The exclusion of persons holding certain public offices or posts can be due to vastly different reasons.
In some instances it is to keep certain state functions out of political disputes that are declared in competitive elections of a general nature. Such is the case of exclusion of kings and their heirs, up to a certain degree, or of court officials or members of organs in charge of constitutional matters.
One particular case is that in legal systems, judges and magistrates form part of a civil service career. This is to assure their neutrality in the exercise of public power, which is why they are sometimes compelled to take leave of absence from judicial work before being able to stand as a candidates, or even for a certain period of time following their term of duty if elected, or after the elections, should they not have been elected.
The prohibition on standing for parliamentary or presidential elections also affects those who hold certain positions or fulfil public functions, to guarantee their neutrality (and the appearance of neutrality) or to prevent the abuse of their functions, with variations in each system. Obviously, it is not possible to try to stop civil servants from participating as voters or
citizens in the electoral processes, as was often the case in the nineteenth century. But the limitation with regard to the right to passive suffrage is
maintained. This rule, which is also applied to those who have been appointed to public positions implying political confidence within the administration, does not normally apply to members of the government, in which their capacity as members of the government outweighs their responsibility in charge of the former.
Attention should also be paid to the case of active military officials, who are subject to some reinforced limitations compared to civil servants. In the latter case the limitation is reduced to a temporary leave of absence, but the general rule in the case of military officers is that they have to leave active service for good before being able to present their candidacies. They are, therefore, deprived of all possibilities of resuming their military careers again. This limitation is aimed at guaranteeing the subjective neutrality of anyone forming part of the armies, as well as the necessary objective neutrality in an institution that must also steer clear of general political conflicts.
Another limitation is the one affecting those who have already held the presidency for a certain number of terms. It appears in systems in which the presidency has merely had representative or moderating attributes (Italy, Germany), as well as in presidential systems in which the president, as head of the executive power, is one of the key figures of the political power. In some cases, even re-election is forbidden (Mexico); in others, the possible
number of terms is limited to two (the United States of America) or holding office for more than one or two terms consecutively. The origin of this limitation can be found in the configuration of presidential powers in the emergence of republican systems, in contrast to the executive power that was vested in a monarch, without any further temporary limit than the lifetime of each monarch.
However, the possibility of successive re-election is common in presidential
regimes whose democracy is doubtful, so the executive power in fact becomes lifelong. This was the case in various South American countries at different times in history, as in Paraguay, for example, during the Stroessner regime. Along the same lines, constitutional reforms that increase the possibility of successive presidential terms in countries where the head of state holds extensive powers may be cause for concern.
A lateral manifestation of this prohibition on re-election, is that, to a certain degree, relatives of a previous president are forbidden from standing as a candidate for the presidency in numerous presidential states (Mexico, Bolivia, etc.).
Finally, some limitations on the right to passive suffrage based on social or historical peculiarities still exist. Priests or other religious figures are often excluded in countries where one or several faiths historically had great influence or actively participated in social and political conflicts. Historically, the French Revolution or the influential Soviet regimes can be recalled. This is also the case with many Latin American constitutions (among others, Mexico, El Salvador, Ecuador, Paraguay, Honduras, Bolivia and Guatemala), perpetuating a 19th century Spanish tradition. On the other hand, there are the theocratic regimes, although these elections (and, by implication, the regimes themselves) can hardly be considered democratic.
Yet, numerous Latin American constitutions stipulate the prohibition of passive suffrage to anyone who may have actively participated in armed revolts against constitutional governments or in de facto governments and dictatorships that emerged from the success of such revolts. An example of this is article 186 of the Guatemalan Constitution of 1985. Such exclusion is absolutely justified from the point of view of values, but it is not easy to find one sole conclusion encompassing all the historical and political peculiarities of each case. In this regard, the inevitable need to classify the conditions of democratic restoration in cases where it is produced by means of an agreed transition (Chile), or the social or political support manifested afterwards in some democratic elections in other countries (the case of Hugo Banzer in Bolivia) may be kept in mind.
