Basic Issues
The immediate concern after the close of voting is to ensure that all accountable voting materials in the voting station are collected, accounted for, and secured in preparation for conduct of the count. The focus of this will be on the following areas:
- securing of ballot boxes (or, if used, voting machines or computers);
- collection of other accountable voting materials--unused ballots or ballot envelopes, spoilt, or otherwise cancelled ballots or envelopes, voters lists, and any supplementary records of persons voting;
- reconciliation of ballots (or envelopes) and their issuing records.
Where the prime integrity control mechanism is the ballot itself, reconciliations of ballot stocks are necessary. Where the prime integrity control mechanism is a ballot envelope issued to eligible voters, reconciliations will instead involve these ballot envelopes.
Collection and accounting for ballots (or ballot envelopes where relevant) should, in general, not begin until all voters and any other persons not authorised to remain in the voting station have been moved outside. Where there are no observers or party/candidate representatives present, it may be useful to request that a small number of voters remain to witness this accounting. However, if this is done, it would be preferable if these voters were first asked to sign the same oath or conduct declaration required of accredited observers.
If official seals or stamps are used to authenticate ballots or ballot envelopes, these should be collected by the voting station manager (at the same time as the ballots are being collected), formally accounted for, and held under security until packaged.
Initial Reconciliations
No matter whether the count is undertaken at the voting station or a separate counting centre, an initial reconciliation of ballots (or ballot envelopes) received at the voting station to ballots (or ballot envelopes) that should be on hand at the close of voting must be undertaken at the voting station, to establish the number of ballots or envelopes that are purportedly in ballot boxes.
This reconciliation should occur before any material is packaged for transportation to the counting centre, and before any ballot boxes are opened if the count is to occur at the voting station. It is a significant control process for the integrity of voting and the count. It is also a process which is often recorded incorrectly, and can thus cause later disputes. Accuracy of reconciliations requires emphasis in voting station manager training and care in execution.
Where voting machines or computers are used, accurate internal integrity check mechanisms or software to prevent illegal exclusion or addition of votes must be installed for this purpose.
For further details of this reconciliation, see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Received.
Reconciliation of Ballots Issued to Voters
The other major integrity check on ballots that needs to be implemented is a reconciliation of records of the number of voters who voted against records of the number of ballots issued or ballot envelopes issued (see Reconciliation of Ballots or Envelopes Issued).
Later reconciliations at the count should reconcile the number of voters recorded as having voted against the number of ballots extracted from the ballot box.
Discrepancies in Ballot or Ballot Envelope Accounting
Discrepancies in close of voting ballot (or ballot envelope) and voter numbers accounting can occur for a number of reasons apart from fraud. However, any discrepancy, for whatever reason, will arouse suspicion about the integrity of voting station operations. Strict controls, care, and perhaps a little additional time spent at each stage of the ballot (or ballot envelope) handling process can prevent embarrassing and inexplicable ballot (or ballot envelope) accounting and reconciliation discrepancies.
Common non-fraudulent reasons for discrepancies in ballot/ballot envelope and voter number accounting include:
Ballots or ballot envelopes received at the voting station were not correctly and accurately check counted before use. Even counterfoiled, numbered, ballot booklets can have missing ballots. Loosely packed ballots or ballot envelopes, particularly without numbered counterfoils, are even more susceptible to error in post-production packaging. It is essential that ballots, or, where relevant, ballot envelopes received at each voting station are check counted and any discrepancy between delivery advices and actual stocks received is noted in ballot accounting records. The voting station manager should endorse the results of the check count, and these figures used in all subsequent ballot/ballot envelope accounting calculations.
Failure to record properly any official movements of unused ballots or ballot envelopes to and from the voting station during voting day.
Voting station official errors in maintaining records of voters who voted. This is a task that requires consistent monitoring during voting to ensure that each voter issued a ballot (or ballot envelope where this is the control mechanism) is recorded as having received a ballot or ballot envelope, and that this is done in the correct, consistent manner to aid counting of total figures.
Where ballots are the integrity control mechanism, spoilt or discarded/rejected ballots not being immediately sealed/secured in an envelope or container and kept under security so that they cannot be later placed in the ballot box.
Counting and calculation errors. Each count and calculation required for close of voting ballot accounting should be rechecked by another voting station official before being entered into the ballot account and voter reconciliation records.
Examples of Reconciliation Forms
For some examples of voting station reconciliation forms for ballots, see Ballot paper account England - reconciliation form and included in Voting record book - Canada, Return of Polling Place Officer in Charge. Australia and Ballot Paper Accounting and Results Sheet - New Zealand.
