In structuring political representation, it is not easy to establish general conclusions regarding the value that should be attributed to factors--probably opposed--of personal, or individual, representation and the representation of groups.
According to the argument generally put forward in favour of positive discrimination measures and multicultural views, it might be that placing
all the weight on equal representation will not be the perfect solution, except in highly homogeneous societies.
However, the principles of 'one person, one vote' and the equality of citizens in the eyes of the law is part of the finest democratic traditions since the French and American Revolutions, serving as the weapon that ended representation based on the class strata of society. The principle's current value and force are beyond any doubt, and it should continue to be the essential element of representation. In the majority of countries, adjustments due to the reality of the population structure are probably necessary. However, these should be maintained within limits that do not mean a repeal, not even partially, of the consideration of each citizen as an individual holder of rights of a political content.
Indeed, in democratic terms it is not desirable to return to a modern form of representation based on the class structure of society, by means of identifying communities of interest who benefit through positive discrimination that ultimately affects the relative value of the citizens' vote as a whole.
This type of measure might be effective when it comes to integrating communities that were traditionally excluded from the system. The reservation of seats to the Maoris in New Zealand (see Electoral Districts in New Zealand) or the Misquitos on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua have been justified this way. But if they are considered as an instrument for the improvement of the status quo and not as an element that perpetuates the differences, they should be of a clearly transitional nature.
The contrary would imply faking democratic principles as they are conceived
within the liberal tradition. In the latter, the will of the state is the reflection of the will of the citizens as a whole, equal amongst themselves and not an agglomeration of the expressions of intermediate groups made up of citizens by virtue of factors such as race, mother tongue or religion, whose accidental effects on democratic equality it is aimed to overcome and not to perpetuate.
From another point of view, stemming from the constitutional duty of the political parties to work together to form the national will and as privileged instruments of political participation, it is evident that the tendency can and must be to fulfil the task of drawing traditionally under-represented or excluded social groups into the political process, even including quotas in their electoral lists wherever necessary. It will appear that it is in this field of free citizen membership, and not the field of legal impositions, that this scheme of equality should develop.
