Singapore is a parliamentary democracy modeled on the British Westminster system. The government has been controlled by the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) since independence from Britain in 1959. This uninterrupted reign of power stems from two key factors: First, PAP’s prudent economic management has moved Singapore from an economic backwater to one of the wealthiest countries in the world; second, the PAP has a low tolerance for opposition and micromanages elections to ensure resounding majorities in the Parliament. While voting is widely considered to be “fair, accurate, and free from tampering,” [1] the development of a robust opposition has been hampered by limits on basic freedoms associated with democratic practices and by the Government’s control and use of the electoral process as an instrument for political dominance.
Electoral System
Singapore’s parliament is unicameral. Until 1988, members were elected by universal and compulsory suffrage in single-member plurality constituencies (SMCs). Increases in population were accounted for by steady growth of the number of seats contested (from 58 in 1968 to 84 as of 2001).
In 1988, amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act [2] established a mixed system in which some MPs are elected in SMCs while others are elected through a “Party Block Vote” in multi-member Group Representative Constituencies (GRCs) [3]. The purpose of the Party Block Vote is to promote better representation from minority communities. Parties contesting a GRC must propose a slate that includes at least one member of an official minority (listed as Indian, Malay, Eurasian, or Other) [4]. Within the GRCs, voters select from among closed party lists, with the party receiving a plurality of votes winning all seats in the district [5].
Revisions in the electoral law have increased both the number and size of the GRCs [6] and reduced the number of SMCs. As of 2001, nine seats were elected in SMCs, and 75 were elected from the GRCs. Table 1 details the size and composition of the constituencies.
Table 1: Single-member and Group Constituencies in 2001
Group Constituencies | | | | Single-member Constituencies |
Name | MPs | Electors | | Name | MPs | Electors |
Jalan Besar | 5 | 100,268 | | Potong Pasir | 1 | 16,616 |
West Coast | 5 | 110,779 | | Ayer Rajah | 1 | 18,475 |
Bishan-Toa Payoh | 5 | 114,621 | | Joo Chiat | 1 | 21,745 |
Jurong | 5 | 115,113 | | MacPherson | 1 | 22,010 |
Holland Panjang | 5 | 118,834 | | Nee Soon Central | 1 | 22,975 |
Aljunied | 5 | 125,115 | | Hougang | 1 | 23,320 |
Tampines | 5 | 125,432 | | Chua Chu Kang | 1 | 24,863 |
Hong Kah | 5 | 129,073 | | Bukit Timah | 1 | 26,951 |
Pasir Ris-Punggol | 5 | 134,151 | | Nee Soon East | 1 | 28,465 |
Marine Parade | 6 | 140,174 | | | | |
Tanjong Pagar | 6 | 141,150 | | | | |
East Coast | 6 | 144,012 | | | | |
Sembawang | 6 | 166,137 | | | | |
Ang Mo Kio | 6 | 166,644 | | | | |
The GRC has several important political implications. First, whichever party wins the most votes in a GRC wins all five or six seats. As a result, elections routinely produce a disproportional seat allocation that always favors the PAP. In 2001, for example, the PAP won 75.3% of the national vote yet netted 82 of 84 parliamentary seats. As one analysis notes: “Over the last four general elections, the opposition has gained an average of 30 percent of the vote in contested seats, but this has led to only between 1.2 percent and 4.9 percent of the parliamentary seats.” [7]
Second, from the opposition’s perspective, the GRCs “dilute the force of personality of party leaders and also present the problem of fielding competent teams with minority representatives.” [8] As a consequence, opposition parties are often unable to field a full slate of candidates, and many of the GRCs are contested only by the PAP. In 2001, for example, PAP ran unopposed in nearly two-thirds of the constituencies. A related concern is the fact that the GRC also shields weaker PAP candidates (i.e., those who lack the dynamism or force of personality to compete strongly) through team membership [9].
Finally, the GRC system is routinely gerrymandered by the national elections department. Opposition parties complain that redistricting nearly always results in better prospects for PAP candidates as competitive districts are generally dismembered to ensure PAP dominance. Since the redistricting process (and in fact the elections department itself) is not independent from the government or overseen by the judiciary, no checks are in place to prevent abuse of the system. Following the 2001 elections, Amnesty International charged that “The small and poorly funded opposition parties complained that constituency changes and a range of regulations imposed by the PAP made it more difficult for them to win votes.” [10]
Table 2: Election Outcomes since introduction of GRCs
Evolution of the Electoral System in Singapore | |
Year | Total No. of Seats | No. SMCs | No. GRCs | No. GRC Seats | % PAP National Vote | % PAP Seats |
| | | | | | |
1988 | 81 | 42 | 13 | 39 | 63.2 | 98.8 |
1991 | 81 | 21 | 15 | 60 | 61 | 95.1 |
1997 | 83 | 9 | 15 | 74 | 65 | 97.6 |
2001 | 84 | 9 | 14 | 75 | 75.3 | 97.6 |
Legal Framework for Redistribution
Singapore’s elections are governed by the Constitution and the Parliamentary Elections Act (last revised in 2001). All elections staff, including those responsible for redistricting, are appointed by the government [11]. Elections are administered by civil servants in the “Elections Department” which reports directly to the Prime Minister. There is no independent elections commission [12].
