Proof of identity is required by EMBs as a fraud control mechanism. One of the fundamental aims of a democratic electoral system is to ensure that each voter is entitled to one vote, and that each voter casts one vote only. Consequently, steps need to be taken to avoid 'multiple voting', or the act of one person voting more than once, and instances of persons voting who are not entitled to vote.
Fraudulent voting can occur where a person registers and votes under one or more fraudulent names (or identities). Fraudulent voting can also occur where a person votes using the names of other registered voters, usually without their consent.
Provision of proof of identity can be used in two ways to prevent or reduce fraudulent registration and voting. Where proof of identity is obtained during the registration process, this can be used to ensure that only genuine people are listed on the voter register (as opposed to registration of fictitious identities). Where proof of identity is provided during the voting process, this can be used to ensure that a person cannot vote using another person's name.
The process of verifying proof of identity, both during voter registration and during polling, can be laden with difficulties. In many countries it can be relatively easy to obtain false identity documents. Verifying that an individual presenting identity documents is indeed the individual listed in the documents is also not always a straightforward task. The process of comparing signatures and/or fingerprints on documents is a skilled one, and without adequate training, EMB staff cannot be expected to pick up all cases of forged signatures or non-matching fingerprints. Similarly, comparing individuals with identity photographs is not always easy, and EMB staff would generally not be equipped to pick up all cases of impersonation, or identify whether a photographic identity card has been tampered with and amended with a different photograph.
Consequently an EMB will need to undertake a risk assessment to determine how much, if any, effort should be expended on receiving, verifying and recording proofs of identity. If the risks are low and the expense involved is considerable, and EMB may decide that only minimal identity checks are required. If the risks are high, more effort will need to be put into identity checks. Depending on the political stakes involved, the expense and effort involved in using false identity documents may be considered worth the trouble by those wishing to fraudulently influence election outcomes. An EMB will need to judge how likely it is that false identity documents may be used in order to decide whether to take steps to improve the chances of discovering and rejecting false identity documents.
An EMB should also consider whether it is more effective to undertake identity checks at the voter registration stage or at the voting stage, or both. Identity checks undertaken at the registration stage are relatively worthless if it is easy for a person to fraudulently vote in another person's name during the polling period. It may therefore be more effective to concentrate on proving identity during the voting stage. An alternative approach to use of identity checks to prevent multiple voting might be to use indelible inks on voters' fingers or similar strategies to indicate whether a person has already voted in an election. (See Innovative Uses of Materials.)
