This section deals primarily with national observers who form part of an organized civil society observation effort. Individuals can also play an important integrity monitoring role, as do political party monitors which are discussed in Political Party Monitors.
Individual citizens
Individual citizens are integrity's first line of defence. A well informed voter who asks the right questions, can expose, stop or deter an integrity problem. Even a voter who is not informed, but who questions something that just does not seem right can be an effective integrity mechanism.
For example, in the 1998 elections in the Philippines, the civil society monitoring group NANFREL urged every voter 'to act like a pollwatcher and help prevent electoral fraud.'
On Election Day, you will spend anywhere from 20 to 45 minutes looking for your name and precinct, lining up to get your ballot, filling it out and casting your vote. In some cases, you could spend more time depending on how large the crowds are at your polling place. During that time, you can protect your interest as well as that of other voters by keeping a protective eye on the electoral process.296
In the U.S., for example, the NonGovernmental Organization (NGO), Voting Integrity Project (VIP), follows the same line of reasoning by seeking to 'educate and equip American voters to protect the integrity of their elections in their own communities.' 297
VIP finds that election fraud is very difficult to prove and that 'pro-active programs designed to prevent election fraud are more productive.' 298
Organized national observation
Monitoring of the process by organized civil society groups is one of the key integrity mechanisms. These groups collect information from their observer teams, analyse the observations, assess the quality of the election and publicize their findings. How effective these groups are as an integrity mechanism depends on their organizational strengths and financial capacity, as well as how civil society is regarded and functions within that particular system (see Social and Political Context).
Elections are part of the internal workings of a country, and the ultimate judge of an election should be its domestic participants. There are a few cases where the presence of international observers is indispensable, notably peacekeeping elections or in countries undergoing a difficult transition, or where nonpartisan civil society groups are either nonexistent or not functional. However, in the long term, the establishment of domestic groups that are able to monitor their own elections without external assistance is an essential part of democratic development.
An example of the power of domestic monitoring is the 1997 elections in Kenya where civil society organizations trained more than 28,000 domestic observers. According to Joel Barkan and Njuguma Ng'ethe: 'In what may have been the most comprehensive domestic observation of an African election, observers were posted at nearly 12,600 polling stations and at each counting station to monitor the tabulation of the votes. This pervasive observation presence may have also helped the turnout' which was 68%. 299
In the case of Indonesia, more than 600,000 national observers covered the 1999 elections and helped ensure the integrity of the election results through their close monitoring of the count. (See the Indonesia case study: Domestic Monitoring and Election Integrity).
The benefits of domestic observation over international observation, is discussed in IDEA's Lessons Learnt from International Observation:
Domestic non-partisan monitoring groups are often better equipped to carry out particular types of specialized monitoring more efficiently than international observers. A few examples include verification of the voter registry which is a highly personnel intensive activity, monitoring the complaints process, documenting instances of intimidation and human rights violations, and media monitoring.
In addition, civic organizations have an important role to play in implementing civic education programmes, fostering transparency and accountability in government, and promoting election law reform. 300
This position is supported in the article The Observers Observed:
Domestic election monitors, if properly organized and prepared, have important advantages over foreign observers. They can much more easily turn out in very large numbers, usually in the thousands. They know the political culture, the language, and the territory in question and consequently are capable of seeing many things that short-term foreign observers cannot. As citizens, they embody the crucial idea that the society in question should take primary responsibility for improving its own political processes. 301
Effectiveness
Effective national observation is usually:
Difficulties
National groups trying to fulfil their integrity mechanism role can face many difficulties, especially in countries undergoing a difficult transition or in LDCs. These difficulties can include:
- Lack of resources, both human and financial. It is difficult for NGOs without adequate financial resources to implement a comprehensive observation effort. Resources are needed to hire qualified staff, train and equip them. Some NGOs rely on volunteers, but there are still expenses that must be met, training that must be done and equipment that must be purchased.
- Reliance on donors. Relying on donors can raise several issues. The national monitoring effort can appear to be foreign or donor driven. Donor requirements and funding cycles can make it difficult for NGOs to develop acceptable funding proposals or to receive funds on time. For instance, at a lessons learned conference, the Cambodian NGO coalition, COFFEL, identified several lessons learned in relation to obtaining donor funding:
- study the mandates of donor organizations closely;
- seek funding from a wide array of sources;
- make the observation project objectives as clear as possible in the proposal; and
- understand donor policies and restrictions on the use of their funds. 303
To address these kinds of issues, for example, the national observation group, NANFREL, in the Philippines, seeks support from the business community. It believes domestic support reinforces the notion that democratic elections are in the community's best interest.
- Accreditation. Domestic groups that are critical of the process, can sometimes have difficulties obtaining credentials to observe the process. (See Accrediting Observers.) Problems in obtaining credentials need to be reported immediately to the election management body, oversight agency and international observation groups.
- Lack of access. Domestic groups can have difficulties gaining access to electoral sites, electoral managers or candidates. Accreditation is supposed to address the access issue, but discrimination can still occur. These incidents should be document and reported immediately to the election management and oversight authorities.
- Lack of coordination. Coordination of domestic observation activities and deployment can avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that all the electoral sites are covered. This coordination should take into consideration the relative institutional strengths of each NGO. There can also be a coordination problem with the amount of money paid to national observers, whether it be a stipend or per diem. The use of large financial incentives by one group can create serious problems for other NGOs attempting to establish a volunteer network.
- Security problems. In countries undergoing a difficult transition or in post-conflict societies, national observers can be targets for intimidation and threats. This can affect the observers ability to travel, observe freely and report back on the information without self-censorship or fear of retribution. For example, in the 1998 national elections in Cambodia: 'Threats, intimidation and violence were daunting challenges to the Cambodian observers during this year's election process. None of the groups suggested that their ability to release public statements was compromised by the political environment. They noted, though, that intimidation affected their ability to gather information on the process and that threats coloured the reports that it received from observers.'304
