If electoral laws essentially regulate a procedure, the one employed in the electoral reform is
of fundamental importance, for the material result of the reform as well as for its acceptance
by the political forces and the voters in general. The basic features that should rule in a
process of this nature, have already been set out: the greatest possible consensus among
the political forces, transparency, clarity on its objectives, consistency in the
results and swiftness in the finalisation of the reform.
The specific manifestations of each one would obviously vary, depending on the socio-political
conditions of the country and the reform strategy it adopts. A reform process which is not
very ambitious, that seeks only to modify the indispensable elements of the electoral system
as fast as possible to provide the country with a constitution or to legitimise its legislative
and executive powers (the case, for example, of the Ukraine and other states that split away
from the former Soviet Union), runs more risks of internal inconsistency and lack of consensus
in the ultimate scope of the reform, than one that develops a democratic political system
completely from scratch. The same can be said about countries that endeavour to reinforce or to
intensify the already existing democratic elements without a constitutional break-up (of which the 1996 Mexican reform is a
good example), as opposed to those which recover or build
democratic systems from regimes that were not (the case in the majority of the Central
European states after the fall of the wall of Berlin).
But in all the cases one factor is especially relevant: the speed with which a reform aimed
at modifying the electoral system, must be finalised. Because of the consequences of the uncertainty on the transparency and the
real ends of the process, as well as an unstoppable discrediting factor that the
existing system would go through from the moment its reform is commenced - or announced, a reform of this nature cannot
be drawn out by periods that would not seem too long for similar reforms to
a legal system.
The requirement of consensus does not need much explanation: the electoral system
establishes the basic rules of the game in the political system and it must have stability, otherwise an acceptably effective Government will not be possible. Overall agreement must therefore exist among the main participants. This does however not prevent discrepancies that
may seem essential (e.g., on the majority or proportional nature, as is revealed in countries
as stable as France and the United Kingdom), because there is a peaceful agreement on the
rules that must govern in the event of any reform.
Clarity on the objectives is definitely a prerequisite for consensus. Reforms such as that of the
Peruvian Constitution of 1994, are considerably weakened by the perception, within the
opposition and among the public, that their purpose was to permit the renovation of the mandate - and the reinforcement of the powers - of the president that instigated the reform, rather than
other ends of a more general nature. The successive, gradual reforms in Morocco displayed
a lack of a precise programme and a schedule that spelt out their ultimate ends.
Transparency is the result of an accumulation of factors, among others, the designation of the
material creators of the rules to be applied, the way in which the work is done and whether the inevitable (and necessary, in the interests
of consensus) contribution of the criteria of the basic political forces is opaque or out in the open.
All of them are favoured by relative speed in the process: a reform that is dragged out
over years, can probably no longer be perceived as a genuine desire towards democratisation, as
the Tanzanian experience has proved.
The internal consistency of the new law, without internal contradictions like those in the legislation of the Ukraine pointed out above, without ambiguities (for example regarding the
recognition of the democratic political parties) and with a reasonable aim towards
permanency, is the best guarantee of acceptance and stability. There are no surer rules than
those exposed, as proved by the success of processes as radically opposite as the Spanish
process of 1977/78 and the Central European processes subsequent to the Velvet Revolution:
the unequivocal will to democratise, clear in its objectives; reasonable consensus among the
political forces; popular and international support, where this existed; transparency and
speed in the process and consistency in the results.
