First Considerations
What type of election management body (EMB) should a democracy have? The question may
be asked by politicians, legislators or academics interested in the continued development of a
newly democratised nation. Alternatively, it could be asked by interested individuals looking to
change the arrangements within an existing democracy in need of a fresh approach to the
management of its electoral process. The options are many, and they include:
- temporary election management body
- permanent election management body
- independent body whether temporary or permanent
- partisan temporary or permanent body
- mixed partisan/nonpartisan body
- specialised judicial body
- government ministry
- decentralised body
Whatever the consideration, the first port of call is the constitution or electoral law of the
country in question, to establish what the legislators envisage for the democracy in question.
This suggestion assumes that such provision exists, which may not always be the case. In
Romania, for example, the election law allows for the formation of a temporary Central
Electoral Bureau within a few days of fixing the election date. It is viewed differently in South
Korea, where the law provides for a permanent commission with members serving for six years.
In Albania, alternatively, the law originally established a temporary Central Election
Commission. Following international pressure, the election law was changed, and a permanent
body has now been established.
Of course, other circumstances need to be taken into consideration. The economic climate is a
consideration. Can the country afford a full-time, permanent central election body, or should it
make do with a temporary, part-time group of individuals to perform similar tasks over a shorter
period, with the possibility of permanence when economic stability arrives? Can a permanent
government body be given responsibility for election administration in addition to its other
responsibilities? Also, what possibilities are there of foreign donors assisting with the
establishment of the electoral body? These considerations are all important. Whatever the
decision, the electoral body has the responsibility to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.
The various types of election management bodies referred to above are considered in more
detail below.
Temporary Body
The financial advantages of establishing an electoral body for a relatively short period of time
are obvious. Renting accommodations, hiring staff, and use of equipment for limited periods
will reduce costs and may more easily attract investment or donations from outside agencies.
This type of body is also more likely to be treated sympathetically, in the budgetary sense, by the
government of the day.
Similarly, there will be organisational advantages to temporary bodies. Staff may be borrowed
or seconded from other areas of expertise available to the government. The civil service or
commerce may be able to release staff for short periods, if necessary. If staff is hired, temporary
contracts are easier to put in place, and employees may be more adaptable. Again, one must not
forget foreign donors, as other governments may be in a position to allocate experts to assist for
short periods of time. (In such case, it is important to have the right balance of nationalities in
order to avoid dominance by one particular country.) One other benefit of a temporary body
could be that shorter time scales could lead to greater efficiency as fast-approaching deadlines
will, with well motivated and committed staff, lead to increased performance. It is easier to
work long hours knowing that there is a cut-off point on the horizon. Temporary EMBs may
also be more suited to small states, although they tend to be less independent of the appointing
authorities.
All that said, one needs to be aware of the disadvantages of temporary bodies. Hurried financial
aid to temporary commissions can lead to over-provision, waste and an inefficient use of
financial resources. It is sometimes said that it is possible to tell whether there is an upcoming
election in some countries due to the influx of new computers, fast printers and, in particular,
state-of-the-art photocopying machines. Other disadvantages include an inconsistent approach
to electoral management, loss of election 'memory,' less opportunity for ongoing training and
the adoption of a professional approach to the tasks in hand. Also, modern multiparty elections
require continuity in management in order to continually update methods of processing. A
temporary EMB would be unlikely to provide this continuity. Election administrators in some
countries with temporary bodies have complained that the legislation does not allow them
sufficient time to both organise themselves internally (e.g., locate adequate physical space and
staff, establish standard operating procedures, and so forth) and organise the upcoming election.
Permanent Body
The advantages of establishing a permanent national election management body must be
weighed against the increased financial burden associated with the introduction of a permanent
structure. It may be that the members serve in a voluntary capacity, after being released from
the normal work functions, to assist with this part of the democratic process. Costs will need to
be properly budgeted and met. Permanent offices, staff and other expenditures will be higher
than for a temporary commission.
There are, of course, organisational advantages to permanent bodies. Proper structures can be
put in place for the commission and its staff to undertake their duties. The permanence will
enable the EMB to take on a wider scope of duties and powers, and it should lead to greater
efficiency. These additional duties and powers could include ongoing voter or civil registration,
civic education, party and finance regulation, and so forth. A permanent body will require a
proper work plan, which should be subject to review on a regular basis. Additionally, there will
need to be a process of reporting to parliament. Annual reporting and budgeting should be part
of the parliamentary process.
Independence
An independent election body is one that is structured in such a way as to be insulated from
individuals, groups or institutions that have an interest in the outcome of the election.
Well-respected individuals, usually named by the head of state or the parliament with the
agreement of all parties, serve for a specified period of time ranging, usually, from three to seven
years. This method of appointment is sometimes considered controversial, since the head of
state and/or government may also be the leader of a contending political party. Therefore, the
trend is to include nominees of opposition parties in appropriate cases. Ideally, the term of
office should be set so that it never coincides with an election.
