Protecting against Discrimination, Intimidation and Fraud during voting is the responsibility of the election management and policy bodies and
law enforcement. Integrity can be helped by Political Party Monitors, National Election Observation, International Election Observation, and the Media, as well as
through the active participation of the voters themselves (see Every Voter a Poll Watcher (NANFREL)).
Although, as stated by Elklit Jorgen and Palle Svensson, 'irregularities on polling day seriously threaten freedom and fairness only to the extent
that they are extensive, systematic or decisive in a close race'
206, irregularities need to be addressed. Even if they do not affect the election results, they undermine the credibility of the
process and the legitimacy of the official results.
Protective measures can be designed into both the electoral
management and operations systems. Some of the measures that can be taken to minimize integrity problems during polling include:
Good management and operational systems
Overt fraud, as well as operational problems, can be dealt with by good management and
supervision. This is facilitated by good planning and the development of systems that use checks and
oversight mechanisms. These could include:
- good inventory and control mechanisms for electoral materials - during their delivery,
storage, distribution, use at polling sites and retrieval;
- tracking of ballots through mechanisms such as serial numbered stubs during their delivery, storage, distribution
and retrieval from polling sites. Reconciling ballot numbers during polling to make sure
that no ballots have been added or are missing. In the Philippines, for instance, ballot numbers are
checked when given to voters and again before the folded ballot is cast into the ballot box;
- having copies of the electoral law and electoral procedures at every polling site;
- using numbered seals on ballot boxes, and ensuring that the numbers are noted by
poll workers, political party monitors and in the official record for the vote. Other systems use mechanisms such as having all present sign across the tape used to seal the box;
- having competent, well-trained poll workers (see Training of Voting Operations Staff and Evaluation of Recruitment and Training) and a qualified person to act as the chief polling officer for each polling station
who supervises voting, takes all reasonable steps to ensure orderly conduct at the polling
station, and ensures that polling and the count at that station is free and fair;
- ensuring that the access to the polling station is limited to electoral employees, accredited
observers/monitors and registered voters. Anyone whose conduct is not conducive to free
and fair elections is usually denied access to the polling station, and security officers called,
if necessary, to remove troublemakers from the premises;
- hiring nonpartisan or neutral poll workers. In most systems, poll workers are not candidates or
political party officials and are not allowed to wear any party emblems, colours or political
identifying marks;
- using a written employment contract with poll workers that includes their exact duties,
ethical requirements for the job (impartiality, honesty, politeness) and salary so that there
is no confusion or misunderstandings;
- posting voter registration lists before polling day so voters can find their names and make
sure they have not been inadvertently, or deliberately, eliminated from the lists. This gives
election managers time to fix the error or to amend the procedures to allow these voters
with valid ID documents to be added to the list on polling day; and
- placing the privacy screen for voting in polling stations in such a way that no one can see
how a voter votes.
For more on good management of polling see Voting Control.
Secure and neutral polling sites
Voters need to feel protected from political activists and pressure during voting. Polling sites should be
located in a safe and neutral location, such as a school, sports centre or village hall. They should
not be in the home or on the property of a candidate or political party official. In some systems, a
dominant ruling party may be in control of government operations and, as a result, government
buildings may not be seen as neutral polling locations.
Troublemakers should be kept away from polling sites, and crowds kept at a far enough distance
that they do not hinder access to the station by voters. In South Africa, for example, voters must leave the polling station
as soon as they complete voting. In Ireland, the presiding officer may order
the arrest of any person suspected of committing an electoral offense. 207
The polling site needs to be secure enough that it can protect the polling materials and ballot boxes.
In some places, losing candidates have been known to steal ballot boxes or destroy them after the
elections in order to invalidate the results from that area. Another tactic is ballot box
substitution, where the entire ballot box is exchanged after the polling. 208 These can be detected by the use of seals on ballot
boxes, and good continuous monitoring by political party monitors and observers.
For more on polling site security see Security.
