One of the areas of electoral regulations that most clearly shows the need for public control on equal opportunities is the finances of the political parties during an electoral campaign, perhaps more important than at other times (see Public Financing). This control is reflected in the following:
Control and limitation of private contributions. The establishment of quantitative limits on contributions made to electoral campaigns is very common (e.g., in the United States US$1,000 per campaign, per candidate). Funding by public companies or companies with public shares, as well as states, organisations, companies and foreign citizens is also forbidden. Some regulations encompass more specific cases, such as the present prohibition in the Russian regulations applied to religious denominations. Coincidentally, anonymous cash donations are usually forbidden or limited to very small amounts. Donations have to be public, and it is considered that contenders have the right to know who finances each candidacy and to what extent. Within certain limits, contributions are tax deductible in many countries to encourage private donations (among others, the United States, Germany, Canada, Switzerland, Belgium) or donations from estates (United Kingdom). This is also possible for companies in countries such as Holland and France.
Limitations on private contributions do not, however, mean their prohibition. On the contrary, there are meaningful examples within the sphere of the former Eastern European countries (e.g., Kazakhstan and Bulgaria) where this rule, combined with the granting of equal amounts of public funds to
each contender, theoretically aimed at safeguarding the equality of the
contenders, in practice gave rise to a marked inequality in favour of the ex-
communist parties in power, as the amounts in question were very small.
The distribution of public contributions according to pre-set, objective, and reasonable criteria. These contributions may consist of a direct subsidy by the State for specific activities, or the payment, under specific conditions and with prior public control, of the electoral expenses incurred, which in turn, implies a legal definition of the latter. In many countries, in addition to this electoral aid, ordinary activities of the political parties are also funded, normally in proportion to their parliamentary representation in the annual budget. It is not uncommon for this percentage of subsidies to the parties to represent over fifty per cent of their annual budgets. An overall view of public financing in 17 western countries is shown in the
following chart:
|
Country |
Political Party |
Parliamentary Groups |
Annually |
Electoral Campaigns |
> 50% budget party |
Other than financial |
|
Germany |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
Australia |
X |
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
Austria |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
Belgium |
X |
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
Canada |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
X |
|
Denmark |
X |
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
Spain |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
U.S. |
X |
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
France |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
X |
|
Holland |
X |
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
Ireland |
X |
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
Italy |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
Japan |
X |
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
Norway |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
X |
|
U.K. |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
X |
|
Sweden |
X |
|
|
X |
X |
X |
|
Switzerland |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
X |
Establishing a limit on electoral expenses permitted for an electoral campaign. In spite of the fact that the first examples of limitation on electoral expenses of parties date back to England at the end of the nineteenth century, these measures more recently have been generalised in electoral regulations. They are aimed rather at trying to curb the excessive costs of the campaigns in the context of more or less frequent scandals related to irregularities in the financing of political parties.
So, in reality these procedures should be seen more as a kind of pact of self-restraint (though often disregarded) among the main parties, than from a view of permitting the participation of political groups with less economic resources.
In spite of this practice being widespread, experience shows that the imposition of unreasonably low limits, such as those established for the presidential elections in Russia (see Problems in the Regulations on Electoral Funding in Russia), becomes a real invitation to illegal financing of political parties, which should be taken into account when it comes to regulating this matter.
On the other hand, an indirect but very effective procedure to limit electoral expenses is the reduction of the campaign period which is in keeping with the new reality of mass media. There is a certain trend towards a campaign lasting two weeks, which continues to be considered the minimum essential period of time.
Consequently, a number of specific control mechanisms for party finances during electoral periods are necessary, including:
- the need for ad hoc electoral accounts
- the appointment of electoral administrators
- more incisive public mechanisms for the control of these funds
- the possibility of administrative and/or criminal sanctions stemming from the violation of the procedures set forth
Among these sanctions, the naming of the candidate can even be nullified, as can the results obtained in the election by the candidacy in question, along with possible disqualification to participate in future elections. All this can happen, in addition to the accounting or criminal prosecutions that may ensue and, in the less serious cases, a proportional reduction of public subsidies.
The organisations entrusted with the control of electoral finances of the parties can be the electoral organisations themselves, as occurs in the majority of the Anglo-Saxon as well as the Central and South American countries (see Regulation/Oversight of Campaign Finance). However, there is no shortage of models that grant such jurisdiction to parliamentary bodies (Germany, Italy and Spain, among others) or even to an organisation run by the executive or judiciary (United States and Austria).
