built-in safeguards and by ensuring
adequate control and supervision.
Good management includes good logistical and
inventory control systems for the delivery and reception of the tally sheets and electoral
materials from the initial counting centre to the consolidation centres.
- Good counting systems. Election managers can design a transparent and accurate
counting system. These systems usually include an easy to fill in tally sheet with enough copies
available for monitors to use. Making enough copies of official documents so that
results can be posted at the counting site and monitors witnessing the count can have a
copy for their parallel count is another integrity mechanism that can be used.
Counting systems must also have predetermined
procedures on what to do with spoiled ballots and ballots where the voters intention is not
clear. For example, in Mexico, detailed counting procedures have been developed to ensure
ballots are accurately read and recorded. This includes crossing out counted ballots and
putting them into a special envelope. 220
- Identifying spoiled or rejected ballots. These need to be separated out from the valid
votes and marked. In South Africa, for instance, the counting officer marks each rejected ballot with
'rejected' on its back side. Disputed ballots also need to be separated out so that they can
be reviewed at the next level.
- Ensuring all relevant information is on the tally sheets, including the number of ballots
delivered to the polling station, the number available at the start of polling, the results and the
number of spoiled, disputed, cancelled or unused ballots. Ensuring the numbers are reconciled during the count is another integrity mechanism that will catch errors or other problems before they rise up through the system and become harder to detect. Using ballots with serial numbers can aid this reconciliation as it is easy to
make a mistake when hand counting hundreds of ballots.
- Ensuring a transparent count. This is essential to the integrity of the process and the credibility of the results. The presence of monitors during the count, which is done within the time frame allotted for counting, helps ensure a transparent and accurate count. In most countries where ballots are
counted by hand, systems are used where the vote for each ballot is read and then the
ballot is shown to all monitors and counters present to demonstrate that this was the actual vote.
In some systems, such as Denmark, anyone can attend the count, increasing the transparency of the process even further.221 Posting the results outside each counting place, and publishing the official results in the
mass media as soon as they are available also contributes to a transparent process.
- Good monitoring. If political party monitors and domestic observers watch the
entire process - from the closure of the polling station to the opening of the ballot boxes to
the count and completion of the tally sheet, it limits the opportunities for manipulation of the materials or results. It is important that monitoring be continued through
the consolidation of the count and the release of the official results as, in some systems, this is where the results can be manipulated. (For an example of this see Cheating in Elections (Philippines).) In many systems, monitors keep
track of the count and sign the tally sheets indicating their agreement or disagreement with the results, stating why in the case of disagreement.
- Having an effective appeal process. Integrity requires that there be a mechanism for monitors and
candidates to challenge the count and for their complaints to be addressed in an effective
and timely manner. The appeal process is usually included in either the electoral law,
regulations or procedures. As the appeal process may require a recount of the ballots,
ballots are usually kept for as long as is required by the legal appeal process. For more on
this, see Complaints and Appeals.
- Good enforcement. In every system, tampering with the count or election results by not
counting ballots, deliberately misreading votes, changing the results, destroying ballots or
tampering with the tally sheet, is a crime. Immediate investigation of allegations of tampering and good enforcement of the laws can deter election fraud. For more, see Enforcement of Election Integrity.
Machine counting
New technology is changing the way voters vote. Electronic voting or the use of ballots that are
counted by machine is becoming more and more prevalent. Providing the machine meets the
minimum standards (see Voting Mechanisms), electronic counting of votes is usually able
to provide a rapid and accurate count.
Machine counting removes the subjectivity involved in assessing the validity of the vote and can ensure an
impartial count, but machines cannot determine the intention of the voter if the voter made an extra
mark on the paper or missed the spot where the machine reads. This can invalidate an otherwise
valid vote and is an integrity issue. Voters need to be aware of how to correctly
use and mark a machine-read ballot, and this can be done through a targeted voter education programme.
Machine counting also eliminates many of the human errors in counting and opportunities for manipulating the count and consolidation of the results. However, machines are not infallible and, if not programmed or maintained correctly, can make mistakes. For instance, in the 1998 elections
in the U.S. state of Hawaii, seven voting units out of the 361 used had problems reading the
ballots. These were caused by lens occlusion, defective cables and read heads. It was a very
close race and the losing candidate felt the results from these seven machines might have altered
the outcome of the election.
The Hawaiian Legislature ordered a statewide elections review - the first in the history of the
state. An Oversight Committee was formed to oversee a recount. The Committee found that the
machines had been defective, but that the recount had not changed the election results. Their
report concluded that 'elections are far more complex than publicly known and the procedures
have far more safeguards built in than most people were aware of. '
222 This type of Official Oversight helps ensure the integrity of the count and the accuracy of the process.
