Being able to vote in an atmosphere free of fear, intimidation or manipulation is an important integrity principle. Security during the election process is critical, especially during voting, counting and transmission of the results. A peaceful
election environment facilitates a free, fair and credible election, and avoids the security problems that could jeopardize the integrity of the materials, participation or election results.
Security of the process includes the security of the participants as well as
security for the materials and electoral systems. Voters must be able to vote without fear and
monitors must be able to observe without intimidation. Candidates must be able to campaign
without fear of assassination or harm to their supporters. To ensure integrity, election managers need to be able to plan
and implement elections without interference, and election materials must be safeguarded so they
are not tampered to change the election outcome.
Good security provides the peace of mind that is essential for a free and fair election process.
Insecurity breeds fear and has participants reacting to what they think might happen instead of
what they think should happen.
Maintaining physical security for elections is the responsibility of the government and is usually
done through the civilian police force. The arrangements on how security is handled vary by
country and circumstances. An important integrity aspect is that law enforcement remains
neutral and professional, that it provides enforcement equitably and that law breakers
are prosecuted in a fair trial.
Good Security Planning
Good security requires good planning. This usually starts by identifying vulnerable areas in the electoral
process and the physical sites that need protection. Once these vulnerabilities are identified,
protective measures can be developed and put in an election security plan. Election security also includes control and tracking systems for documents within the election management body,
ensuring payrolls are delivered on time and that poll workers and security agents have received adequate training.
A good security plan is enhanced by good coordination between the election management body and the law enforcement agencies. A joint security plan might be developed and a
coordination mechanism established to facilitate information-sharing and decision-making. This is usually done at the national, regional and local levels of both
institutions.
In Cambodia, for example, security was a major concern in the 1998 elections. There were still elements of the
Khmer Rouge active in the north, and unresolved extra-judicial killings from the factional fighting
that had occurred the year before. The National Elections Committee (NEC), in coordination
with the government security forces and the domestic NGOs, developed a multi-faceted security
plan:
With the cooperation of the government, the NEC also worked out a successful security
plan for the actual voting and ballot counting. Security personnel drawn from the armed
services or police and seconded to the NEC were attached to each polling station, but they
were not in regular uniform and were identified only by an NEC arm-band. The low
visibility of soldiers and policemen played a major part in maintaining peace on election
day and in creating an atmosphere conducive to high voter turnout. The NEC also
encouraged NGOs in their training of thousands of military, police and gendarmes as
election peacekeepers.195
For more on the training of security forces to act as election peacekeepers in Cambodia, see the case study Civic Education for a Nonviolent Election.
Neutrality of the Security Officers
Good election security relies on the neutrality and professionalism of law enforcement officials.
They act in a professional manner and treat everyone equally. The constitutional and civil rights of the citizens are respected and they do not become involved with the political
campaign or agenda of any political party or candidate. The security officials must also respect
the law and enforce it without the use of excessive force or violence.
In some systems, especially post-conflict societies and those undergoing a transition, security
problems can stem from police misconduct. They can harass voters attending rallies or stop voters from going to the polls through the use of road blocks. The law is not enforced and a climate of insecurity can permeate the elections. Ensuring the neutrality and
professionalism of the security services in these situations can be difficult. A start can be made by
adopting a binding Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement and focusing public and government
attention on its enforcement.
Protection of Polling Sites and Electoral Offices.
Physical security for electoral sites (management offices, registration and polling sites) and the
electoral officials who work in those sites enables an environment where the process can be administered in a
neutral and unobstructed manner. Theft of electoral supplies and equipment can adversely affect
the integrity of the process and needs to be addressed through good on-site security, such as
security officers controlling the entrances and exits, employee photo identification badges, sign-in
sheets for after-hours use of the building, as well as good inventory control management systems.
Badges for observers and monitors can also assist, as they allow security officers to know who is
authorized entry into areas where critical aspects of the process are carried out.
