There are as many types of electoral organisations. It would be very difficult to find two electoral organisations that are exactly the same, so no two coinciding doctrinal classifications of these organisations can be found either. Should such a case come up, it would be highly debatable and most likely found to be incomplete.
In all countries, electoral organisations are created because of deficiencies in--or the lack of--one or both of the branches of government that represent the separation of power, the executive or the judiciary, to face an operation as complex and politically relevant as elections. The questions that all political systems must answer when it comes to organising their electoral processes are:
- does an ordinary administration exist that acts with professionalism, neutrality and sufficient independence with regard to the political party that is in power to guarantee that these traits will be maintained when a possible alteration in power is at stake?
- are the public opinion and the political parties themselves prepared to firmly believe in the neutrality of their administration in order to be able to organise them?
- assuming that the public administration is neutral, is it sufficiently efficient and equipped with the necessary means for such a complex operation?
- is ordinary judicial control sufficient to guarantee the adequate performance of the administration?
- supposing that it is, can the judiciary be entrusted with the control over the elections?
- or, on the other hand, does the judiciary lack the neutrality or the necessary means to carry out its function under the conditions required for an electoral process?
Ideally, should a state be in a position to answer all six of these questions affirmatively, electoral organisations would be unnecessary, at least in the sense that we know them today.
Naturally this does not mean that they will not need an electoral administration, just as an administration of forestry or health are required, but the specific elements arising from the holding of elections would not add any qualification whatsoever.
There would be an organisation in the executive branch that would physically carry out the electoral operations, and its control, of no specific nature, would be entrusted to the traditional schemes of control of democratic countries, e.g., parliamentary control, judicial control, eventually an ombudsman who would receive complaints from the citizens, perhaps a control mechanism of public televisions through a parliamentary commission, etc. And, of course, a free press would be prepared to denounce any abuse by the executive power.
At the opposite extreme, if none of the institutions indicated can operate adequately during the critical time of the elections, it will be necessary to create an electoral organisation that will be able to substitute all of them. It would have to be the executive and judicial powers, an administration and control organ, all in one, and independent in the broadest sense of the word.
