There is no universal rule to decide which organ should be responsible for the implementation of the reform, or what the ideal composition should be. In principle, in a phase prior to its discussion and adoption in accordance with the rules of each legal system, a law of a certain technical complexity, drafted by a commission, must be it parliamentary or composed of independent experts or governmental specialists.
An argument in favour of it being a commission made up of experts that are independent of the government and the main political forces is usually that its work will probably be more balanced and neutral outside the realm of economic interests of the political agents and perhaps even technically more accurate, insofar as the absence of pressures from any side will permit a more meticulous study of the needs and the most effective technical solutions. However, neither it is assured that in reality such exquisite conditions of neutrality exist nor is it evident what the designation procedure should be to guarantee its attainment. In addition, the participation of the political forces in the preparation of a reform that will affect one of their basic regulations must not be ruled out beforehand.
On the one hand, it does not usually occur that the experts in constitutional law are so cut off from national political life that they are impervious to any partisan influence or to opinions that are not strictly scientific. Neither do the designation procedures of these commissions guarantee this neutrality beyond all doubt. Consider those appointed by the president of South Africa for the reform of the apartheid regime, or the commission appointed by the Azerbaijani president to draft the new electoral law. And some recent experiences where the commissions were made up of political forces were by and large positive, such as Mozambique, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Colombia, and El Salvador.
The problem is not, in reality, so much the composition or designation of these commissions, as the general rules under which they carry out their duties. A commission open to the contradictory influences of the different political forces is preferable to those acting under the dictums of one of them alone. Likewise, a commission whose discussions are relatively transparent (without converting them into hollow bodies, unable to carry out their duties) is preferable to others whose secret actions sap public confidence by their results.
As a rule, it is more important for the political forces to accept the overall composition of the commission and its projects with a degree of consensus, without which the success of any reform would not be easy, rather than forge an angelic neutrality.
It is also essential for them to act within some general criteria agreed upon prior to the commencement of the work, including an express agreement on the objectives of the reform, an approximate time schedule and some working procedures that will facilitate technical quality and transparency. Reform processes such as in Tanzania and Morocco, whose gradualism was not necessarily objectionable, have, however, been criticised for their lack of clarity. The absence of a clear purpose, of accurate deadlines and even, in the Moroccan case, a regulation that would materialise the results of the progress, caused waning public confidence in the reform project.
The recently appointed commission in the United Kingdom, chaired by an ex-labour minister, now in the liberal-democratic ranks, has the purpose of studying a possible reform that will make the British electoral system more proportional. However, neither has its composition been discussed, nor is it foreseeable that its conclusions will be, due to distrust regarding the
expertise or the neutrality of its members.
A more extreme example is the reform of the Spanish electoral system as one of the initial elements of political reform that culminated in the Constitution of 1978. The basic elements of the electoral system, later constitutionalised, originate from a Law for Political Reform drafted by a few people that were holding the main political positions in the post-Franco era and approved by the non-democratic chamber of the Franco regime.
The need for widespread parliamentary consensus to approve the reform and the advisability of independent electoral organisations intervening in its implementation, or at least having a say, has already been discussed in a previous section (see Creation and Amendment Process).
One final matter regarding the subjects of the reform is the advisability or need for a reform of this kind to be approved by the majority of the electorate in a referendum. It is evident that the electoral law must have maximum legal rank, because of its material relevance, as well as the advisability of reinforcing its stability and permanence also in a symbolic manner. But the internal logic of a representative democratic system neither demands the endorsement of that which has been agreed upon by the freely elected representatives of the people by means of a subsequent referendum, nor it is always recommended to thus aim for the reinforcement of its legitimacy. This can hardly be considered in experiences such as those in numerous African countries (Mozambique, Uganda, etc.) whose transition to a democratic regime has included a simultaneous effort to carry out a census, the law, the administration and the first electoral process. On the contrary, a process such as the Spanish political reform was indeed reinforced by a referendum that provided the proposed procedure with the legitimising support which the reformist government that promoted it lacked.
