Basic Issues
Management of observation of voting processes is an intensive task requiring:
For further information on management of electoral observation activities, see Facilitating observer activities, Inviting and Accrediting Observers, Providing Orientation Materials and Overview of Observation Activities.
During the period of voting, there will be similar pressures on electoral observation management as on electoral managers to ensure that geographically dispersed staff perform well, often in adverse field conditions and under intense time pressure. Electoral observer management will often be under pressure to make decisions not only affecting the quality of the electoral observation, but, where there are security risks, the safety of the electoral observers themselves.
Direction of Electoral Observation Operations
It is critical that close control is maintained over electoral observation operations during the voting period. Effective electoral observation may require rapid flexibility in:
- deployment to cover more fully locations where difficulties or challenges to processes have arisen;
- implementing contingency logistics plans (including in extreme cases emergency evacuation procedures);
- processing information coming in from the field that may require urgent representations to be made to senior state authorities.
Clear decision-making powers, chains of command, and communications structures and facilities within the electoral observer team will be needed for decisions to be made and communicated in an effective manner.
Operations Centres
An electoral observation operations centre, fully staffed during the voting period, is advisable. The size and sophistication of the centre would vary with the size of the electoral observer operation. To maintain cost-effectiveness, such centres, similar in focus to those implemented by electoral management bodies (see Operations and Security Centres), could be jointly maintained by all bodies involved in voting process observation. Such centres would:
- be the initial point of contact between field observers and observer management;
- be staffed by electoral observer advisers and managers of sufficient authority and knowledge to be able to guide observers in their tasks, and make direct decisions affecting the progress of the electoral observation program;
- act as the communication base for electoral observation activity, with direct radio or phone links to all observers, whether at fixed locations or in transit;
- control electoral observation contingency plans for the voting period, including control of any emergency supplies and logistics capacities;
- be equipped to provide immediate formal representation to senior election managers where field observers report unresolved major irregularities;
- in areas of higher security risks, have direct communication links to security and emergency forces' local and national commands.
Where electoral observation is conducted over large geographic areas, setting up of such centres on a regional basis, with boundaries of areas of responsibility congruent to those of electoral districts, will assist response times.
Reporting
Electoral observation during the voting period will be effective only if reporting schedules and formats to and from the field have been clearly defined and are strictly implemented by both electoral observation managers and all field observers. (For further information on this, see Observation Reports.)
Visibility
A basic decision has to be made about the visibility of the electoral observation process during the voting period. Ideally, it should be as open, comprehensive, and visible as electoral observers are expecting of the voting process itself. In doing so, it both promotes faith in the quality of electoral observation findings and, by its open and pre-advised presence, can act as a deterrent to those who may wish to manipulate voting processes.
In environments of higher security risk, however, the ability of security forces to protect widely dispersed electoral observers has to be taken into account. This can be a difficult decision. In some situations where local security forces are being relied upon, state authorities may well exaggerate or manipulate risks to observers in order to deter electoral observation. Where security risks are high, electoral observers should not venture without security protection. If this is not made available, electoral observers' analysis and reports should be looking for correlations between such areas and specific patterns of administrative and voting behaviour and results (see Observation Reports).
Where only minimal security protection is available it may be possible for flying visits of small electoral observer groups to be made to some voting locations. Visibility and deterrence value of these will be relatively low, and if local security forces are involved they may well not be unannounced visits.
However, while overall voting integrity may be difficult to assess from such brief visits, some idea of the atmosphere, effectiveness, secrecy, and freedom of the voting process can be gained from brief electoral observation of:
- location of voting stations and their layout;
- persons present in the voting stations and their behaviour;
- processing of and service to voters;
- those who have voted (though care must be taken not to put such voters at risk).
Role of Electoral Observers
For discussion of the roles of electoral observers during voting, see Observation of Voting and Counts and Observer Rights and Responsibilities.