Boundary Authority
Prior to each election, the Prime Minister appoints a five-member “Electoral Boundaries Review Committee,” staffed solely by civil servants from the Elections Department. There are no restrictions concerning when the Prime Minister may call for the map to be redrawn. In the past, however, redistricting has always occurred immediately prior to an official announcement of an election.
Upon completion of the review, the Committee submits a report to the cabinet detailing modifications to constituencies and the drawing of boundary lines. The report is accepted by the government without need for debate or approval of the parliament or oversight by the courts [13]. Once approved, the new map is published in the Government Gazette.
Redistribution Criteria
The criteria and process for boundary review is not spelled out in the Parliamentary Elections Act or in any formal legal framework. The only constant across Singapore’s electoral history appears to be a 30% limit on district population deviation [14].
The basis for redistricting appears to be the ethnic distribution of the population. Given Singapore’s small size and high population density, the majority of Singaporeans live in government-built-and–managed, high-rise apartment buildings. The Housing Development Board (HDB) effectively determines where ethnic groups live by actively limiting the number of ethnic groups in each apartment complex. According to one analysis: “The HDB stipulates that only a certain percentage of each ethnic minority group (not more than the national percentage, that is, approximately 25 percent for Malays, 5 percent for Indians and 1 percent for Eurasians) can live in a particular housing estate. Buyers and sellers of the flats must seek permission from the HDB before a transaction can be made.” [15] As a consequence, the government effectively determines the ethnic distribution of the entire country, making it difficult for minority communities to form a plurality in any one electoral district.
Redistricting for the 2001 and 1997 Elections
2001 The general election of 2001 also brought accusations of gerrymandering by opposition parties. The Boundaries Commission submitted its recommendations for electoral district changes only a day before the announcement of the general election. The new map strengthened PAP electoral support in both GRCs and SMCs across the country [16]. It also eliminated four-person GRCs, leaving only five- and six-person GRCs, which had the dual effect of making it more difficult for opposition groups to come up with enough candidates to contest a district and guaranteeing PAP an extra seat in every district that had previously been a four- person GRC [17].
Protests against the 2001 elections were held almost immediately following the publication of the new districts. The Singapore Democratic Alliance, a coalition of four opposition parties, claimed that the new map guaranteed the PAP a victory even before voting took place. The protests spurred several small riots as demonstrators became increasingly indignant over the predetermined outcome [18].
1997 Three months prior to the general election of February 1997, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called upon the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee to redraw the constituency map. Chaired by Wong Chooi Sen, a Cabinet Secretary and PAP party loyalist, the Committee made sweeping changes to all but four electoral districts, despite census data indicating that significant population changes had occurred in only 10 SMCs and three GRCs. The changes were accepted by the Government and implemented shortly before the polls opened.
The Committee created six new GRCs, enlarged six, made two smaller, left one unchanged, and eliminated or renamed another six. Fourteen of the previous twenty-one SMCs were merged into new GRCs or absorbed by pre-existing GRCs. The election law was also amended to raise the maximum number of representatives in a GRC to six and reduce the minimum number of SMCs to eight seats. In the end, the total number of GRCs remained unchanged at 15, and the total number of SMCs shrunk from 21 to nine. The net result was an increase in the percentage of seats in parliament filled by GRCs to 89%, up from 74% in the previous election, and a decrease in the percentage of seats filled by SMCs to 10.8%, down from 25.9% in the previous election.
Some of the most politically significant changes occurred in the six districts that were either eliminated completely or chopped up and renamed. The Eunos district was eliminated completely, with its electorate split into the surrounding districts. In the previous general election, Eunos had experienced the closest race of any of the GRCs, with the PAP winning a narrow victory over the Worker’s Party (WP) by a vote of 45,833 to 41,673. Similarly, the Bedok constituency, where the PAP won over the WP by a vote of 49,109 to 30,121, was renamed East Coast and parts of five other districts were added to it. Three of those districts contained significant PAP support, thus weakening WP’s base. The tactic proved successful as the PAP ran uncontested in East Coast in the 1997 elections.
All four of the SMCs held by opposition party members prior to the election were left as SMCs. However, the boundaries of one of the SMCs were substantially changed. Nee Soon Central, an SMC held by the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) prior to the 1997 elections, was added to the Ang Mo Kio GRC. As a result, the SDP lost the seat in Nee Soon Central to the PAP by a vote of 9,591 to 15,214. The Ang Mo Kio GRC, which absorbed a portion of Nee Soon Central, was uncontested. Thus, the PAP effectively eliminated a strong source of opposition support in one district by diverting a substantial portion of its population to a district where no opposition party even contested the election [19].
