It would not be trifling to warn that the first requirement regarding the object of a reform process is to clearly define right from the start, what
the purpose is and what result should emerge from it (a new general electoral law, the procedures that regulate a constitutional
referendum, a law and the necessary administrative organ to carry out elections, etc.).
The issue, in this respect, is not what purpose will drive a government to undertake it, which might be limited to aiming for its re-election with
the electoral system that it considers most favourable, but the clear determination of the objective of the reform. This will avoid that it is
dragged out unnecessarily, that the achievement of an agreement becomes infinitely complicated or the that acceptance of change on the
part of the citizens and the political agents is invalidated right from the start.
Minor modifications of a technical nature are relatively frequent in electoral laws, largely because they have to be so detailed and accurate,
that they turn out to be inelastic and require continuous small adjustments. But prior specification of the objective of a reform is
indispensable when it affects essential elements of the electoral system. Take the commission recently established to study a possible
modification of the British electoral system, towards a more proportional representation: the Conservative party, historically the party that has
benefited most from the current majority system, received the constitution of the commission with the warning that a proportional system
would disfigure the British political system to the point of ruining it altogether.
A third aspect relevant to the object of the reform is whether it should be limited to the reform of the electoral law or whether it should be
extended to the procedures that regulate other elements of the system: the political parties, their funding or even the media. As a general
criterion, reforms that do not heed all the aspects that intervene in the process will presumably have more problems, derived from internal
inconsistencies. The reform must contain all the essential aspects, without leaving excessive margins for regulations on execution either.
Experiences in countries such as Kenya, Gabon and the Ukraine, that opted for a quick reform, limited to the most pressing aspects of the
electoral system and that subsequently had problems both with the effective operation and the acceptance of the legitimacy of the electoral
system thus modified, can be put forward in favour of this criterion.
The countries quoted are examples of a minimalist strategy in their electoral reform: the kind that aims for a fast and more controlled reform
by the government that steers it, limiting the changes to aspects that are most immediately necessary for elections to be held. The results
have been encumbered by problems of internal coherence between the reformed parts and those subsisting from the previous
non-democratic system and have left a large part of the public opinion unsatisfied, insofar as, in such cases an electoral reform has a
symbolic content that demands substantial visible modifications.