Physical security of offices and electoral personnel is also important. In high crime areas, visible
security in the form of fences, window bars, well lit entrances and parking lots, and uniformed
officers could have a deterrent effect. In conflict areas, electoral administrators and workers can
become political targets and need additional safeguards to ensure that they are able to do their work in
a safe and secure environment. This can be a challenge in countries in transition with new police
forces and nervous electoral workers. (See Special Considerations in Countries in Transition).
Threats against the process or personnel do not need to be credible to frighten and disrupt the
electoral machinery, so the security fears of electoral officials and staff should be taken seriously
and addressed as soon as possible.
In polling stations, order needs to be maintained during their establishment, polling,
and the count. In some countries, this is done directly through police protection and by taking indirect
measures, such as closing bars and liquor stores during polling. For example, in the Philippines,
it is illegal to serve, sell, buy or take intoxicating liquor on polling day. 196
Firearms are prohibited within a certain
radius of a polling station by most electoral laws.
Some systems have a person responsible for security at every polling site. They control
access into the building, allowing a limited number of voters into the polling station at a time,
keeping the line orderly and moving in order of first come, first serve. This can avoid mob scenes
at crowded polling stations, which can get out of hand and disrupt polling. Orderly lines also
provide less fodder for those intent on creating disorder. For more on site security see Entrance and Queue Control. At the same time, these security personnel should not appear to be intimidating or biased or their presence could discourage some voters from entering the polls.
Protection of Electoral Materials
Ballots, tally sheets and other electoral materials must be protected from unauthorized
duplication, destruction or tampering to protect the integrity of the vote. This protection should start upon their arrival in the country or delivery to the election management body and continue through their storage
and distribution to polling sites. Some systems require the return of ballots to central storage
areas after the count in case they are needed for recounts.
Keeping track of ballots is facilitated in most systems by the use of a serial numbered stubs that can be used in a
paper trail. The way ballots are packed also helps with security. Packaging ballots in different
sized tamper-proof packaging can enable distribution of the right amount of ballots to each polling
station without the need to open and repack the ballots. Sealed containers with the right number
of ballot packages per electoral district, with the serial numbers, polling location and type
of ballot marked on the outside, can also facilitate storage and distribution and minimize the opportunities for mishandling.
Protection of Candidates, Monitors and Voters
Candidates are verbal targets for opposing parties and candidates, but they can also be targets for
violent acts by those who would like to disrupt the process or eliminate opposition figures.
Candidate protection is usually provided by the police and other specialized law enforcement
agencies. In addition to candidates, campaign rally sites, debates and other public events where
large numbers of people gather for campaign purposes need to be protected.
Polling must also be protected. Voters need to be able to leave
their homes and vote without fear of violence in the streets or intimidation in the polling station.
They need easy access to the polling station. Having to work their way through
threatening individuals or partisan groups to vote can artificially reduce voter turnout. Voter registration cards also need to be protected from unauthorized confiscation or theft.
Monitors also require security so they can observe the process, ask questions of officials, make
comments on the election summary sheets, and sign the tally sheets without intimidation or fear of
retribution. Domestic observers in countries in transition can feel vulnerable to intimidation and
violence, especially when they observe problems stemming from the ruling party or security
forces. For example, in the insecure environment of the 1998 elections in Cambodia, domestic monitoring
groups, such as COMFREL, 'organized meetings at which its volunteers discussed concerns about
political conditions with party representatives, election officials and local authorities... This
dialogue had a positive effect and decreased the level of violence during voter registration and the
campaign period.'
197
Threats on election day, can come from within the election management body as well as from the outside. In some systems, unhappy poll workers can strike right before or after
polling, take polling materials hostage for things such as better pay. These issues can be
minimized through good planning, training and competitive pay (see Staffing and Recruitment.)
Problems can also come from other sectors of society which might take advantage of election day
to publicize their own issues or disrupt the process. These can be strikes by public transporters or
even collective action by the security forces. For instance, in South Africa 'strikes and lockouts on voting day
by employees and employers in the public transport or telecommunication sector are prohibited
and are not protected in terms of Chapter IV of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.198