Good monitoring
Monitors and observers who watch polling and the count can deter and detect many integrity
problems. Monitors, in particular, who may challenge irregularities on the spot, can be an
effective integrity agent. (For more see Monitors of Election Integrity.). In
Mexico, for instance, political party agents certify the authenticity of election day files through their presence
and personal signatures. They are authorized to sign ballots before election day, and at the start of
voting, to ensure that ballots have not been tampered with or substituted. 209
Having monitors from several political parties along with domestic observers reduces the chance
of collusion with polling station officials to manipulate the results. Monitors usually sign the tally
sheet and ensure that they have a copy that they can use to double check that the results are not
changed later. This is an important mechanism because as explained by former MP Ding Tanjuatco in the Philippines:
After the count is completed in the precinct, the votes are recorded in a document called
the Election Return. The intercalation of a single digit can result in a hundred votes added
in favour of a candidate. And this is so easy to do because by this time the level of
awareness had been relaxed, the recording being anticlimatic to the counting.
This can also happen at the consolidation level where adding one or two more digits can change
the results by tens of thousands of votes. 210
Tampering with the results can be discovered through a parallel vote count, where the party
monitors or domestic observers report back the results from each table, and these results are
compared with the official results announced by the election management body. For the use of the parallel count in Indonesia see the case study Domestic Monitoring and Election Integrity.
Confirming voter identity
To avoid the problem of voter impersonation, where a person uses the valid registration of
another voter to vote, some systems require voter identification. This enables the polling officers
to check that the person who showed up to vote is the person who is registered. This can be done
by producing the official voter registration card, or through showing some other type of
acceptable identification.
In the case of Ireland, voters can only vote if the presiding officer is satisfied with the elector's identity. This
can mean being required to produce proof of identity for the presiding officer, and without proof,
may not be permitted to vote. 211 In South Africa, the
polling officer may require that the voter's fingerprints be taken to ensure identity. 212
In other systems, requiring proof of identity is seen as a means of harassment or discrimination,
and is prohibited. In the U.S., for example, the federal Voting Act does not allow a polling official to ask for
voter identification. This has led to a widespread perception, that noncitizens or other ineligible
persons, are able to vote in the place of anyone on the voter registration list. Several states are
addressing this issue by proposing state legislation to require voter identification at the polls. This
includes California where:
Under the current system, virtually anyone can walk in off the street, sign the voter
registry using any name on the voter roll and cast a ballot. Once that ballot is cast, even if
we can prove fraud after the fact, the nature of the secret ballot prevents us from being
able to invalidate the illegal vote. With this one common-sense reform (requiring voters to show IDs), we would be able
to tighten and improve the security of California's election process. 213
Identifying voters who have already voted
To avoid the problem of individual voters voting more than once, some systems mark the voters
who have completed voting. Once marked, the voter can no longer vote. The most common
marking system is the use of indelible ink on one of the voter's fingers. Other systems use hand
stamps which are visible under fluorescent lights. For the ink to be effective, the election management body
must ensure that there is enough ink for every voter and that it is potent enough to last
through the polling period. Storage and distribution of ink is also usually monitored, as ink can
be used by those interested in subverting the process to prevent eligible opposition voters, or
those who have been paid not to vote, from actually voting.
Ensuring ballot integrity
It is important to ensure that there are no unauthorized copies made of the official ballot, that
voters receive unmarked ballots for polling and that the ballots are not switched before or after the
count. To accomplish this, some systems mark the ballots with an identifying mark.
Some systems use special paper or watermarks to discourage and identify unauthorized
duplication (see Ballots). Others mark the ballots as they are being handed to voters to
ensure that the voter returns the same ballot. In Ireland and Kenya, for example, ballots are not valid until they
are stamped with an official's authenticating mark. In the case of Mexico, after checking to make sure the
ballots have not been pre-marked, political party monitors can sign the back of the ballots. In
several other systems, including the Philippines and South Africa, the head of the polling station
authenticates the ballot by signing the back of it.
These can deter most efforts to provide voters with pre-marked ballots or to replace valid ballots
with fraudulent ones. However, in a few places, these safeguards have been bypassed by 'chained
balloting.' As explained by Ding Tanjuatco, a former MP in the Philippines:
Some candidates will take the word of the bought voter. However, if he wants to be sure
that he gets his money's worth, the candidate will employ chained balloting or 'lansadera'.
At the start of the day, all the potential 'buyees' are gathered in one place and, as soon as
the polls are opened, one of them is sent to the polling place. After the usual identification
process, he obtains a ballot from the poll clerk, which he takes with him to the polling
booth.