Conclusion
Singapore has a functioning democratic system in which voters are freely able to elect their preferred representatives. However, tight government control of the electoral process, combined with other tactics designed to harass opposition parties, results in these elections being less than free and fair. Given widespread popular support for PAP’s prudent management of the city-state, these anti-democratic practices do not serve any identifiable purpose except to provide the PAP with a consistent super-majority. Even without the obvious gerrymandering, the PAP would likely win a substantial majority of votes for the foreseeable future.
In terms of the boundary delimitation process, several key flaws are notable:
- Lack of a legal framework: The redistricting process is not governed by a consistent legal framework. While the Parliamentary Elections Act mandates the creation and composition of SMCs and GRCs, it does not specify any criteria by which the districting process should occur.
- Lack of independence of electoral officials: The government controls both the Elections Department and the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee. Redistricting is conducted in secret, with no public input or oversight, and the EBRC staff is appointed by the Prime Minister’s office, compromising its neutrality.
- Lack of transparency: Opposition parties and civil society groups have no role in the delimitation process. Once delimitation is completed, no external authority is responsible for approval of the new electoral map. The Courts are excluded from the process entirely.
- Time Constraints on the Opposition: The government routinely publishes updated electoral boundaries only weeks before an election. This hinders the ability of opposition parties to recruit candidates and propose slates in newly-created districts. As a result, nearly two-thirds of the GRCs are not even contested during the polling [20].
Appendicies
Notes:
[1] US State Dept. Annual Human Rights Report.
[2] (s8A) The full Act is available at http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/
[3] The Party Block Vote is also utilized in Djibouti, Lebanon, Tunisia, Ecuador and Senegal. According to International IDEA, “[t]he advantages of the Party Block Vote are that it is simple to use, encourages strong parties and allows for parties to put up mixed slates of candidates in order to facilitate minority representation. However, a critical flaw of the Party Block is the production of super-majoritarian results, where one party can win almost all of the seats with a simple majority of the votes.” See http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/esd-blockvote.html
[4] Each GRC is categorized based on whether the minority member represents the “Malay” or the “Indian and Other” minority communities PEA, 8A1b, http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/
[5] Constituent responsibilities in the GRCs are left up to the discretion of the group. Generally, a district is divided into several wards, with each member of the elected group being assigned a ward to specifically represent. However, despite dividing the districts into wards, each member of the group is legally responsible for representing the entire district.
[6] In 1991, for example, the number of GRCs was increased to 15 and SMCs reduced to 21. In 1997, 15 GRCs were scaled into four-, five-, or six-member constituencies, and SMCs were reduced to only nine. For 2001, all GRCs were scaled to five or six members.
[7] Mauzy, Diane K., “Electoral Innovation and One-Party Dominance in Singapore.” In John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh and David Newman (eds.), How Asia Votes. (London: Chatham House Publishers, 2002): 235 – 254.
[8] Mauzy: 244.
[9] http://www.fesspore.org/pdf/Electoral%20Politics/Singapor.pdf p. 206
[10] http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020528ai.htm
[11] PEA 3(1).
[12] http://www.fesspore.org/pdf/Electoral%20Politics/Singapor.pdf p.209
[13]http://www.fesspore.org/pdf/Electoral%20Politics/Singapor.pdf p.210
[14] Warren Fernandez, “15 GRCs, 9 SMC’s for Election,” The Straight Times, 22 November 1996, http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/dream/politics/ref/grc2.html; According to previous accepted practice, there can be no more than a 30% deviation in population among GRCs and no more than 30% deviation in population for SMC’s.
[15] http://www.thinkcentre.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=1435
[16] John Burton, “Why Bother Voting? The Government is Almost Unopposed,” The Economist, 1 November 2001, available at http://www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/01Pf/econ011101.html; see also Appendix A.
[17] “Opposition Faces New Obstacle after Authorities Slap New Election Rules,” The New Straight Times, 21 October 2001, available at http://www.sfdonline.org/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/01Pf/nst211001.html.
[18] “Riots break out on eve of Singapore General Election,” Japan Newswire, 2 November 2001.
[19] Fernandez, “15 GRCs, 9 SMC’s for Election”; “Changes to the Electoral Map,” available at http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/dream/politics/ref/images/elecmap.jpg; “History of Singapore Elections.” eCitizen, available at http://www.ecitizen.gov.sg/inc_frame.htm?link=http://www.elections.gov.sg. See also Appendix C.
[20] In 2001, 55 out of the 84 parliamentary seats ran uncontested, thus guaranteeing a PAP majority regardless of the outcome of the elections; see also Appendix B.
[21] “2001 General Election Results,” eCitizen, available at http://www.ecitizen.gov.sg/inc_frame.htm?link=http://www.elections.gov.sg
