Basic Issues
To ensure that security at voting sites is delivered cost-effectively, planning of appropriate security precautions and responses should be undertaken on the basis of risk assessments of the general election environment and specific geographic areas (for details of security risk assessments, see Security Risk Assessments).
Coordination with Other Agencies
Unlike most voting operations management issues, which may be fully addressed within the electoral management body, providing security for voting sites may involve intensive cooperation with other agencies of state--police and military forces--with their own method of operations and priorities that may not be fully in line with that of election management. In planning voting site security measures, essential issues include:
- ensuring that sufficient security resources are available in the specific locations and during the hours required;
- fostering very close coordination between security forces management and election managers in developing security responses and voting site plans;
- clearly identifying the chains of command and responsibility for security planning and action between civilian and security forces organisations.
These factors in voting operations will be more critical the higher the security risks for the election.
No matter what the security situation, some degree of planning and cooperation between electoral management bodies and security forces will be required. It is important that this is, and is seen to be, under the control of electoral management bodies; security forces control of this planning process can be easily interpreted as evidence of control of the election.
Responsibilities
The boundaries of different organisations' responsibilities must be clear to all participants in security planning. Broadly they can be outlined as:
- electoral management bodies responsibility for decisions on security planning that may affect election processes (but taking appropriate advice from security forces on issues such as the security implications of particular voting site locations or methods of transport);
- security forces responsibility for determining what is the appropriate use of force or power to ensure public safety in response to situations arising during voting.
Under any circumstances the following particular aspects have to be dealt with during security planning.
Joint Planning Structure
The structures implemented to develop security plans will also vary according to the level of risks in the election environment. In all cases, continual information exchange between election managers and security forces is beneficial.
Even without formal consultative structures, it is highly useful for officers in both electoral management bodies and security forces to be designated as contact persons on election security matters, and meet regularly to ensure that corporate knowledge of each other's activities is current within these organisations. In low security risk environments, where the focus of security is more on election integrity than personal safety, such liaison may be the only security planning structure required.
In higher security risk environments, and particularly where there are many players in the state security structure or international peacekeeping forces have been introduced, a formal structure that meets regularly on security issues, chaired by an appropriately senior electoral official, is vital for voting security coordination.
Geographic Areas of Responsibility
Electoral district boundaries, especially when drawn by an independent body, are unlikely to be congruent with security forces' normal administrative or operational areas. As far as possible, security forces' operational boundaries for election security should be made up of whole electoral districts (either singly or in clusters), to ensure simplified, effective action and liaison during voting. Effective liaison points between election and security authorities need to be developed within each of these areas of responsibility. In higher security risk environments, such liaison is usefully developed into joint operations centres, fully integrating security force planning and action into voting operations management (see Operations and Security Centres).
Resource Planning
In planning security requirements, all involved need to realise that security forces generally do not know a lot about elections operations, and conversely, election managers are not often experts on appropriate security responses. It is useful if security is dealt with like other technical issues, with needs and specifications drawn up by the electoral management body, draft plans to meet these developed by security forces, and then brought to a joint meeting for approval, using wherever possible security force personnel with an understanding of election needs through prior experience.
Sufficient advance notice of voting operations plans is necessary to enable security force resource planning. The basic information needs are:
- proposed location and period of operation of voting sites, count centres, election administration offices, and storage facilities;
- proposed distribution and return plans for election materials, equipment, and staff.
These should be provided to security forces, even in low security risk environments, as soon as they are determined. In higher security risk environments, information on other aspects of voting, such as planned/approved political campaign rallies and expected voter routes to and from voting stations, will also need to be discussed with security authorities. Advice on security issues relating to these proposals should be considered by the electoral management body before planning is finalised.
Early advice to security is prudent as provision of election security may require adjustment to security forces' existing plans in a number of areas, such as:
- leave rosters;
- unit rotations;
- use of their budget allocation for overtime or fuel;
- servicing schedules for vehicles or air transport.
In high security risk environments, manpower planning for election security is likely to be an extensive task for security forces. Consequently, advice on likely needs is required as early as possible before voting day.
Without mobility, security forces will lose considerable effectiveness in their ability to cover all voting sites. As these may be large in number, and geographically dispersed, it will often not be possible to provide static forces close to each voting site capable of dealing with all emergencies. Thus transport and logistics planning (sufficient availability of light and heavy vehicles and for remote areas possibly helicopters or aircraft) must be carefully considered in security plans.
Emergency Responses
Part of the planning process is to develop clear guidelines for responses to emergencies; be they possibly natural such as fire, or definitely of human intent, such as bomb threats and public riot. For such planning, there may be a need also to involve civil emergency personnel. Plans and guidelines in this regard need to be provided to voting station officials and reinforced during their training (see Training Session Content).
Chains of Command and Accountability
It is important to determine who is responsible and accountable not only for overall or regional security planning, but for security delivery at the voting site level. As further discussed in Voting Site Security Arrangements, it is highly preferable that at all levels election managers, down to voting site managers, remain responsible for decision-making in the election environment. The issue of how much discretion local security force commanders have will vary according to the risks in the particular environment, and needs to be covered in security action plans for voting sites. However, for a security force commander to act without a prior request from voting station officials or election management, where there is no clear threat to safety, may compromise the perception of integrity of the election.
(For further discussion of effective command structures, through joint operations centres, see Operations and Security Centres.)
Communications
For effective implementation of security plans, a clear communications strategy needs to be developed, both in terms of the physical networks used and communications use policies. A single communication network linking election managers, voting sites, and security forces through regional or electoral district operations centres will enhance communications effectiveness. (For further discussion of security communications issues, see Use of Communications Networks.)
Higher Security Risk Environments
In all cases it would be preferable to be able to rely on civilian policing authorities for provision of voting site security, to maintain the image of the election process. However, there will be cases where, either through lack of resources, lack of professionalism, or perception of bias in civilian police authorities, that military forces are required to assist with voting security. In such cases, it is generally preferable that they take a low-visibility role, except when required to take action on actual or potential security breaches.