At this point, everything is still fine and dandy. But what he does with the ballot becomes
the heart of the illegal scheme. Instead of filling up the ballot, he puts it in his pocket and
casts something that looks like a ballot into the ballot box. Thereafter, he presents the
blank official ballot to the buyer who pays him an amount for his effort. The buyer then
fills up the ballot himself and hands the same to the second voter. The second voter goes
to the polling place and obtains a blank official ballot but does not drop this in the ballot
box. Instead he drops the ballot which was filled up by the buyer. He then turns over the
blank official ballot to the buyer and the cycle is repeated. 214
Protection for absentee ballots
Voting by absentee ballots contains more possibilities for fraud since most systems do not require
the physical presence of the voter at any stage in the process. Electoral managers can include
mechanisms to protect the secrecy of Absentee Voting but it is still
difficult to detect an individual who votes more than once using different names.
In the case of the U.S. state of Arkansas, the Secretary of State is working to tighten the procedures for
absentee voting in her state. She has proposed that a voter be limited to picking up and delivering
five ballots to the county clerk's office for each election, that only one ballot per envelope be
allowed, and that the registered voter should sign the outside of the mailed envelop to enable the
county clerk to verify the signature with the voter registration records. 215
Other systems, such as Denmark, protects pre-election voting, by limiting it to being done in person at a national
registration office, and only after presenting identification documents.
Use of appropriate equipment
As with the use of good systems, the use of appropriate equipment can minimize some integrity
problems. For example:
- Official documents in multiple copies. By using paper that automatically makes several
copies of the report, political party monitors can be immediately provided with a copy of
the official tally sheet. These copies can facilitate the work of political parties to
undertake a parallel count or to double check the official results and could be used as
evidence, if necessary, for a legal challenge of the results.
- Secure ballot boxes. Ballot boxes must be able to be closed securely and sealed. They
also require a sealing mechanism with a serial number or other identifying mark so that it
is evident if a box has been opened or tampered with. Mexico, for example, uses transparent ballot
boxes to show that boxes are not pre-stuffed. South Africa labels and numbers all ballot
boxes so they can not be substituted without being detected.
- Adequate privacy screens. Screens to protect voter privacy are used in most systems.
The screen should be large enough so that persons within the polling station cannot see
the ballot or the way in which the voter is marking the ballot.
For more on appropriate equipment see Voting Day Equipment.
Good security
A free and fair vote requires good security. This is important both inside and outside the polling
station and applies to the voters, polling staff, monitors and materials. For more see Security.
Enforcing the laws
Enforcement of the electoral and criminal laws is a key deterrent. Good enforcement requires incidents to be
investigated, suspects interviewed and those believed to have broken the law prosecuted. Those who are found guilty of a criminal offence should be held accountable for their actions and be sentenced according to
the provision in the law. Enforcement should be done impartially and with equity. Most systems do not allow high level
officials and others in government to be immune from criminal prosecution.
Prosecution and removal of office of those found guilty of election fraud can be a disincentive to
election fraud. For example, in 1994, a U.S. federal judge removed a state senator from office over election
fraud and another 16 persons either pleaded guilty or were convicted of absentee ballot fraud.
216
For more on enforcement and prosecution
see Enforcement of Election Integrity.
Educate voters
Preventing the buying of votes or the manipulation of the vote through intimidating tactics can
be difficult, especially in countries with high unemployment, low incomes and security problems.
The voters may not be aware of their rights, of the mechanisms that will be used to protect the
secrecy of their vote or of the motives of the vote buyers.
A good voter education programme can make voters more aware of their rights, where to go
for redress and how the systems is supposed to function. It can also explain the effects of
corruption and the need for integrity in public service and the electoral process. For more, see Voter Education.
Changing election dates or polling hours
If something has gone fundamentally wrong, and it is impossible to have free and fair polling in
certain locations, the election management authorities may consider changing the polling hours or
date of the election. The scope of the changes usually depends on the type of elections being held
and the size of the problem.
South Africa, for instance, allows for a general postponement of the elections if
necessary to ensure a free and fair election. It also allows for reruns in certain polling stations
or different voting hours for different voting stations. It can also extend voting hours at a voting
station until as late as midnight on voting day or temporarily close a voting station for part of the
day if it is 'temporarily impossible to conduct a free and fair election at that voting station.'
217