Members invariably are academics, judges or other notable and respected individuals in the
country. The members will have no connection with any political party and will usually be
prevented from having any political involvement by the legislation governing the formation of
the commission. This way, the commission will be seen as being above any political
interference and will be able to hold on to its independence.
Strong leadership is important to maintain such independence, and a senior member of the
judiciary may be ideal in the position of chair. The link to the judiciary should prevent
interference from the government or opposition parties, but there is, of course, no guarantee of
this independence. It is important that the commission be seen as independent by the voting
public.
One of the most important guarantors of independence is budgetary independence. This
independence is ensured when the legislature must, by law, grant the EMBs budgetary request,
subject only to a post-election audit overview (this is considered in Independence of Budget).
Despite such safeguards, the commission may be accused of being partisan. In addition, the
commission may be unable to secure authority without political backing and run the risk of
being perceived as weak or ineffectual by voters.
Partisan Election Management Body
In new or developing multiparty democracies, there may be a desire to have independent
electoral management in order that the commission can have a truly representative mix of all
political parties involved in the election contest. One of the purposes of a partisan EMB is to
ensure that one party watches the other. A problem arises when, as sometimes happens in new
democracies (Namibia in 1989 and later in Bulgaria), the number of political parties on the
ballot becomes too great. Unless declared coalitions are formed, it may be difficult to have all
interests represented on the commission. Venezuela used to have an electoral council formed by
representatives of the largest parties and two groups of smaller parties. The political makeup of
the commission should be addressed in the legislation.
There are cost advantages to this type of commission. Expenses on salaries could be kept to a
minimum if party appointees act on a voluntary basis. The commitment to the electoral body
could be enhanced to protect party interests and, as everyone on the commission is a stakeholder,
this commitment could aid efficiency. Additionally, political clout exists, connections to party
leadership (particularly the ruling party) will assist the process, and voters will view the body as
representative of the country.
However, there are disadvantages. There is no guarantee of quality nominations, and
representatives will probably have other commitments. There is a view that members are bound
to pursue their own party's interests, and, of course, formal or informal coalitions may vote out
or oppose good ideas of individual parties. In addition, nominees usually take instructions from
the party and are known to boycott meetings of the EMB on party instructions. Parties have also
been known to replace their representatives frequently, disrupting the functioning of the body.
There is also the danger that the larger parties could collude with each other to exclude the
emerging smaller parties from the process.
Partisan/Nonpartisan Mix
It is possible to have a mixed representation between party representatives and independent
nominees, and it could be argued that this type of commission would enjoy the best of both
worlds. In some countries, the party representatives have voice but not a vote on the council.
Judicial Body
In some countries, like Romania and Pakistan, members of the judiciary are appointed to the
commission with the responsibility of administering the elections. This type of appointment
should guarantee independence, but it may present problems if the judiciary of the country in
question is not viewed as truly independent. In Brazil, elections are administered by a special
branch of the judiciary. Tribunal members come from the court system and the legal
community. Local election judges are also members of the regular judiciary. And permanent
professional staff hold most administrative posts under a secretary general.
Government Ministry
In the government ministry case, there is no permanent or temporary national election
commission established, and elections are administered entirely by a government ministry, often
the Ministry of the Interior. Employees will be civil servants from the particular ministry, and
they will undertake the organisational functions associated with the permanent body established
in other countries. Complaints and other challenges will usually be determined by the judiciary.
The advantages of this type of system include:
- the existence of experienced staff who could be released from normal duties at election
time
- the possibility that electoral responsibilities may be given to part of a national statistics or
population office which assists voter registration and the gathering of other voter information
requirements, such as, for example, identity cards
- civil servants accustomed to the bureaucracy and, therefore, will display a knowledge of the
system which may lead to efficiency and advantageous cost implications
Countries with this type of arrangement include Algeria, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Ivory
Coast and Senegal.
Decentralised Electoral Management
Decentralised electoral management is a system in which local bodies undertake the
organisation of electoral matters on behalf of the central body. This system is similar to that
which is used in the United Kingdom for all elections and in New Zealand for local and regional
elections. Other countries with comparable systems include Ireland and Sweden.
Other Examples
In some countries, the management body is a mix of the different systems described above. In
Mexico, for example, there is a dual structure at the national level, with the Federal Electoral
Institute looking after electoral administration and the Electoral Tribunal adjudicating all
manner of complaints. In Argentina, the Ministry of the Interior looks after election
administration and the National Election Court makes general policies and determines disputes.
In Canada, the chief electoral officer (CEO) is appointed by the House of Commons and
manages Elections Canada. Upon taking the appointment, the CEO relinquishes personal voting
rights, presumably to keep the CEO above politics and to demonstrate true independence and
impartiality. The CEO appoints returning officers for each of the 295 electoral districts.
Elections Canada has a permanent establishment of approximately sixty staff members who deal
with operations, information technology issues, give advice on legal issues, act as the
broadcasting arbiter, and deal with election finance issues.
